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ABSTRACT
The Chinese shipping industry is one of the fastest developing sectors in the Chinese 
economy. However, few studies have explored the changes within it, especially 
concerning its human resource element -  seafarers -  and the newly formed crewing 
agencies through which they are employed. This research seeks to explore the 
contemporary experience of Chinese seafarers and especially how this is impacted by 
the management strategies of Chinese crewing agencies. In doing so, it contributes to 
debates about changes in Chinese society - that is, whether the economic reform has 
led to a new market economy in China.
The idea of the emergence of a modernized, free Chinese seafarer labour market is 
critically examined through research into the employment and labour supply strategies 
of two ship crewing agencies, which have been reformed to different degrees, and the 
experience of the seafarers who work for them. The research utilises qualitative 
methods, with twenty-two managers and fifty seafarers being interviewed extensively, 
supplemented by documentary research. It seeks to explain why China’s seafaring 
labour export is far lower than people have expected.
It is seen that it is difficult to characterise China’s seafarer labour market as a free 
market. The state has limited the liberalization of the market by granting foreign 
manning qualification to less than sixty state-owned crewing agencies. It is seen that 
institutions at higher levels still intervene in the operation of the agencies, with their 
management consequently showing a lack of market orientation to different extents, 
which constrains the development of China’s labour export.
It is also difficult to characterise the movement of Chinese seafarers in the labour 
market as free movement. The argument that Chinese economic reform leads to the 
transformation of Chinese seafarers into freelancers, which implies a substantial 
increase of seafarer export due to the attractiveness of working in foreign shipping 
companies, is too simplistic. In addition, the wages of Chinese seafarers working in 
the global labour market are lower than the international benchmark rates and are not 
necessarily higher than the payments by domestic shipping companies. This weakens 
the willingness of Chinese seafarers to work in foreign shipping companies.
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INTRODUCTION
China’s economy has experienced dramatic growth in the last 30 years. The Chinese 
shipping industry is one of the fastest developing sectors in the Chinese economy. Its 
human resource element -  seafarers -  work onboard ships, both nationally and 
internationally. Although China’s seafarer labour export has been growing since the 
1990s, it is still lower than the expectation of the international shipping industry and 
some academics.
Since the late 1990s, articles in trade papers for the maritime industry have reported 
that China’s seafarer export will increase remarkably (Lloyds list, 1998; 2000a; 
2000b; 2008). In the academic field, Sharma (2002) predicts that China is going to 
emerge as the new leader of the global seafaring labour market after evaluating the 
advantages and drawbacks of China in seafarer export. Wu et al argue for the 
substantial increase of China’s seafarer export by considering the following two 
aspects. On the one hand, they deem that the emergence of the hundreds of crewing 
agencies in the market opens new channels for Chinese seafarers to work onboard 
foreign ships (Wu et al, 2007, pi 5). On the other hand, as a consequence of China’s 
economic reform, the planned employment system in the planned economy period 
was destroyed, and consequently, freelance seafarers who are not signed to any 
agencies or shipping companies have emerged in the shipping industry. Therefore, 
Wu (2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; Wu et al. 2006; Wu et al 2007) argues that Chinese 
seafarers are becoming freelancers, and that they will flood the world’s seafarer 
labour market due to the attractiveness of working in foreign shipping companies 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘trend theory’).
Despite these expectations, the annual export of Chinese seafarers has not increased 
much since 2000, but has remained at around 40,000 each year (Bao and Liu, 2008, 
p380).
In addition, BIMCO/ISF (1995) estimated that China’s seafarer export would increase 
to more than 89,000 by 2000 and to 104,000 by 2005. However, in 2000 and 2005, 
there were only 38,164 and 41,260 Chinese seafarers working in the global labour 
market, representing only 42.8% and 39.7% of the numbers predicted by BIMCO/ISF,
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respectively. In 1999, Li and Wonham argued that BIMCO/ISF had underestimated 
China’s export of its seafarers in the 2000s and that it could be the alternative to the 
Philippines as the largest supplier of global seafaring labour (1999, p299). However, 
China’s seafarer supply represented around one fourth / fifth of the seafarer export of 
the Philippines in both the 1990s and the 2000s (Bao and Liu, 2008, p380; Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration, 2007 a and b).
This thesis seeks to contribute to the discussion as to why the practical supply of 
seafaring labour to the global labour market is lower than expected by casting some 
light on the extent of the reform of China’s seafarer labour market. It provided first­
hand investigation of how seafarers, managers and TU officials evaluate their 
experiences as a result of the management of their crewing agencies and the situation 
of China’s seafarer labour market in the context of Chinese economic reform. Recent 
years have seen an increase in the number of studies of the changes undergone in 
various industries in China (Cooke 2008; Jin et al 2003; Li, 2003; Qian 2004; Rui and 
Tao 2004). However, few of these studies have considered the maritime sector. Again, 
there has been a growing literature on Chinese workers and their opinions (Chan 
2011; Lee, 2007; Zhu et al, 2011). But none of this has been concerned with Chinese 
seafarers. One of the purposes of this thesis is to rectify both of these deficiencies.
The thesis is in four parts. Part One of the thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 
aims at providing a macro social and economic background for the thesis by 
introducing the reform of Chinese enterprises and the shipping industry and 
researchers’ views regarding the reform in China’s seafarer labour market and 
seafarer export. Chapter 2 focuses on the methods applied in the research. Chapter 3 
considers the extent of the liberalization of the Chinese seafarer labour market by 
discussing the development of Chinese crewing agencies of different ownerships and 
their roles in labour export. This provides a background for Part Two and Part Three, 
in which case studies are presented of two Chinese state-owned crewing agencies, 
which have been two of the largest and most influential operators in Chinese foreign 
manning business.
Part Two concentrates on the case study of a subsidiary crewing agency of a state- 
owned shipping company and consists of four chapters. Chapter 4 introduces the
2
history of the agency and investigates the reasons for its lack of autonomy and market 
orientation. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 investigate in detail the impacts on seafarers of the 
agency’s management strategies regarding seafarer export. These are argued to be 
significant elements of the explanation for the failure of the crewing agency to 
effectively exploit the seeming potential of its foreign manning business.
Part Three analyses the case of an independent state-owned crewing agency in three 
chapters. Chapter 8 looks at the agency’s history and considers the reforms of the 
management concerning seafarer’s contracts and material support and the 
consequences to seafarers. Chapter 9 demonstrates how, despite the reforms, the 
interference of the head office has constrained the agency, forcing it to act other than 
in a market-oriented way, which has resulted in low wages for officer seafarers and 
eventually their resignation. Chapter 10 demonstrates how the agency failed to resist 
the resignation of seafarers by looking at the relevant management strategies and the 
impacts on seafarers, and considering the role of the TU in representing seafarers. It 
finally presents the limited increase of the labour export as a result of the shortage of 
officer seafarers since the middle of the 2000s.
Part Four focuses on the impediments to the free movement of seafarers to 
demonstrate that Chinese seafarers are limited in their ability to leave their state- 
owned agencies to become freelancers and that the trend theory, which argues that 
market reform leads to freelance seafarers and thereby brings about a substantial 
increase of seafarer export, is too simplistic. Specifically, Chapter 11 demonstrates 
how seafarers’ dependency on their state-owned companies prevented them from 
becoming freelancers. Chapter 12 explains how institutional barriers restrained 
seafarers from leaving their state-owned agencies to become freelancers. Chapter 13 
explains seafarers’ dissatisfaction with seafaring as a career and why some of them 
left their agencies for land-based jobs instead of becoming freelancers.
The Conclusion discusses some of the possible reasons for the limited increase in 
rates of China’s seafarer export by drawing together the threads from the previous 
chapters.
3
PART ONE 
BACKGROUND AND METHODS
4
Chapter 1:
China’s economic reform, shipping industry reform and seafarer labour export
1.1 The reform of Chinese enterprises
Before the economic reform in China, all political and economic activities were 
strictly planned and directly controlled by the Chinese government. In order to change 
this planning system and improve the economy, economic reform was introduced in 
China towards the end of the 1970s. The whole reform process can be divided into 
three stages, with two themes running through the entire process, namely 1) granting 
authority to state enterprises in their decision-making (this reform mainly took place 
from 1984 to 1992); 2) reconstructing the ownership and structure of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (which occurred mainly after 1992).
The first stage
Between 1979 and 1983, increasing the autonomy of enterprises became the main 
focus of the reform. As a result, SOEs began to maintain a small proportion of their 
profits and to make their own decisions over limited management issues (fang quan 
rang li) (Braun and Warner 2002). However, due to the conflicts between the new 
reform methods and the unreformed system, the effect of the reform at this early stage 
was very limited (Child 1994).
The second stage
In the second reform stage, from 1984 to 1992, the main aim was to deepen the 
reform of power decentralization from the government and authority acquisition of the 
enterprises. An important step was the issuance of the Contract Responsibility System 
(CRS) in the mid-1980s. This system declared the diminished role of the state’s 
administration of enterprises’ business and emphasised the enterprises’ responsibility 
for their economic results. Rooted in the CRS, the director’s responsibility system 
clarified the rights of directors in decision-making and representing the enterprises. 
To legalise the full authority and autonomy granted to the enterprises, the Enterprise 
Law was passed in 1988 and formally implemented in 1993.
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The non-state-owned companies in China made their appearance at this stage (Child 
1994). With the publication of the policy ‘Temporary Regulations on Private Owned 
Enterprises’ in 1988, POEs were allowed to register in China (Lau 1997).
Although foreign invested business was encouraged by the Chinese government in the 
1980s, it was in a limited fashion, in the form of cooperation with SOEs, establishing 
joint venture companies (JVC: Cooke 2005). Reasons for this can be related to two 
aspects. Initially, during the preliminary stage of foreign investment in China, foreign 
investors were not familiar with the operation of Chinese business. Therefore, they 
needed the cooperation of Chinese companies. In addition, the Chinese government 
had its own considerations. On the one hand, the Chinese government welcomed 
foreign capital because of the beneficial consequences. For example, the advanced 
management of foreign companies could be learned by SOEs and COEs; JVCs could 
create more jobs for Chinese workers; JVCs could save those SOEs and COEs that 
could not survive market competition and China could obtain more opportunities to 
enter the international market. On the other hand, the Chinese government hoped to 
control the foreign capital so as to protect the weak Chinese companies and Chinese 
economy. Therefore, joint venture was the main form that foreign capitals were 
operated from the mid-1980 to the beginning of the 1990s (Cooke 2005).
The third stage
The reform of Chinese enterprises has accelerated since the 1990s. This started with 
Deng Xiaoping’s tour of Southern China in 1992. His proposition - ‘developing the 
market economy of Chinese features’ - changed China and Chinese people’s lives. 
With the 14th Party Congress in 1992, key reform measures were implemented, such 
as ‘Modem Enterprise System’ and ‘Group Company System’. The policies were key 
to promoting the reconstruction of the ownership and organizational structure of state 
enterprises. The policies also encouraged SOEs to adopt modem management 
methods and improve their authority and accountability.
To increase the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, a series of reform policies 
concerning the employment system of Chinese workers were carried out. The 
document ‘Three System Reform’, which includes the reform of employment, wage 
distribution and social insurances, was published in 1992. It re-emphasized the
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responsibilities and the full authority of companies for the employment of workers. In 
particular, it encouraged companies to determine the wages, bonuses and other 
managerial affairs of workers by making specific regulations and labour disciplines 
under the regulation of the government (Yueh 2004, p i50). Such changes 
consequently improved workers’ incentives and increased their dependence on 
enterprises (Gallagher 2004). In addition, to reduce the burden of the SOEs as a result 
of their requirement to provide for all aspects of the welfare of workers and managers, 
a social insurance system that consisted of the responsibility of the enterprise, the 
government and the employees was carried out (Gu 2001).
A ‘furlough policy’ (Xia Gang) was implemented in 1994. It aimed at eliminating the 
traditional role of the SOEs and demonstrating to the Chinese workers that the ‘ three 
old irons ’1 had finally been smashed. This policy was facilitated by China’s Labour 
Law, published in 1995. It required employees and employers to sign a contract when 
the employment relationship was established and for the employment period to be 
agreed by both parties. Consequently, companies were able to recruit fixed-term and 
temporary workers flexibly and also to fire workers.
As a result, China’s unemployment rate increased substantially during the period of 
economic restructuring (Giles et al 2005). Around 34 million state-sector employees 
were laid off between 1998 and 2001 (Rawski 2002, p 367). By the end of 2005, there 
were around 8 million unemployed workers in Chinese cities (MOLASS 2006). The 
reforms improved the flexibility of employment but left Chinese workers in a fearful 
position (Blecher 2002; Ding and Warner 2001; Gallagher 2004; Mok et al 2002; 
Warner and Lee 2007).
To establish the market economy in China, non-state-owned enterprises were 
encouraged to participate in the ‘construction of New Socialist China’ and a series of 
policies were implemented to facilitate this. For instance, ‘Grasping the large, letting 
go the small’ (zhua da fangxiao) was carried out in 1992. This policy allowed middle 
and small sized state enterprises to go bankrupt and to be merged and purchased by
1 ‘Three old irons’, i.e. life-time employment (the ‘iron rice bowl’), centrally administered wages (the 
‘iron wage’), and state-controlled appointment and promotion of managerial staff (the ‘iron chair’).
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POEs and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), though the pillar and basic industries 
were still managed by the state (Yueh 2004). As a result, most of the SOEs were no 
longer supported by the government; small and medium SOEs that could not survive 
the market competition were eventually merged / purchased by POEs and FIEs. In
thaddition, in 1997, the shareholding programme became the central theme of the 15 
Party Congress (Yeh 1998). The Chinese government at different levels published 
various preferential policies to attract investments from the private and foreign 
sectors. The non-state companies have grown rapidly since the 1990s (Cooke 2006).
Specifically, the number of POEs increased from 654,531 in 1995 to 1,508,857 in 
1999; the number of FIEs increased by almost 10 times, from 25,389 in the beginning 
of the 1990s to more than 200,000 at the end of the 20th century (Wang 2001, p 6). 
Since 1997, the FIEs have exceeded JVCs in numbers (Yan and Warner 2002, p 1). 
According to Jefferson and Su (2006), from 1997 to 2001, the number of large and 
medium sized JVCs, POEs and FIEs increased from nearly 1,000 to around 6,000, 
while the number of large and medium-sized SOEs decreased from 14,811 to 8,675; 
in 1999, half of all Chinese large and medium sized companies were owned by the 
state and the rest were owned by the non-SOE sectors.
The POEs and FIEs contributed tremendously to the growth of China’s economy. By 
the end of 2008, among the enterprises in China that made annual profits over 
5,000,000 yuan, 79% were non-SOEs (NBSC 2009b). They contributed to 77% of the 
production profits of all enterprises in China (SSN 2010). In addition, they absorbed
12.5 million laid-off workers in urban cities in 2005 (Knight and Li 2006, p i04) and 
employed 41.4% of Chinese workers in cities and towns in 2008 (NBSC 2009c).
The reform policies have brought significant changes to the structure of China’s 
industry, which have attracted the attention of scholars.
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1.2 Research into Chinese industries and Chinese workers in the context of the 
Chinese economic reform
China’s economic reform has brought about the rapid development of the Chinese 
industries. Some researchers have documented what has been happening since 1979. 
A common theme identified from their studies is that while Chinese industries have 
achieved significant successes since the economic reform, they face critical 
challenges.
Cooke (2008) looks at the Automotive Industry in China. It is seen that as a result of 
the economic reform, the Chinese auto industry has been opened to cooperation with 
foreign enterprises through the mode of joint ventures since the mid-1980s. The 
foreign auto manufacturers have brought new technology and modem management 
strategies into the Chinese auto industry, which significantly improved its production 
capacity and market competitiveness (Qian 2004). By 2005, China had become the 
second largest auto manufacturing country in the world. However, the economic 
reform has also brought challenges to the auto industry, especially considering the 
fierce competition between Chinese and foreign auto enterprises for domestic and 
international auto markets. In addition, with the growth of the Chinese auto industry, 
the Chinese government’s protection of the industry has been much reduced, 
weakening the competitiveness of the immature Chinese auto industry in the global 
market (Cooke 2008; Li and Zhang 2005; Qian 2004). Furthermore, compared with 
the global leading auto manufacturers, the Chinese auto industry is at a disadvantage 
in terms of developing domestic brand products, developing strategic alliance with 
multinational companies, acquiring brand-name international auto firms, attracting 
and retaining talents and strategic downsizing the enterprises and plants (Cooke 2008; 
Li and Yang 2005; Li and Zhang 2005).
In contrast to the Chinese auto industry, the pharmaceutical industry in China receives 
protection and support from the government (Rui and Tao 2004). The Chinese 
pharmaceutical market has become one of the fastest-growing pharmaceutical markets 
in the world as a result of the implementation of a series of reform policies (Cooke 
2008). For instance, Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises operate under a number of 
laws and regulations that are based on the updated international standards (Li 2002).
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In addition, the biological R&D in Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises is much 
advanced due to large investments from the Chinese government and foreign 
companies (Li 2002). Moreover, Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises learn new 
technology, operational styles and management standards and philosophy through 
cooperating with foreign enterprises (Li 2003; Yeung 2002). Furthermore, the 
international competitiveness of large domestic pharmaceutical companies has 
improved due to the reform, which has forced the industry to consolidate through 
closure or merger/acquisition of firms (Jin et al. 2003). Like the Chinese auto 
industry, the pharmaceutical industry in China faces strong competition from foreign 
multinational companies in both the Chinese and the global pharmaceutical market 
(Cooke 2008). The problems, such as small firm size and low level of specialization, 
low technology level and lack of new products, low level of R&D and inadequate 
protection of intellectual property right, constrain the growth of the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry (Buo 2004; Cooke 2008; Li 2003; Wang et al. 2003).
Researchers such as Cooke (2008), Jin et al (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) discuss the 
development of the Chinese retail industry since the economic reform. The retail 
industry has a long history in China. Due to the economic reform, the industry has 
become open to fierce competition from foreign retail enterprises that are now 
expanding their retail chains rapidly in China. In response, Chinese large retail 
enterprises adopt the strategy of merger/acquisition to grow stronger. In addition, 
some smaller domestic retail companies have formed networks to share supply and 
distribution resources to improve their competitiveness (Jin et al 2003; Wang et al. 
2004). However, the Chinese retail enterprises face the problems such as small 
enterprise size and small operation scale, the shortage of skilled workforce, low level 
of technological innovation, the brain drain of talent and the rapid expansion of 
foreign retail chains in China. This makes it difficult for the Chinese retail firms to 
compete against foreign retail giants (Cooke 2005; Wang et al. 2004).
Some researchers explore the effects of the economic reform on new industries, such 
as the IT industry, which is significant to China’s international competitiveness in the 
current and future period. The IT industry has expanded rapidly in China since the 
1980s and some Chinese IT firms have now become giant competitors in the global 
market due to the successful reform of the industry, such as attracting foreign firms
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for their advanced technology and investment, promoting exports by cooperating with 
multinational companies, the Chinese government’s support of the development of 
R&D and the state’s strategic protection of the IT industry (Kraenen and Dedrick 
2001; Lai et al 2005; Rui and Tao 2004). However, the competition between Chinese 
and foreign enterprises, the small sizes of Chinese computer companies and the lack 
of IT engineers and technicians seriously constrain the development of the Chinese IT 
industry (Cooke 2008; Rui and Tao 2004).
Nolan and Zhang (2003) investigate the global competitiveness of large Chinese firms 
in the oil and aerospace sectors. Facing global competition, PetroChina and Sinopec 
are at a disadvantage in terms of the quantity of oil and gas reserves, technology and 
financial strength and the need to introduce a cohesive corporate culture in order to 
establish a unified company. China’s Aviation Industries have failed to develop into 
dominant, world-leading leading corporations. The authors conclude that although 
China’s leading firms have achieved significant successes, they have faced fierce 
competition at the global level and China’s leading firms are in a highly vulnerable 
position.
A group of researchers also pay attention to the operation of Chinese enterprises 
across different industries to explore the changes in the workplace due to the 
economic reforms. A common theme identified from their studies is that the direct 
intervention of the government in Chinese enterprises has declined, while increasing 
profits and competitiveness have become the goal of the Chinese firms.
For instance, by studying the changes in management and the experiences of the 
workers in three Chinese enterprises, Zhu et al (2011, p21) conclude that:
We can see that the transformation of SOEs into different systems has clearly 
brought a higher degree of dynamism, such as in the adoption of market-driven 
management systems and developing new products and markets. Such changes, 
we would argue, are likely to lead to better performance outcomes.
Based on the analysis of the ethnographies of different Chinese industries, Lee (2007) 
argues that as a result of the economic reform, the Chinese government regulates
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enterprises from the outside through laws and regulations, rather than from within the 
workplace. In addition, workers are largely subjected to the management of the 
companies and the market forces of supply and demand, rather than political control 
produced by the state.
When discussing strikes among Chinese workers, Chan (2011) identifies the weak 
intervention of the government on enterprises:
The Chinese government does not normally resort to direct administrative 
intervention to get employers to provide a better deal for workers (2011, p48).
Therefore, the economic reform in China has advanced the reform and development 
of Chinese industries. Though researchers have documented this by studying various 
industries, few of the studies have looked at the Chinese shipping industry, which was 
one of the first industries to be opened to foreign business by the Chinese government 
and has significant importance to China’s economy (the studies are introduced later). 
In particular, there are very few studies of the Chinese ship crewing agencies.
In addition to exploring the changes in the industries, some researchers pay attention 
to the experiences of workers as a result of the social and economic transformation in 
China.
Friedman and Lee (2010) look at the changes to the structure of Chinese employment 
as a result of the 30 years of economic reform and the consequences for Chinese 
workers. They find that the Chinese employment relations have been characterized by 
commodification, with the implementation of labour contracts, and by casualization, 
with the increasing percentage of employment opportunities appearing in capitalized 
companies, including both private and state-owned enterprises that have been 
reformed to more closely resemble their privately owned competitors (Friedman and 
Lee 2010, p529). The interests of capital are taken as hegemonic by the state and it 
confers individualized legal rights on workers, rather than collective rights of free 
association. As a result, workers’ protests in China are cellularised; laws are seen to 
be un-enforced; and the labour conditions for Chinese workers have declined.
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Chan (2011) analyses workers’ strikes, in particular those that happened in footwear 
factories managed and owned by Taiwanese companies. It is seen that when 
confronted with workers’ strikes, the state individualizes the disputes and deals with 
the problems through the arbitration and court systems. Under such a mechanism, 
workers in China react only when their minimal legal rights are being violated. Chan 
argues that most of the industrial protests in China are still at the stage of simply 
seeking to protect workers’ minimum legal rights, rather than to advance their 
interests. Chinese workers’ rights and interests are not effectively protected.
Zhu et al (2011) look at the transformation of the Chinese SOEs into enterprises with 
new ownership models, particularly the consequences to the management and to 
workers’ rights. They conclude that workers’ rights have been improved through the 
practices of the various HRM strategies, such as employees’ participation schemes, 
skill training, performance-linked incentives, etc. However, the management is so 
powerful that workers are not effectively represented by their TUs and workers’ 
collective voices are not heard. Bearing such problems in mind, it may be difficult to 
assume that China can establish a harmonious relationship between labour and 
management when it prioritises the interests of capital to boost the Chinese economy.
Cooke and He (2010) consider the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in thirty-one textile and apparel enterprises in southern China. They find that working 
standards have not improved as a consequence of the CSR practices. This is because 
the companies pay attention to the marketplace activities when they implement the 
CSR practices, rather than to issues of labour standards such as health and safety 
provisions and social security contributions. In addition, workers are not involved in 
the implementation of companies’ CRS activities.
Lee (2007) shows that as a result of the economic reform, Chinese workers are 
deprived of guaranteed life-long employment and welfare provision and are faced 
with ‘economic insecurity and normative uncertainty’ (Lee 2007, p7). The Chinese 
workplace is no longer a political site for the state to foster clientelism or exert 
ideological and political control, but is now a place of ‘pervasive presence of conflict 
and cynicism, even alienation’ (Lee 2007, p4).
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This point is the common theme that Lee identifies from a number of ethnographies of 
different industries in her edited book (Lee 2007). For instance, Chan (2007) pays 
attention to the life of service workers, particularly people selling life insurance, 
which is a new profession in China. Chan finds that the sales agents experience 
constant anxiety about their incomes and job security because of the commission- 
based sales system (Chan 2007, p244). Michelson (2007) studies the legal profession 
in China. It is seen that Chinese legal professionals are faced with job insecurity, low 
prestige and financial pressure. This is taken as one of the reasons why Chinese 
workers’ legal rights cannot be protected.
Zheng’s (2007) ethnography of China’s Karaoke sex industry explores the 
exploitative working experiences of the hostesses (most of whom are young peasant 
women) in relation to violent gangs, abusive bosses, madams and state agents that 
condemn the erotic company of hostesses as ‘cultural trash that destabilize state rule 
and socialist system’ (2007, pl30). Zheng’s analyses show that the reason why young 
rural women become hostesses, subject to the abusive and violent working 
environment, is that these women hope to gain equal status with urban residents, 
living in better social and economic condition. Hostesses’ experiences reflect the 
limited occupational opportunities for the peasant women in the urban cities due to the 
dualism of urban-rural resident identities under the hukou system in China.
Ross (2007) focuses on the life of workers in the IT industry in Shanghai, especially 
those who are outsourced, working for foreign companies. Ross finds that without 
established rules in the workplace, the expectations of managers and the 
responsibilities of workers are not set or clarified. Workers in this highly competitive 
industry are asked to take on different kinds of tasks and consequently work under 
great pressure. In the companies, the turnover rates are high; managers and workers 
do not trust each other and the workplaces are full of tension. Kessler’s ethnography 
(2007) of Beijing and Shanghai’s IT companies explores the fact that the engineers 
are considered the ‘technology thieves’ and consequently isolated, distrusted and even 
hated by companies because of companies’ difficulty with the control of proprietary 
information as a result of the high turnover rates of the engineers.
14
Switching the focus from the workers in the Sunbelt region of China to those in the 
Rustbelt, Lee (2007) describes the labour rebellion in the northeast part of China. She 
describes how a large number of workers have mobilized to demand payment of 
pensions and wages in arrears in the mode of ‘cellular activism’. It is found that 
although most of these workers eventually got their wages and pensions, the mode of 
workers’ rebellion failed to challenge the problems within the governmental 
institutions, such as corruption, limited accountability and the lack of rule of law (Lee 
2007, p35).
Therefore, in the process of marketisation, privatisation and the reform of enterprises 
in China, Chinese workers are no longer the masters of the state or the enterprises. 
The workers are confronted with the hegemonic power of the government and 
employers as individuals. Their interests are sacrificed for China’s economic 
development. The Chinese workers have attracted a number of qualitative studies. 
However, here again there has been limited research into the experiences of Chinese 
seafarers.
An important part of the thesis is its documentation of the effects of the economic 
reform on China’s shipping industry and the experiences of Chinese seafarers. 
Initially, it briefly reviews the reform of China’s shipping industry.
1.3 The reform of China’s shipping industry
China’s shipping industry was one of the earliest industries to be opened up in the 
1960s. It grew fast, transforming from almost nothing in the 1950s to a giant in the 
global shipping market today. In this process, the continuous reform of Chinese 
shipping enterprises was an important driving force. Along with the industrial 
transformation, a huge demand for seafaring labour occurred, which has pushed the 
development of China’s seafarer labour market to some extent since the 1990s. This 
section reviews the reforms of China’s shipping industry by looking at the shipping 
enterprises’ reform, the development of the whole shipping industry and the evolution 
of its seafarer labour market. After introducing this context, section 1.4 reviews some 
points made by researchers about the reforms taking place within China’s seafarer 
labour market and the supply of Chinese seafarers to the global labour market.
15
1.3.1 Chinese shipping enterprise reform - the case of COSCO 
At the time of the establishment of P.R. China in 1949, China’s shipping industry was 
virtually non-existent, since few ships were left after the China-Japan War and the 
Civil War. Due to the need to recover foreign trade, in 1951, the Chinese government 
cooperated with a Polish shipping company and established a Chinese-Polish 
Shipping company. However, this was far from enough to support the sustainable 
development of China’s economy. The Chinese government consequently decided to 
accelerate the process of establishing China’s own commercial fleet. In 1961, the first 
state-owned ocean fleet was established and Chinese Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO) was set up at the same time (Song 1990).
During 1960s and 1970s, COSCO grew fast. While it was a small shipping company, 
possessing four ships of 30,000 DWT in 1961, the tonnage of the ships increased to 
5,000,000 in 1975 (COSCO 2010). In addition, it established its five subsidiaries 
between the 1960s and 1970s -  the Guangzhou Subsidiary in 1961, the Shanghai 
Subsidiary in 1964, the Tianjin Subsidiary in 1970, the Qingdao Subsidiary in 1976 
and the Dalian Subsidiary in 1980. Within twenty years, COSCO expanded its 
shipping from Asia to Europe by opening up the first international liner shipping route 
in China in 1967, to Australia in 1978 and to America in 1979: the latter symbolized 
the recovery of the ocean trading relationship between the two countries. Particularly, 
crew manning business in China after 1949 was resumed with COSCO’s supply of its 
seafarers to a Japanese shipping company in 1979 (COSCO 2004).
From 1980 until today, COSCO’s development can be divided roughly into two 
stages, moderate growth and accelerated growth, segregated by the year of 1993. 
From 1979 to 1993, influenced by the Chinese enterprise reform, which aimed to 
transform the SOEs into independent economic entities, the monthly ‘balance 
meeting’ held by the government in Beijing to assign planned shipping tasks to the 
state-owned shipping companies was abandoned (Wan 1990). COSCO was given 
some autonomy in deciding some of its shipping business. In addition, profit making 
became the priority of COSCO’s operation. To emphasise this and clarify the 
company’s responsibility for its own performance, an ‘economic contract’ was signed 
between the COSCO and the higher administrative institution and between COSCO 
and its five subsidiaries. Furthermore, concerning the reform of workers’ employment
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issues, the permanent employment status of some workers was replaced with fixed- 
contract status. Moreover, COSCO itself began to plan and decide workers’ payment. 
It introduced the personal performance salary into the payment structure so as to 
improve the motivation of workers. However, due to the interference of the 
government and very little competition from the shipping market, the extent of the 
reforms was very limited (Shen et al. 2005, p4).
Experiencing slow progress during the 1980s, COSCO speeded up its reform in the 
1990s in the context of the organizational restructure and reform in China. With the 
deepening of the reforms, COSCO became a giant shipping company not only in the 
Chinese shipping market but also in the global market.
On 25th December 1992, in accordance with the Chinese government’s requirement 
on the reform of the ocean shipping system, COSCO was made independent of the 
administration of the Ministry of Communications (MOC). At the same time, the 
National Development and Reform Commission, along with other government 
departments, approved the China Ocean Shipping Company’s change of name to 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company. On 16th February 1993, the Chinese Ocean 
Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO Group) was established in Beijing (COSCO 
2010).
Two years later, guided by the reform policy of establishing a ‘modem enterprise 
system’ and a ‘shareholding enterprise system’, COSCO Group restructured its 
organizations and re-allocated its assets. It aims at achieving operational 
specialization and scale economy, improving the autonomy and accountability of its 
subsidiaries. Since 1997, more than 400 COSCO Group ships, worth more than 50 
billion yuan, were re-allocated among COSCO Group’s subsidiaries. Consequently, 
each of those subsidiaries specialized in one kind of shipping business. The COSCO 
Container Division in Shanghai managed COSCO Group’s container ships and 
specialized in container liner services across the world; COSCO Dalian specialised in 
global tanker shipping business; COSCO Qingdao and other subsidiaries were 
engaged in worldwide dry bulk shipping; COSCO Guangzhou operated not only 
traditional general cargo ships but also special transportation ships (Shen et al 2005 
p4).
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Besides optimising its structure, COSCO Group made efforts to improve its business 
management and to explore more ways of absorbing operation funds. While 
remaining in state ownership, the management, the organizational structure, 
production, operation and decision-making processes were encouraged to learn from 
the western enterprises. A Board of Directors was set up in COSCO Group. It decided 
COSCO Group’s operations and replaced the direct administrative control of the 
government. In addition, with the reform of the investment and merging system in 
China, COSCO Group’s stocks made their appearance on the stock market, including 
Shanghai, America, Singapore and Hong Kong. COSCO obtained wider and more 
flexible sources of funds for its operations (COSCO 2010, COSCO 2004).
COSCO Group’s shipping business has faced intense competition since the late 
1990s. On the one hand, the rate of growth of the Chinese economy was sustained at 
14% annually during those years. This inevitably produced a great demand on the 
growth of the Chinese shipping industry, especially the large state-owned shipping 
companies, to guarantee stable support for a healthy flow of foreign trade. On the 
other hand, a huge number of newly established privately owned and foreign invested 
shipping companies were established in China. By the end of the 1990s, there were 
120 Chinese -  foreign joint venture shipping companies, 18 foreign invested shipping 
companies and 50 foreign companies’ branches, as well as 412 foreign invested 
international freight transport agencies (we will examine whom they employ and on 
what basis later in this chapter). In addition, the world’s top twenty liner shipping 
companies marched into the Chinese shipping market (MOC 2000). These companies 
competed with COSCO Group for shares of the shipping markets, nationally and 
internationally.
To cope with the challenge, COSCO Group cooperated widely with foreign shipping 
companies, signing co-shipping contracts on main, international sailing routes. 
Internally, COSCO Group implemented the international integrity of its business 
organization, operation and information and also attempted to build a global 
cooperation network so that it could be better market-orientated and more capable of 
providing instant, high-quality global customer service. To do so, the China Ocean 
Logistics Company was established in Beijing in 2002, with eight logistics
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subsidiaries. They look at the domestic and global market and provide transport 
services throughout the whole supply chain from procurement to distribution, value- 
added services, multi-mode transport and delivery services, etc. These operations 
undoubtedly strengthen the competitiveness of COSCO Group in the global shipping 
market (COSCO 2004).
To date, the capacity of COSCO Group’s fleet has exceeded 50 million DWTs, and it 
is ranked the world’s second largest. In addition, COSCO Group has been listed in the 
Fortune Global Top 500 (COSCO 2010).
The reform and fast development of the shipping companies of different ownerships 
have contributed greatly to the development of China’s shipping industry.
1.3.2 The fast development of China’s shipping industry
Driven by the reform of Chinese shipping enterprises, the shipping industry has 
become one of the nation’s pillar industries since the 1990s. It supports China’s 
foreign trade through transporting 80-90% of trading goods (Cheng 2008, p 8). It also 
contributes 8%-10% of the national economic output annually (Bao and Liu 2008, p 
371; Liu and Jia 2008, p46). Specifically, the rapid development of the shipping 
industry is reflected in four aspects, as follows.
Firstly: the number of ships in China and the dead weight tonnage (DWT)
By 2009, there were more than 176,900 ships in China, including 164,800 in-land 
river ships, 10,018 domestic coastal-line transport ships and 2,079 merchant deep- 
ocean going ships (MOC 2010). Because of the expansion of the fleet, the DWT of 
Chinese ships has increased by around 10 times since the 1980s (Chart 1.1). In 
particular, the increase in the DWT of public transport vessels was substantial, while 
the private transport vessels’ DWT contributed a small part. This is mainly because 
although thousands of private and foreign owned shipping companies have emerged 
in China since the 1990s, their scale was rather small; many of them were just ‘single 
ship’ companies. Without a long-term plan, they did shipping business when the 
shipping market was flourishing and retreated flexibly when the market was falling. 
They employed temporary seafarers to achieve employment flexibility (Zhao 2002, 
pl 72).
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Chart 1.1 The Growth of the DWT of Chinese Transport Vessels (from 1985 to 
2005)
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Secondly: the ocean freight traffic and the volume of freight handled in China’s sea 
ports
The volumes of freight transported at sea have also increased dramatically. This can 
be seen from the ocean freight traffic (Chart 1.2) and the volumes of freight handled 
in Chinese ports (Chart 1.3), which have increased fivefold since 1990 and tenfold 
since 1985, respectively. From 2003 to 2007, the volume of freight handled in 
Chinese seaports was sustained as the world’s largest (MOC, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007).
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Chart 1.3 Volume of Freight Handled in Major Coastal Ports in 10,000 tons 
(from 1985 to 2005)
350000 n
300000 T
250000 -
200000 -
150000 -
100000 -
50000 -
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Years
Source: NBSC (2009f)
21
Thirdly: the construction of the infrastructure of China’s shipping industry
Along with the rapid increase of the volumes of goods transported at sea, the 
construction of the infrastructure of China’s shipping industry has sustained rapid 
improvement. The fast development of China’s ports construction is one example of 
this. This success was a consequence of the administrative decentralization of the 
Chinese government, which made possible the active participation of POEs and JVEs 
in China’s port construction.
In 1985, after the central government opened 14 coastal cities for the first time since 
1949, the state published preferential policies to encourage the POEs and JVEs to join 
in China’s port construction (Wang et al 2004). However, these policies were not 
implemented until the 1990s due to the intervention of the government (Frankel 
1998). Since the 1990s, POEs and JVEs have contributed significantly to China’s port 
construction. From 1979 to 1992, only fifty seaports were constructed in China. 
However, 185 ports were built in the six years between 1993 and 1999 (Wang et al 
2004, p240). By 2000, 70% of container terminals in China were owned by POEs and 
JVEs; 60% of ports facilities were owned by POEs; over 50% of foreign trade was 
handled at POEs’ terminals (Frankel 1998, p247).
After 2000, the scale of Chinese seaports, especially large ports, increased greatly. In 
2009, there were fourteen large ports in China that could handle more than ten million 
tons’ freight (NBSC 2009f). Because of this, China became the country possessing the 
largest number of large ports in the world. Shanghai port was ranked the largest port 
in terms of total cargo volume in the world from 2004 to 2007. Eight Chinese ports 
were on the list of the twenty largest container ports in the world in 2008, six of which 
were ranked in the top ten. Shanghai Port handled 2449 TEU, was ranked second, 
followed by Hong Kong Port and Shengzhen Port, ranking third and fourth, 
respectively. Another three Chinese ports, Guangzhou, Ningbo and Qingdao ranked 
seventh, eighth and tenth (Lloyd’s List 2008).
Fourthly: the number of new-built berths
In addition, the successful construction of the infrastructure of China’s shipping 
industry has been represented by the fast growing numbers of new-built berths in
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coastal ports, especially after 2000 (Chart 1.4). In 2007, the number o f new-built 
berths reached 211, nearly five times the number in 2001; new-built berths above
10,000 tons showed a faster increase, from 18 in 2001 to 114 in 2007. The fast 
construction of berths, especially those above 10,000 tons, contributed greatly to the 
capacity of China’s seaports to handle freight (Chart 1.5). It is seen that those large 
berths above 10,000 tons represented a significant proportion of the increased 
capacity.
Chart 1.4 The Number of New-Built Berths in China (from 2001 to 2007)
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The fast development o f the shipping industry in China pushed the evolution of 
China’s seafarer labour market.
1.3.3 The emergence and development of China’s seafarer labour market 
The fast development of the shipping industry has produced a huge demand for 
seafaring labour. The number of Chinese seafarers was estimated to grow from
330,0002 in 1998 (Zhao 2000b, pi), to 394,0003 by the end of 2001 (Shen et al 2005,
2 In China, no reliable data about Chinese seafarers can be found. According to Shen et al (2005), the 
seafarers’ trade unions never register seafarers rigorously; and other governmental institutions have 
never made any census of Chinese seafarers. Previous government-published data about seafarers were 
based on the reports of Chinese shipping companies. However, after 1998, due to the restructuring 
reform of Chinese shipping enterprises, many companies no longer reported data to the government 
because many of them were separated from the government and out of its control; at the same time, 
many seafarers were laid off or left companies and many others were under-employed, so it is difficult 
to distinguish between seafarers under different situations. Because of this, it is hard to say whether 
these published data by the government were accurate and comprehensive. Therefore, researchers often 
researched and made their own estimates of the numbers of Chinese seafarers or cited the number 
estimated and researched by other researchers or professionals. This number was cited by Zhao from 
Li’s estimation: Li firstly clarified the definition and status of the seafarers researched and then revised
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p i9) and to around 500,000 by 2007 (Liu and Jia 2008, p53; Cheng 2008). At the 
same time, the seafaring labour market in China has emerged and developed to some 
extent since the 1990s. The process will be reviewed briefly as follows.
Before the economic reform, there was no labour market in China, as all workers were 
assigned by the government to certain work units (danwei) according to the 
government’s plan. In addition, work units had no autonomy to make decisions 
regarding workers’ employment issues because these were also centrally controlled by 
the government. The employment relationship between work units and workers before 
the economic reform was characterized by life tenure and stability (the iron rice bowl: 
Warner and Zhu 2000).
Since the economic reform in China, and especially since the 1990s, the evolution of 
the Chinese seafaring labour market was pushed forward by several main forces. The 
first and foremost was the reform of the Chinese economy, because of which the 
central government replaced the planned workers’ assignment mechanism with a free, 
two-way selection system between employees and employers. The second force was 
the reform of shipping companies, especially the emergence and development of POE 
and FIE, which produced a huge demand on seafaring labour, who were employed 
based on fixed-term contracts. The third force was the implementation of the Labour 
Law in 1995, which enabled SOEs that possessed most of the seafaring labour before 
1995 to fire workers, ‘liberalizing’ Chinese workers from traditional life-long 
employment status and enabling employment based on fixed-term contracts (Shen et 
al 2005).
and estimated available data published by the government by using statistical skills
3 This number was estimated by Zhao according to the number in the Chinese Seafarers’ Service Book. 
This was mainly because during her research it was found that the numbers given by the same 
government department were contradictory. The Seafarer Administration department of the Ministry of 
Communications of P.R. China reported that by the end of 2000, there were 492,972 ocean seafarers, 
while in the report, “2000 China’s shipping report”, published by the same institution, the Ministry of 
Communications of P.R. China, it was reported that by the end of 2000, there were around 380.000 
seafarers. The difference was more than 110,000. Although the researcher tried to explore the reasons 
for this discrepancy, nobody could give proper explanations. Therefore it was impossible to estimate 
which number was the more reasonable. Ultimately, the researchers estimated the number themselves.
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Based on these main forces, hundreds of crewing agencies were set up, engaging in 
the business of allocating labour resources to meet the demands of shipping 
companies. Many seafarers were involved in the distribution process. With the 
opening of a global seafaring labour market to China, Chinese seafarers are no longer 
limited to working for shipping companies within China, but can in principle join the 
global market, working onboard foreign ships.
China’s foreign manning business started with the deployment of 29 seafarers from 
COSCO working onboard a Japanese ship in 1979 (COSCO 2004). The supply of 
Chinese seafarers to the global labour market has been improving since the 1990s. 
From 1992 to 2006, it underwent a 400 per cent increase (Chart 1.6).
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Despite this fast growth, Chinese seafarers who worked in the global labour market 
represented only 6.1 per cent of the seafaring labour in the global labour market in 
2003, which was less than a quarter of the number of Filipino seafarers (27.8%: Ellis 
and Sampson 2008, p i4).
The scale of Chinese seafarer export is also much lower than expectations by the 
international shipping industry and foreign academia. BIMCO/ISF (1995) estimated 
that the supply of Chinese crew to the global market would reach more than 89,000 in 
2000 and by 2005 it would flood the world seafaring labour market with 104,000. 
However, Chart 1.7 represents the differences between the BIMCO/ISF’s prediction 
and the actual numbers.
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Some researchers have even argued that Chinese seafarers were going to march into 
the international labour market with such great strength that they might even replace 
Filipino seafarers (Li and Wonham 1999, p299). However, this is far from the truth 
(Chart 1.8).
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Chart 1.8 The Numbers of Filipino Seafarers and Chinese Seafarers Working in 
the Globla Labour Market (from 1992 to 2006)
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Since the 1990s, there has been a debate concerning China’s seafarer labour export. 
Some researchers have contributed to this discussion. In the next section, the key 
ideas of the main authors will be discussed.
1.4 The idea of ‘going global’
1.4.1 The views from the shipping industry
With the economic reform in China, there has been a perception in the international 
shipping industry, which became popular as early as the 1990s, that Chinese seafarers 
would flood the world’s seafaring labour market.
In 1998, a conference reporting China’s progress in manning foreign ships was held in 
Qingdao City, China. After the conference, many industrial professionals from 
different countries were impressed by the “calibre of Chinese seafarers emerging” 
(Lloyd's List 1998). In particular, the words of Tony Lane, who was at the conference, 
were quoted in this article:
29
I have the impression from this conference that more and more firms are willing 
to try the Chinese out. I know from at least one large shipping company here 
that they are ready to sign up now.
Another article (Lloyd's List 2000a) also claimed that “AFTER many a false dawn, 
China is finally beginning to emerge as a major labour-supplying country....”
Mr Sherwood, the managing director of Delta Marine, said in 2000 after his company 
investigated Chinese seafaring labour market for two years, “I think the potential 
market is huge. But that is something for the future... I do not think it is a bottomless 
pit, but it is going to develop into a very important source.’’(Lloyd's List 2000c).
A similar point was also reflected by Lloyd’s List (2000b), which claimed that 
China’s seafarer export would increase quickly in the near future.
Despite the discussions from the industry, very few researchers have discussed the 
supply of Chinese seafarers to the global seafaring labour market or the reform of 
China’s seafarer labour market. Nevertheless, there has been debate in the literature. 
On the one hand, researchers like Shen, et al (2005) and Zhao (2000b; 2002) see that 
it is difficult to predict that the Chinese seafarer export will increase substantially, due 
to many constraints. On the other hand, Li and Wonham (1999), Sharma (2002), Wu 
(2003; 2004a; b; Wu et al 2007) argue that China will hopefully become the top 
supplier of seafaring labour to the global labour market.
1.4.2 The views from the academic field
Shen, et al (2005)4 discuss the reform of China’s seafarer labour market and identify 
some problems. Firstly, the mechanism of the market is far from sound, mainly 
reflected by the weak social security system and the unregulated, messy market. 
Secondly, the employers of Chinese seafarers - the Chinese shipping companies and 
crewing agencies -  act unprofessionally and lack market-orientation; Chinese
4 This book is based on a research project funded by Seafarers International Research Center, Cardiff 
University and collaborated between Sociology Department of Shanghai University and SIRC.
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seafarers lack the ability to bargain and are heavily dependent on their state-owned 
companies. Thirdly, the reputation of seafaring has declined and seafarers’ social 
status has decreased with the development of China’s economy. In light of these 
problems, Shen, et al concluded that the supply of Chinese seafarers to the global 
labour market would not increase substantially in the coming years (2005, p 186).
Zhao (2000b; 2002) discusses the reform of China’s seafarer labour market. She notes 
that some state-owned crewing agencies lack reform and seafarers’ flow in the labour 
market is limited. In addition, there is no adequate regulation or administration 
concerning the employment of Chinese seafarers onboard foreign ships. These papers 
highlight that the development of China’s seafarer export can be influenced by 
complex factors, such as the development of the social security system in China, the 
English ability of Chinese seafarers and the dynamics of the world seafarers’ labour 
market. There is no simple answer when considering the nature of Chinese seafarers 
on the world market. There are chances but also challenges. In this thesis, we will put 
forward arguments in favour of this more cautious interpretation.
There are different views, however. Some researchers argue that the export of Chinese 
seafaring labour will increase significantly. Li and Wonham (1999) evaluate the 
report of BIMCO/ISF (1995) and suggest that it has underestimated the supply of 
Chinese seafarers to the global labour market (though the report has already 
exaggerated the scale of the export, as we have seen from Chart 1.7). The authors 
argue that China “is a potential alternative to Filipino as a major supplier of seafarers” 
(Li and Wonham 1999, p299) and that this potential can be realized by improving the 
English standards and skills of Chinese seafarers through cooperation between China 
and foreign shipping companies in Chinese maritime education and training, 
alongside the deepening of China’s economic reform.
Sharma (2002) argues that China is going to emerge as the new leader of the global 
seafaring labour market. He explains:
The major reasons can be the population of the country, the training infrastructure
and the availability of alternative occupational opportunities. PRC naturally holds
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the lead in all of them to ensure that adequate supply is maintained to the SGLM 
[seafarers’ global labour market] (2002, p21).
Sharma also identifies the main obstacles to the ability of Chinese seafarers to man 
foreign ships, such as their weak English and the low occupational tenure. However, 
the author assumes that these difficulties can be overcome, considering the sound and 
supportive public policy in China, the high initiative of Chinese crewing agencies to 
export to the SGLM, the good training infrastructure and the foreign shipping 
companies’ cooperation with Chinese shipping companies to train and recruit 
seafarers.
In addition, some authors argue for the substantial enlargement of China’s seafarer 
export by assuming that the emergence of the hundreds of independent crewing 
agencies can improve the working opportunities of Chinese seafarers onboard foreign 
ships (Gu 2002; Wu 2004a; Wu et al 2007; Yin et al 2008, p202). For instance, Wu et 
al (2007, p i5) claim that, “The formation and development of crew 
agencies/management companies has opened new channels for freelance seafarers to 
work onboard foreign ships.”
The researchers who take the view that Chinese seafarers will flood the global 
seafarer labour market are faced with the following problems. Initially, they neither 
consider the problems within China’s seafarer labour market deeply nor discuss the 
complexity of the problems (such as the problems identified by Zhao (2000b; 2002) 
and Shen et al (2005) based on the data gathered around the beginning of the 2000s). 
Secondly, though they mention some obstacles to China’s seafarer export, they take it 
for granted that the problems will be solved naturally with the continuing and 
deepening of the economic reform. They also assume that the emergence of hundreds 
of crewing agencies in China means the improvement of seafarer labour export, 
without any evidence or research looking beneath the quantitative data to examine the 
operation of the crewing agencies or their capacity to man foreign ships. Based on 
their argument, therefore, it seems that due to the reform of the Chinese economy, a 
liberalized seafarer labour market has been established, which will lead to an 
accelerated supply of Chinese seafarers to the global labour market.
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The conclusion of this study is different from the above assumption. It is suggested 
that China’s seafarer labour market is not of the kind that people are assuming when 
they think that it has been liberalized and the crewing agencies have been market- 
oriented though ten years of economic reform have passed since Zhao’s research 
(2000b; 2002). This may contribute to the explanation of the limited rate of increase 
of China’s seafarer export.
Indeed, some researchers are not only interested in the reform of the labour market, 
but also pay attention to the impacts of the economic reform on Chinese seafarers. For 
instance, Zhao’s studies (2000a; 2002; 2006) explore the consequence of economic 
reform to seafarers. The discussions refer to the changes in employment relations in 
Chinese shipping companies in general, the creation of social and economic 
differentiation among seafarers of different ranks and positions, and seafarers’ 
working experiences as a result of the reduction of crew size and the fast turnaround 
of the ships. It is concluded that seafarers’ working conditions and welfare treatment 
have deteriorated as a result of the economic reform and economic globalisation.
Zhao’s research also pays attention to particular groups of seafarers, such as women 
seafarers and commissars. She claims that Chinese women seafarers have stopped 
working in navigation since the 1980s and started to work onboard passenger ships as 
waitresses as a result of the economic reform, which implied a lowered position of 
women in the Chinese navigation industry (Zhao 2006). Concerning commissars, it is 
concluded that their role has switched from political propaganda during the planned 
economy to the welfare aspects of the work and life of seafarers at sea as a result of 
economic reform (Zhao 2003; Zhao et al. 2004).
Wu also considers the impacts of the economic reform on seafarers and the 
implications for China’s seafarer export, but from an economic perspective. He 
reaches different conclusions from Zhao (2002, 2000b). Wu argues that the reform of 
China’s economy brings Chinese seafarers the opportunity to work onboard foreign 
ships, which can provide Chinese seafarers with more benefits than they would be 
entitled to onboard domestic ships, such as higher wages, more working opportunities 
and more rational and equal management (Wu 2004a, b; Wu et al. 2006; Wu and 
Morris 2004; Wu et al. 2007). Therefore, he predicts that Chinese seafarers are
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becoming freelancers and will flood the world seafarer labour market due to the 
attractiveness of working onboard foreign ships (Wu 2003; Wu 2004a; b, p i4; 2005; 
Wu et al. 2007).
The benefits claimed for Chinese seafarers as a result of the economic reform and 
economic globalisation explored by Wu may be true. However, this study suggests 
that the consequences to seafarers of the economic transitions are far more 
complicated than the benefits listed by Wu. Implicit in Wu’s thinking is a simple 
model, which is that market reform leads to freelance seafarers, leading to a 
substantial increase of labour export. However, the conclusion of our study suggests 
that this is limited; seafarers are limited in their ability to leave their state-owned 
companies to become freelancers.
The present study seeks to cast some light on the extent of the reform of China’s 
seafarer labour market so as to contribute to the explanation concerning the 
overestimate of the likely progress of seafarer export in China. This is done through 
the pursuit of one major aim, which is to examine the employment and labour supply 
strategies of two state-owned ship crewing agencies, which have been reformed to 
different degrees, and the experience of the seafarers who work for them.
The next chapter explains the research method that was applied to support this aim.
34
C h a p te r  2: M e th o d  o f  th e  r e se a r c h
2.1 General
This thesis mainly employed qualitative research methods. Case studies were 
conducted in two Chinese state-owned crewing agencies (hereinafter referred to as 
Agl and Ag2; the agencies will be introduced in a later part of this chapter) in 
Qingdao City. The analysis in the thesis was based on the data collected from my 
three research trips between June 2007 and September 2008. Seventy-two semi­
structured and in-depth interviews with seafarers and managers were completed 
(thirty-four interviews conducted in Agl; thirty-eight in Ag2). Besides the interviews, 
documentary data, such as company annual reports, company magazines, managers’ 
work reports, official letters, pay slips and some government published documents, 
were collected.
Qingdao was chosen as the fieldwork site. Along with Shanghai, it was one of the first 
coastal cities to be opened to foreign business by the state in 1984 (Song 1990). It is 
one of the most important shipping and port cities in China. In 2008, Qingdao port
thwas ranked the 5 largest among Chinese seaports in terms of the volumes of handled 
freight and the 10th largest container port in the world (MOC 2008). The most 
important shipping companies, such as COSCO, China Shipping and the China 
ChangJiang National Shipping (Group) Corporation, set up branches in the city.
In addition, Qingdao was one of the first cities to start the foreign manning business. 
As early as the 1980s, the local government set up a ship crewing agency to develop 
seafarer labour export. In this city, where shipping and ship manning business are 
advanced, there are the most important shipping companies and crewing agencies. 
Agl and Ag2 have been two of the largest and most influential Chinese crewing 
agencies and the study of them can represent, to some extent, the operation of the 
most active crewing agencies in China (please refer to sections 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2 and 
Table 2.1 for more detail).
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2.2 The research methods
This research is mainly a qualitative study. This is because an important part of the 
thesis is to discuss seafarers and managers’ perceptions regarding the management of 
their crewing agencies and the Chinese seafarer labour market in the context of 
Chinese economic reform so as to provide some explanations for the limited increase 
in rates of Chinese seafarer export. The detailed views of seafarers and managers 
generated a vast amount of meaningful qualitative data on which to reflect. In 
addition, management strategies need to be systematically documented and explained 
in order to facilitate the understanding of seafarers’ feelings and experiences.
While the structured interview method was used to gather some basic information in 
the research - such as biographic information of the interviewees - this study primarily 
adopted the methods of semi-structured and in-depth interviews. This is because these 
methods can provide the informants with more scope to express what they consider 
important in their own vocabulary (Bryman 2001, p314; Gubrium and Holstein 1998). 
In addition, researchers can trace important answers from the interviewees by asking 
new questions that are not prepared in advance (Kvale 1996; Mason 2002). Moreover, 
the sequence of questions can deviate from the sequence on the interview schedule 
when using semi-structured and in-depth interview methods, which helps to smooth 
the flow of interviews, and questions that have been talked about during the interview 
can be revisited if necessary (Fontana and Frey 2000). Therefore, semi-structured and 
in-depth interview methods are very flexible. They are helpful in the collection of rich 
and meaningful data.
Of course, there are some difficulties when using such methods. Interviewing requires 
the interviewers to possess some necessary interview skills, such as being responsive 
to the answers of the interviewees and skilled in asking questions and probing and 
eliciting important information, etc. As Kvale (1996) suggests, it is better for 
interviewers to practice before conducting interviews. Therefore, I prepared myself 
before my fieldwork by conducting mock interviews with my colleagues in SIRC. I 
also conducted a pilot study (see below) in summer 2007, to improve my interview 
skills and sharpen my interview questions.
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Another widely recognized difficulty regarding qualitative interviews is the need to 
build up a rapport with interviewees, which has significant implications for the quality 
of collected data (Allan and Skinner 1991). This did not prove to be a big problem for 
me. Because I once worked part-time in a Chinese crewing agency for almost two 
years, I had rich experience of working with seafarers and agency staff. In addition, I 
communicated with my interviewees with the utmost patience at every stage of the 
interviews. I successfully built up rapport with my interviewees and some of them 
became my friends after the interviews (More information about the interviewing 
process will be detailed when introducing my research trips in the following sections).
Last but not the least, organizing and analyzing the huge amount of qualitative data 
collected from interviews can be complicated and time-consuming (Dey 1993; Ryan 
and Bernard 2000). To tackle this problem, I always transcribed my data and made 
important notes as soon as I had finished the interviews, rather than leaving them to 
the end of my research. Additionally, after analysing the data, I always filed them 
carefully and systematically so as to facilitate future retrieval. During the stage of 
writing up the thesis, I revisited the data several times so as to familiarize myself with 
the data and represent their meanings properly.
2.3 The fieldwork
2.3.1 The First period of fieldwork
2.3.1.1 Pilot studies in Agl
In July 2007, I began my first research trip. Agl was chosen as one of the sites for 
case studies. It is a constituent part of what has been the largest operator in the entire 
Chinese shipping industry. Agl is a subsidiary crewing agency of its local branch 
shipping company (the structure of the relationship between Agl, the local branch 
shipping company and the “largest operator” can be seen in Chart 2.1). In 2008, Agl 
employed 52 managers and 3163 seafarers (including both officer seafarers and 
ratings).
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Chart 2.1 The Structure of the Relationship between Agl and its Parent 
Shipping Company and Head Office
A gl’s Head office (the largest operator in Chinese shipping industry)
The aim of the research trip to Agl was to examine seafarers’ views about the 
management of the agency and the opportunities and challenges that the agency was 
faced with as a result of the economic reform. The interview structure was revised in 
Cardiff.
The gaining of access is not always easy, especially when one wishes to investigate 
Chinese state-owned enterprises which are connected to the government and 
consequently politically sensitive. Access to Agl was difficult at the outset. I had a 
friend who was an ex-senior manager of Agl. Unfortunately, he quit several months 
before my fieldwork. When nobody could help me to gain access, I sought help from 
the teachers in the university where I had undertaken my four-year undergraduate 
study. The head of my college met me and promised to help. With my agreement, he 
called the HRM Manager of A gl’ parent shipping company (who had been a student 
of the head of my college and who directly managed Agl at that time) and the 
manager said I was very welcome. When I arrived at the company, the HRM manager 
had already notified the director of Agl to help me to arrange the interviews. On the 
day I visited Agl, I interviewed its director. In addition, other pilot interviews with 
A gl’s HRM manager, Manning manager and two seafarers (a commissar and a chief 
officer) were scheduled for the following days.
The interview questions were varied in accordance with the different positions of the 
interviewees. However, the questions were about the following topics: what do
A gl’s parent shipping company (a local branch shipping company)
Agl (subsidiary agency of the local branch shipping company)
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seafarers think about the management of the crewing agency? What are the impacts 
on the management and on seafarers of the economic reform?
I selected two interviewees from the seafarers who were on leave. One was a 54-year- 
old commissar, bom in the city, who had been assigned by the government to the 
parent shipping company when he graduated from high school. He was very careful 
when talking with me and refrained from commenting much on the ‘sensitive’ topics, 
such as the evaluation of the management. The interview with the commissar was 
conducted in A g l’s meeting room, lasted 40 minutes and was voice-recorded. The 
other informant was a chief officer, in his 40s, with higher education from China’s 
best maritime university. He was bom in the city and assigned by the government to 
the shipping company in 1988. He was talkative and was keen to expose his feelings 
and opinions to me and discuss a range of topics. The interview with him was 
conducted over two separate days; both sessions took place outside the agency (one 
was in a coffee bar in the town centre and the other in a Korean restaurant). Each 
interview lasted more than 2 hours and was voice-recorded. I obtained rich 
information from this participant, which allowed the research to go beyond its original 
questions.
The interviews with A g l’s HRM manager and Manning manager were conducted in 
A gl’s luxury meeting room, with a huge, round table and a basket of fresh flowers in 
the middle. Each interview lasted around 60 minutes and was voice-recorded. It was 
evident that the managers answered my questions extremely carefully. Sometimes 
they just refused to answer, saying “this is a company secret”. I also found that 
sometimes what they said was in contrast to the information given by seafarers. 
Despite this, almost all the manager and seafarer interviewees mentioned the problem 
of the shortfall of officer seafarers and this problem seriously impeded the 
development of labour export. The data collected from the research trip proved to be a 
useful guide to sharpen the structure of the interviews for the second stage.
2.3.1.2 Pilot studies in Ag2
Ag2 was established in 1985. It is one of the crewing agencies with the longest history 
and also one of the most influential agencies in China. Unlike Agl, Ag2 is not 
affiliated to any shipping company, but is supposed to operate independently, as an
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independent state-owned crewing agency (ISCA). It has cooperated with foreign 
shipping companies since its establishment. It employed smaller numbers of seafarers 
and managers than Agl. Unlike Agl, the vast majority of Ag2’s regularly employed 
seafarers were officers; Ag2 recruited freelance ratings temporarily from the labour 
market (More information about Agl and Ag2 can be seen in Table 2.1). The aim of 
the research trip to Ag2 was to examine seafarers’ views about the management of the 
agency and the impacts on the agency of the economic reform.
Table 2.1 Basic Information about Agl and Ag2
Company name Agl Ag2
Category SSCA ISCA
Year Established 1995 1985
Main client Parent shipping company
Foreign shipping 
companies
The number of ships manned in 2008 46 37
The number of staff in 2008 52 19
The number of regularly employed seafarers in 
2008 3163 700
The ranks of the seafarers All ranks Mainly officer seafarers
The number of freelance seafarers employed 
in 2008 0 3215
Sources: The two crew agencies
The gaining of access to interview managers and seafarers in Ag2 was much easier 
than in A gl. The director of Ag2 was a friend of my colleague in SIRC. After he had 
introduced me to the director, access to conduct interviews in the company was 
granted.
Pilot interviews were conducted with two freelance seafarers who were ex-registered 
workers of Ag2 and the Director, Business manager, Manning manager and Training 
manager in July and August 2007. Freelancers were interviewed because they could
5 The majority were the freelance ratings.
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evaluate the management of Ag2 with reference to their experiences of working in the 
labour market as freelancers. This is helpful in understanding the reform of Ag2 and 
the situation of China’s seafarer labour market. The seafarers were interviewed in 
Ag2’s meeting room and the managers were interviewed in their offices. Each 
interview lasted for one hour or so and was voice-recorded. The questions were 
focused around the following topics: seafarers’ perceptions about being freelancers; 
the difference between being a freelancer and a worker of the SOE (concluded fixed- 
term contract); seafarers’ views about the management of Ag2; the operation of the 
crewing agency and its opportunities and challenges. Similar to Agl, the data 
suggested that Ag2 was confronted with the problem of a shortfall of officer seafarers 
and the manning business was constrained by it. The data collected provided the 
background that was used to improve the subsequent fieldwork.
2.3.2 The second period of fieldwork
This period of fieldwork took place between March and the end of June 2008. I 
visited Agl first and then Ag2. The aim of the research trip to Agl and Ag2 was to 
have a better understanding of seafarers’ feelings and behaviors by investigating 
intensively how the seafarers were managed and treated by their employers and the 
meaning to seafarers of the reform of China’s seafarer labour market. The interview 
questions were around the following topics: how seafarers’ manning, promotion, 
training, material support and relationships between seafarers and managers, which 
are the issues closely related to the interests of seafarers, are managed by the 
agencies? In what ways have the management strategies been reformed and how do 
these strategies influence seafarers? How do seafarers perceive becoming freelancers? 
During this period of fieldwork, seafarers were the main interviewees.
The designing of the interview questions took me a long time. As well as the 
discussions with my supervisors in the UK before the research trip, I got advice from 
my friend and teacher, Dr. Zhao Wei, who is an associate professor of Beijing Normal 
University. She has rich experience in workers’ studies and in conducting fieldwork in 
Chinese SOEs. I visited her several times to discuss the interview questions, the 
sequences and outlays of interview schedules and the way to interview people. I learnt 
a lot from her and my interview skills were much improved. By the time I started the 
interviews, I had made 16 drafts of the interview schedule (A copy of the interview
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schedules in the final form can be found in Appendix A to D). These efforts proved 
worthwhile because I collected rich and interesting data through the interviews.
2.3.2.1 Case study in Agl
In Agl, twenty-one seafarers were interviewed. Twelve of them were over thirty-five 
years old and nine were below this age. Fifteen of the interviewees held 
college/higher education qualifications and six were high school graduates. They 
worked at different ranks, at different locations onboard ship, came from different 
parts of China (with different hukou) and held different types of contract (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 The Composition of Seafarer Interviewees in Agl in the Second Period 
of Fieldwork
Ranks hukou Types of contract
officer rating city country registered peasant freelancer6
Working
location Engine
6 5
7 3
6 5 
6 4
5 5 1 
5 4 1
13 8 12 9 10 9 2
N=21
I selected these seafarers from the population of seafarers who were on leave. The 
selection was limited by the fact that some seafarers were unable to attend the 
interviews because, for instance, they were busy with affairs at home or with training; 
in addition, some seafarers suspected that I had been hired by the agency to collect the 
views of seafarers, so they refused to join in the interviews to avoid any unnecessary 
trouble.
I contacted most of the interviewed seafarers myself, instead of through the managers 
of the agency. The interviews were conducted at various places where seafarers were 
easy to reach, such as coffee bars near seafarers’ houses, the schools of the seafarers’ 
children (because some seafarers took their children to school and it was convenient 
to conduct interviews there), restaurants (KFC, Pizza Hut and local restaurants) and
6 The two freelance seafarers were ex-registered workers of Agl. They were not working for Agl when 
they were interviewed.
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the seafarers’ training centre. On some occasions, I had to take two-hour bus rides or 
travel ten miles for the interviews. Despite this, my efforts proved worthwhile because 
the seafarers felt safe and free to express their opinions and feelings in locations of 
their own choosing. Some interesting data beyond the interview outlines were 
collected. Some of the ‘secrets’ of the company that were referred to by the managers 
during my first period of research trip in 2007 were disclosed by seafarers, such as 
issues concerning the contract of peasant workers and the managers taking bribes 
from seafarers. Each interview lasted around 90 to 120 minutes and was voice- 
recorded.
In addition to seafarers, the ex-director of Agl, who was the director of a POCA, and 
its Manning manager, who was a retired Manning manager of Agl, were interviewed 
through introductions from my friend. Through them, I was able to pursue questions 
that the managers in Agl refused to answer and questions that seafarers could not 
explain clearly, such as A g l’s management concerning the employment of managers 
and the complex, internal relationships among Agl, its parent shipping company, the 
head office and government bodies. Interview questions were concerned with the 
evaluation and explanation of the management strategies of Agl, the extent of its 
reform and the consequences for seafarers and foreign manning business. Interviews 
were conducted in managers’ offices. The interviews lasted 87 and 64 minutes, 
respectively, and were voice-recorded.
2.3.2.2 Case study in Ag2
In Ag2, twenty-five seafarers were interviewed. Thirteen of them were over thirty-five 
years old and twelve were below that age. Fifteen of them were graduates from 
colleges and universities and ten of them had high school qualifications. They were 
from deck and engine departments, worked at different ranks, came from different 
parts of China and held different types of contract (Table 2.3).
43
Table 2.3 The Composition of Seafarer Interviewees in Ag2 in the Second Period 
of Fieldwork
Ranks hukou Types of contract
officer ratings city country registered peasant freelancer
Working
location
Deck 8 7 7 8 5 7 3
Engine 7 3 5 5 5 4 1
15 10 12 13 10 11 4
N=25
Again, the interviewed seafarers were selected from the population of seafarers on 
leave. After I had selected the seafarers, the Manning manager called them to come to 
the agency for their interviews. The interviews were arranged by the manager in 
Ag2’s seafarer waiting room, which was a rather small room with a small table in the 
middle. When the interviews were being conducted, no other seafarers were allowed 
to enter. Each of the interviews lasted for one hour or so and was voice-recorded. 
Learning from the experiences of the interviews in Agl, I successfully contacted 
seven of the interviewed seafarers via informal means after the interviews. I treated 
them to drinks and food in local restaurants, McDonalds and coffee bars and I visited 
their houses. Each of these subsequent interviews lasted around two hours or so and 
was voice-recorded. The seafarers talked about some sensitive topics. Some 
information that was outside the interview schedule was collected. It was evident that 
some seafarers, especially the peasant seafarers, were disaffected with the 
management. However, they were afraid that Ag2 would find out that they had 
disclosed the secrets or negative aspects of the company to me. Some of them 
therefore exhorted me to pretend that I had never had these informal meeting with 
them at the end of the interviews.
In addition to seafarers, the director of Ag2 and the President of the TU were 
interviewed during the second research trip. Questions were about the management 
strategies of the agency and their impacts on seafarers.
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During the interviews with seafarers and managers in Agl and Ag2,1 tried my best to 
listen carefully and be responsive to the answers. I was struck that when I mentioned 
that my cousin had been a seafarer for more than ten years and that I had worked part- 
time in a crewing agency for almost two years, the distance between the interviewees 
and myself reduced. They started to ask about my cousin’s situation. They wondered 
how the seafarers in my previous agency were managed and treated. In turn, they told 
me their problems and feelings. Sometimes, they compared their situation with the 
information I provided. This made the interview proceed more smoothly.
During the interviewing process, I also told the interviewees my interpretation of their 
experiences after they had talked, so as to cross-check my understanding. In some 
cases, my interviewees were eager to talk, since their feelings had never before been 
heard by others. They said they had little opportunity to tell others their story and 
express their feelings in such an intensive way; few people cared about them. Some 
seafarers sought advice from me, for instance what they should do to deal with their 
difficulties and whether they should adopt certain actions. Sometimes, I felt sorry for 
their difficult position. However, in all honesty, I did very little to help or improve 
their position, but acted only as a sympathizer and a spirit advocate.
After the interviews, some seafarers telephoned me to tell me about their latest 
situations. Some messaged me to say that if I had any interviews in the future, they 
would like to help. While I treated some seafarers to drinks and food at the beginning 
of the interviews, some of them invited me to meals after the interviews. Several 
seafarers became firm friends of mine and we kept contact after I returned to the UK.
2.3.3 The third period of fieldwork
The third research trip took place between August and September 2008. Its aim was to 
systematically explore the reasons behind the management strategies and internal 
dynamics, so as to understand deeply the feelings and behaviours of seafarers and the 
extent of the reform of the crewing agencies. Questions were asked concerning the 
reforms of the management strategies; the reasons for and the consequences to 
seafarers of implementing current strategies and the relationships between the 
agencies and the institutions at higher levels. The roles of the Trade Unions (TUs) in 
both of the agencies were also investigated. Six interviews with managers and union
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officials were conducted in Agl and five in Ag2. All the interviews were voice 
recorded.
A gl’s Director and the lawyer of the company, the Chair of the TU, the Training 
manager, the HRM Manager, the Vice Director of the Head Office and the Director of 
the parent shipping company were interviewed. The interviews took place in 
managers’ offices. Each of them lasted 60 to 90 minutes. Some managers were as 
careful as they had been in 2007. For instance, the director asked the company’s 
lawyer to be present at his interview. Some questions prepared for the interview with 
the director of the PSC were not answered. Instead, the director asked his secretary to 
write down the answers and email them to me. In contrast, the chair of the TU showed 
more enthusiasm about talking with me. His interview was conducted over two 
separate days and lasted for 3 hours and 50 minutes in total. The Training manager 
was very patient as well and wished to probe some issues with me. His interview 
lasted 79 minutes. The interviews with managers provided me with some valuable 
information.
In Ag2, I interviewed the Director, the HRM manager, the Manning manager, the 
Chair of the TU and the Training manager. Interviews took place in managers’ offices 
and lasted one to two hours. The managers in Ag2 were more open and relaxed when 
talking with me than were the managers in Agl. This might be because Ag2 was not 
as closely related to the government as Agl and therefore the managers in Ag2 were 
less ‘politically sensitive’, or perhaps because the managers in Ag2 had more 
experience of interviews and communications with people from foreign shipping 
companies or organizations. Interviews with the managers provided rich data to help 
me to understand the operation and internal dynamics of the firm.
A summery of the seafarers and managers who participated in the interviews and 
seafarers’ backgrounds are shown in Tables 2.4 - 2.7 (Table 2.4-2.5 refer to the 
interviews in Agl and Table 2.6-2.7 refer to the interviews in Ag2).
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Table 2.4 The Interviewees in Agl between 2007 and 2008
First stage interviews (July to August, 2007) Second stage interviews (March to June 2008)
Identity Post Identity Post
Director Ex-directory
Manager HRM Department Manager8 (retired) Manning Department
Manager
Registered seafarer
Manning Department 
Commissar
Chief officer
Registered seafarer Captain
2 officer 
Chief Engineer 
1st engineer 
2nd engineer
3 rd engineer 
Bosun (Bsn)
Able seaman (AB) 
Motorman 
Chief cook
N=5
Third stage interviews (August to September, 
2008) Freelance seafarer 3 rd officer 
3rd engineer
Identity Post
Director and the
lawyer
Manager
Manager
Chair
Vice Director
Training Department 
HRM Department 
Trade Union 
Head office
Peasant seafarer Captain
Chief officer
3rd officer
Chief Engineer
2nd engineer
Able seaman (AB)
Ordinary seaman (OS)
Electrician
Motorman
Director Parent shipping company
N=6 N=21
7 T he ex -d irec to r  o f  A g l  b ecam e  th e  d irec to r  o f  a  P O C A  after he left A g l .
8 T he re tired  M a n n in g  m a n ag e r o f  A g l  w as em p lo y ed  as th e  M an n in g  m a n ag e r b y  th e  P O C A .
Table 2.5 The Composition of Seafarers Interviewed in Agl
Age Education levels
29 and 30 to 40 Over 40 Junior Senior Two year Four year
under high high college university
school school
6 10 7 2 5 10 6
N=23
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Table 2.6 The Interviewees in Ag2 between 2007 and 2008
First stage interviews (July to August, 2007) Second stage interviews (March to June 2008)
Identity Post Identity Post
Director
Manager
Manager
Manager
Freelance seafarers
Training Department 
Manning Department
Business Department
Able seaman 
1st engineer
Director
Manager Manning Department
Manager HRM Department
Chair Trade Union
Manager Training department
Director
Chair
Registered seafarer
N=6
Their stage interviews (August to September,
2008)
Identity Post
Peasant seafarer
N=5
Freelancer seafarers
N=25
Trade Union
Captain 
Chief officer 
2nd officer 
3 rd officer 
Chief Engineer 
1st engineer 
2nd engineer
-,rd •3 engineer 
Bosun (Bsn) 
Electrician
Captain 
Chief officer 
2nd officer 
3rd officer 
Chief engineer
~nd2 engineer
-,rd3 engineer 
Able seaman (AB) 
Motorman 
Chief cook 
Ordinary seaman
Bosun (Bsn)
Ordinaiy seaman (OS) 
Able seaman (AB) 
Motorman
49
Table 2.7 The Composition of Seafarers Interviewed in Ag2
Age Education levels
29 and 30 to 40 Over 40 Junior Senior Two year Four year
under high
school
high
school
college university
8 11 8 2 9 11 5
N=27
Before exploring the experiences of seafarers in the case studies, the thesis provides 
the context wherein the two studied crewing agencies are located to further explain 
why two state-owned crewing agencies, rather than the agencies of other ownerships, 
were studied. We turn to this next.
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Chapter 3:
The development of Chinese crewing agencies and their foreign manning 
business
It has been well reported that since the economic reform, hundreds of independent 
crewing agencies have emerged in the Chinese seafarers’ labour market (Gu 2002; 
Wu 2004a; Wu et al. 2007; Yin et al. 2008, p202). However, what has not been 
critically considered is the development of the agencies of different ownerships and 
how they have contributed to the supply of seafarers to the global labour market.
This chapter considers this question. It aims to provide a general idea of the extent of 
the liberalization of the Chinese seafarer labour market, which may at least partially 
explain the small increase in the rates of seafaring labour export.
Following the time sequence of the agencies’ registration in China, the chapter firstly 
looks at two types of state-owned crewing agencies (SOCAs). One is an independent 
state-owned crewing agency (ISCA) and the other a subsidiary crewing agency of a 
state-owned shipping company (known, for short, as subsidiary state-owned crewing 
agency (SSCA)). Then, this chapter shows the development of the private-owned 
crewing agencies (POCAs) and foreign invested crewing agencies (FICAs). The 
analysis in each of the sections focuses on two issues: 1) the granting of foreign 
manning qualifications; 2) the employment of seafaring labour.
3.1. Independent state-owned crewing agencies (ISCA)
3.1.1 Cooperation with foreign ship-owners and manning qualifications 
ISCAs have been granted foreign manning qualifications since their emergence at the 
beginning of the 1980s, with the support of Chinese government at different levels. 
The goal of setting up ISCAs was mainly to facilitate the participation of Chinese 
seafarers in the global labour market. According to the Labour Laws of 1995 and the 
New Labour Contract Law of 2008, Chinese workers working overseas are not 
allowed to be directly employed by foreign employers, but must be employed by a 
Chinese agency first and then dispatched by the agency to the foreign employers. The 
purpose of this regulation is to protect China’s shipping companies and labour 
resources. Accordingly, ISCAs are established and granted full qualifications to man
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foreign ships. The contract relationship among seafarers, ISCAs and foreign ship­
owners is shown in Chart 3.1.
Chart 3.1 The Contract Relationships in the Foreign Manning Process
Chinese seafarers
Dispatching contractEmployment contract
Foreign ship-owners
Chinese crewing agency
As can be seen from the chart, different sorts of contractual relations are involved in 
the manning process. Seafarers first sign an employment contract with an ISCA, 
which consequently becomes the buyer of the seafarers’ labour-power and decides all 
the employment issues; then, the ISCA signs a manning contract with the foreign 
ship-owner, which is the user of seafarers’ labour, paying the agencies for the labour 
of seafarers. Consequently, seafarers rely directly on the agencies for employment.
3.1.2 Seafarer labour management in ISCAs
ISCAs manage labour flexibly. They manage officer seafarers and ratings in different 
ways.
Supported financially by the government, ISCAs employ a number of registered 
seafarers. They are more likely to be officer seafarers than ratings because of a 
shortage of freelance officer seafarers in the Chinese labour market (the quantity and 
quality of Chinese freelance seafarers will be explored in a later section of this 
chapter). Many of the new registered officer seafarers are graduates from maritime 
colleges and universities, recruited by ISCA through paying educational institutions a 
large sum of money (10,000 to 30,000 yuan for each student, though different schools 
required different payments).
52
ISCAs reserve a number of registered officers by signing a fixed-term contract with 
them (5-8 years). According to the New Labour Contract Law 2008, most of them are 
entitled to open-ended contracts after ten years of work. Registered seafarers’ 
employment issues are decided by the agencies, especially their onboard working 
opportunities. Unless deployed by the agencies, seafarers are not allowed to work 
onboard ship. To control this, agencies keep seafarers’ sailing certificates when they 
are on leave. In addition, ISCAs, like other state-owned agencies or companies, 
provide registered officer seafarers with training, social insurance and some non-wage 
benefits.
However, ISCAs do not keep a large number of registered officer seafarers. When the 
number of registered officer seafarers becomes insufficient, ISCAs flexibly employ a 
small number of officer seafarers from the market or temporarily borrow seafarers 
from other state-owned shipping companies.
In contrast to the management of the officer seafarers’ employment, the management 
of ratings’ employment is different. A rating’s job is low skilled. There are redundant 
ratings in the labour market and crewing agencies can very easily recruit enough 
ratings with a low salary from the market (Han 2008; Huang 2008). Therefore, the 
ISCAs recruit freelance ratings flexibly, signing a per-voyage contract with them, 
which enables the agencies to avoid paying them the benefits that are offered to 
registered workers.
Having a fixed number of registered officer seafarers and the fact that ISCAs are 
granted foreign manning qualifications by the government give ISCAs an essential 
foundation to develop their foreign manning business. These advantages come from 
the political and financial support of the government at several levels.
3.2 Subsidiary state-owned crewing agencies (SSCA)
3.2.1 The manning qualification
SSCA is another type of state-owned crewing agency in China. Unlike ISCAs, which 
are established by the government at several levels, SSCAs are set up by state-owned 
shipping companies through the reform of ‘separating the management of the 
seafaring labour resource from the management of ships’ (ren chuan fenli). This
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reform was based on the policies proposed at the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, 
with the aim of establishing a modem corporate system. The goal of setting up SSCAs 
was to improve the professionalism of seafaring labour management, thus providing 
more job opportunities to managers and workers of state-owned shipping companies 
and improving shipping companies’ profits by reducing labour costs. SSCAs were 
also expected to become market-oriented companies to develop the foreign manning 
business on a large scale. To this end, SSCAs were granted foreign manning 
qualifications in the late 1900s with the support of their parent shipping companies 
and the Chinese government. The contract relations involved in the foreign manning 
process are the same as those in ISCAs (see Chart 3.1).
3.2.2 Seafarer labour management in SSCA
In contrast to ISCAs, which manage labour flexibly, many SSCAs employ officer 
seafarers and ratings who are surplus to requirements elsewhere in the company. 
Except for newcomers, most of these seafarers are former employees of parent 
shipping companies, having been recruited in the 1970s and 1980s when the reform 
was not deep. At that time, the shipping companies were asked by the government to 
help realize full employment, which eventually caused a labour surplus for the 
companies. Despite the deepening of the reform in the 1990s, the firing of surplus 
workers was prohibited by the government in order to maintain societal stability. Even 
when the SSCAs are established to manage all the seafarers’ resources independently, 
the firing of surplus seafarers is still forbidden. As a consequence, with the support of 
the government and their parent shipping companies, the SSCAs employ surplus 
seafarers to fulfil their social responsibility.
The subsidiary state-owned crewing agencies’ (SSCAs) management of the registered 
seafarers is almost the same as that of the ISCAs. In some cases, SSCAs’ seafarers 
can enjoy better social insurance and non-wage profits due to better and more direct 
support from parent shipping companies. However, it is possible for SSCAs’ seafarers 
to have fewer promotion and job opportunities than ISCAs’ seafarers due to the labour 
surplus in SSCAs.
In addition to the two kinds of SOCAs (the SSCA and ISCA), there are POCAs in 
China’s seafarers’ labour market. Since FICAs in China have not yet been allowed to
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register, their situations will not be discussed in this thesis. The following section 
focuses on the hundreds of newly established POCAs, which are expected to 
contribute substantially to the seafaring labour export in China (Wu 2004a; Wu et al 
2007; Yin et al 2008, p202).
3.3 Private-owned crewing agencies (POCAs)
It is a mistake to think of SOCAs and POCAs as having equivalent rights or 
importance in China’s shipping industry. Since the labour resource and foreign 
manning qualifications are two significant factors influencing the foreign manning 
business, the POCAs’ situations will be analysed by looking at these two aspects, 
respectively.
3.3.1 Lacking foreign manning qualifications
Unlike Chinese private enterprises in other industries, which were encouraged to 
develop and were offered preferential policies by the government as early as the mid- 
1990s, POCAs were not allowed to register until 2004 with the implementation of the 
policy “The management measures o f the credentials o f  labour service cooperation 
with foreign countries”.
The reason for this policy release is related to the deepening reform of China’s 
economy, particularly the changes in the following two aspects after 2000. On the one 
hand, a prosperous shipping market emerged in China and, consequently, there was a 
rapid increase in the number of private and foreign-owned shipping companies. 
Unlike their state-owned counterparts, many of these shipping companies operated on 
a very small scale and did not have their own seafarers. Therefore, a great demand for 
seafaring labour was produced by these non-state-owned shipping companies. On the 
other hand, due to the restructuring reform in China, many shipping companies went 
bankrupt and some of their workers were laid off. The crewing agencies needed to 
distribute the labour resources. These factors contributed to the changes in the 
regulations concerning the registration of POCAs.
Despite this new policy, most of the POCAs are still unable to register to operate a 
labour service in cooperation with foreign companies in the same way as the SOCAs 
because of the stringent requirements of the registration policy.
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The policy, “The management measures o f the credentials o f labour service 
cooperation with foreign c o u n tr ie s implemented on 26 August 2004 by the Ministry 
of Commerce, requires any company that applies for these credentials to have been 
registered for at least three years, with a registered capital of more than 5,000,000 
yuan (3,000,000 yuan for companies in central and western areas of China). The 
asset-liability ratio of the company must be no more than 50% and the company must 
have no negative record. The company must be equipped with a sound management 
system and so be granted an IS09000 Quality Management System Certification. 
Adequate reserve funds for labour service cooperation with foreign countries must be 
paid (1,000,000 yuan and 900,000 yuan for companies in central and western areas of 
China). The business place must be fixed and no less than 300 square meters; there 
must be no fewer than ten professional administration staff (including more than five 
professionals with college or higher educational qualifications regarding labour 
service cooperation with foreign countries with colleges, more than two training and 
administration staff, more than two financial staff and more than one legislation 
consultant); in the previous three years, the company must have supplied no fewer 
than 300 workers to enterprises that have the business qualifications of labour service 
cooperation with foreign countries approved by the Ministry of Commerce; and the 
regulation system of the company must be complete (Ministry of Commerce, 2004).
Due to these high requirements, apart from those SOEs that are supported by the 
government, very few POCAs can meet these criteria. Consequently, most Chinese 
POCAs are unable to obtain the credentials of Labour Service Cooperation with 
Foreign Countries.
Therefore, in terms of being authorized to crew foreign ships, Chinese crewing 
agencies can be divided into two categories (Chart 3.2).
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Chart 3.2 The Categorization of Chinese Crew Agencies
Chinese Crew Agencies
Most of the 
privately 
owned 
crewing 
agencies
POCA
Only a few 
private-owned 
crewing 
agencies, 
if any
POCA
Subsidiary 
crewing 
agencies of 
state-owned 
shipping 
companies
SSCA,
Independent,
state-owned
crewing
agencies
ISCA,
Foreign invested 
crewing 
agencies, not 
yet allowed to 
register
FICA
Hundreds of 
crewing agencies 
not allowed to 
man foreign ships
Second group,
Around 60 crewing 
agencies, authorized to 
man foreign ships 
directly
First group,
Without the manning qualifications, the POCAs’ manning capacity is greatly 
weakened. Chinese POCAs are usually small businesses. Many of them work as 
subordinates of the SOCAs and help them to recruit freelance seafarers when there is 
a need (mainly for the ISCAs). In the process, the POCAs earn a margin of the profits 
of crewing foreign ships. When talking about foreign manning business, a managing 
director of a Chinese POCA said:
We are running a manning business through depending on others [SOCA]. We 
have to pay for their ‘help’ and have to be under their control. If we were 
authorized to man foreign ships directly, we would feel like flying.
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Due to the lack of foreign manning qualifications, many POCAs in China are engaged 
in manning domestic ships.
In addition to the lack of foreign manning qualifications, the development of POCAs 
is restricted by the seafarers’ labour resources, which mainly comprise freelance 
seafarers. The director of Ag2, which has employed a number of freelance seafarers in 
recent years, said, “By completely relying on freelance seafarers, an agency is unable 
to gain a firm foothold”.
The following section explores some problems regarding the Chinese freelance 
seafarers, and how these problems negatively influence POCAs’ development.
3.3.2 Freelance officer seafarers in China
Due to the lack of government support and the small scale of the POCAs, very few of 
them could employ regular workers. As a consequence, most of them depend on 
freelance seafarers. However, it is found that although there are a large number of 
freelance ratings, the quality and quantity of freelance officer seafarers in China is 
rarely satisfactory. This section mainly discusses the freelance officer seafarers in 
China, focusing on their numbers, quality and the regulation of their behaviour.
3.3.2.1 The lack of freelance officer seafarers
Chinese freelance officer seafarers mainly comprise three kinds of seafarers - 
unemployed seafarers whose shipping companies went bankrupt during the reforms in 
the 1990s; some seafarers who quit their shipping companies voluntarily; and some 
new graduates of maritime universities and colleges.
Freelance officer seafarers in China are in short supply. Although there are no data to 
quantify this deficiency, some of the facts listed below may help to explain the 
situation.
It was reported that in recent years, some ships from non-state-owned shipping 
companies that depended on freelance seafarers had stopped running because no 
freelance officer seafarers could be found to navigate these ships (Liu et al. 2008, 
p85). In addition, it was seen that although the POCAs depended on freelance
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seafarers, the agencies were unable to recruit freelance officer seafarers directly from 
the market due to their small number, but had to recruit in special ways. A Manning 
manager of a POCA said:
When we were looking for freelance officer seafarers, we had to ask for help 
from other agencies or friends, through special relationships, because freelance 
officer seafarers were in short supply and when we only put out an 
advertisement, nobody came.
Due to the difficulty of recruiting freelance officer seafarers from the market, some 
POCAs ‘borrow’ seafarers from the large SOCAs that have a surplus. One POCA 
director said:
Recruiting freelance officer seafarers from the market is difficult. There are 
too few of them. Seafarers supplied by our crewing agency were mainly 
registered workers borrowed from a SOCA. Our agency paid not only 
seafarers’ salaries, but also the administrative fees required by that SOCA.
So why are there insufficient freelance officer seafarers in China? One reason 
concerns the policies of the Chinese government. The Chinese Seafarers’ 
Management Statute 2007 requires that, when seafarers are employed by a ship­
owner, a labour contract must be signed between the seafarer and the ship-owner; the 
ship-owner must also pay for social insurance and salaries, which must be higher than 
the lowest social salaries required by the local government (Chapter 4, Chinese 
Seafarers Management Statute 2007). The implementation of this policy has had two 
main effects.
First, it is thought this policy helps to improve seafarers’ employment and hence 
social stability. In China, social insurance and the welfare system are rather weak and 
no effective measures have been set up to protect the lawful rights of seafarers, to 
provide job information or to supervise the operation of crewing agencies (Zhao and 
Amante 2003). Consequently, the government controls the number of seafarers that 
are on the market and encourages more seafarers to become registered seafarers of the 
SOCAs so that they can be taken care of by the companies. Keeping the employment
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rate high is still one of the social responsibilities of the SOCAs, as they enjoy 
significant support from the Chinese government.
As a result, a strange phenomenon arises in the Chinese seafaring labour market in 
that many state-owned crewing agencies suffer from a surplus of seafarers who are 
not allowed to be fired by the government, while some POCAs are trapped by the 
difficulty of recruiting a sufficient number of seafarers from the labour market (Li 
2006).
A second effect of the policy of the Statutes 2007 is to help to protect the Chinese 
shipping industry, which is extremely important for China’s economy (Bao and Liu 
2008; Cheng 2008; Liu and Jia 2008). The policy enables the state-owned shipping 
companies to control a greater proportion of the seafaring labour.
In addition to this policy, there are other reasons for the lack of freelance officer 
seafarers. From the supply side, for example, many Chinese officer seafarers, 
including freelance officer seafarers, have moved to land-based jobs in recent years 
because of the fast development of the shipping industry, which has led to the rapid 
growth of maritime-related land-based jobs, such as maritime officials, ship 
inspectors, port construction and management, ship brokers and shipbuilders, which 
needed experienced officer seafarers (Ma and Xu 2008, p i 18). The long training 
period for a maritime student at school also slows down the supply of maritime 
graduates to the industry (in China, a high school student has to study for at least three 
years to obtain competency certificates, while a rating has to study for at least six 
years to become a junior officer if he can pass the difficult examinations). From the 
demand side, the rapid growth of the Chinese shipping industry in recent years and the 
subsequent huge demand for seafarers are further important reasons.
Consequently, there is a shortage of freelance officer seafarers in the Chinese 
seafaring labour market. While the SOCAs control a fixed number of seafarers, which 
enables them to provide ship-owners with a relatively stable supply of labour, the 
POCAs do not have regular workers but have to depend on these freelance officer 
seafarers. The shortage of freelance officers has consequently limited the development 
of POCAs.
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Apart from the problem of insufficient numbers, the quality of the freelance officer 
seafarers is generally low and one of the most direct reasons for this might be a lack 
of training. The next section considers this issue.
3.3.2.2 The lack of professional training of Chinese freelance officer seafarers 
After graduating from maritime colleges and universities, except for the training 
required by the Maritime Bureau for seafarers’ promotion examination, Chinese 
freelance officer seafarers have little opportunity to be trained. There are several 
reasons for this.
In China, only the SOCAs organise maritime training, which is funded by the 
government and the large ship-owners. However, this training is only for their own 
regularly employed seafarers. The SOCAs do not train freelance officer seafarers even 
if they are sometimes employed by the SOCAs (like the ISCAs). As for the POCAs, 
which are the main employers of freelance officer seafarers in China, they do not 
provide training either, because most of them operate on a small scale and are unable 
to organize the expensive maritime training. In addition, the POCAs, for the purpose 
of profits and survival, do not waste money on training seafarers who are not 
employed regularly. Furthermore, there is no free training from any social institution. 
The Chinese government has not implemented any specific policies or put any money 
into improving the training of freelance seafarers, although, since 2003, it has invested 
several billion yuan in the training of peasant workers to improve their employability. 
Consequently, no institution cares about the training of freelance officer seafarers.
In addition, very few freelance officer seafarers undertake training voluntarily because 
the training fees are high and because there is a shortage of freelance officer seafarers 
and it is thus easy for them to find employment opportunities even without training. 
The lack of training and self-learning of freelancers have become a concern of the 
Ag2’s managers. The director of Ag2 said:
Freelance seafarers, they do not take training. They just know to ask for high 
salaries. Due to the shortage of seafarers, the ship-owners’ selection of 
seafarers was very weak. Consequently, freelance seafarers don’t have any
61
pressure to find working opportunities. I wonder how they will survive when 
some day the shipping market collapses and the temporary shortage of officer 
seafarers diminishes.
The Training manager of Ag2 said:
Due to the current lack of freelance officer seafarers, they do not restrain their 
behaviour. They don’t care about whether they improve their skills or not. 
Consequently, the quality of seafarers declines when they do not undertake the 
necessary training.
One consequence of the lack of training could be the minimal improvement of the 
competitiveness of Chinese freelance officer seafarers. In particular, the weakness 
among Chinese seafarers, which is identified as key obstacle to their significant flow 
into the global labour market, cannot be rectified. The language problem is a case in 
point. Unlike the Filipinos, for whom English is their first language, Chinese 
seafarers’ level of English is generally low. Zhao (2002, p5) said:
[The prospect for China of significantly increasing its share of the world 
seafarers’ labour market] will depend on how much progress China can make 
with its seafarers' English training. Despite the great investment made by 
shipping companies and maritime trainers and educators, learning a foreign 
language for adults is certainly a long and slow process. The lack of contexts 
in which English is spoken as the language may well hold China back from 
significantly further improving her position on the world seafarer suppliers’ 
league table.
Without training, the problems concerning the quality of freelance seafarers can 
hardly be solved. This affects the scale of the POCAs’ labour export negatively.
3.3.2.3 The lack of effective regulation of freelance officer seafarers
The regulation of Chinese freelance officer seafarers is rather weak (Li 2008, p358).
As a consequence, many freelance officer seafarers show a lack of professionalism.
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This makes the management of the agencies that depend on freelance seafarers 
difficult.
It is not hard to find articles from maritime newspapers or journals in China that 
appeal for improvements to the regulation of freelance seafarers because many 
problems are found relating to them. The following comment reflects some of the 
reported problems:
When the ship got to a foreign port, sometimes an irresponsible seafarer would 
ask the agency to replace him with someone else because he wanted to leave 
the ship and said that if the crewing agency did not agree, he would not work, 
but would leave anyway. In order not to affect the shipping period, sometimes 
the agency had to compromise. But when the agency did not agree with the 
requirement, some seafarers just took their revenge, for instance, by reporting 
to the local administrative institutions and bringing a false charge against the 
ship’s condition, like poor equipment and facilities onboard ship, which 
consequently resulted in the detention of the ship at the port and a huge 
economic loss for the ship-owner (Ma and Xu, 2008, pi 18).
The director of Ag2, which has employed a number of freelance officer seafarers in 
recent years, complained about the lack of responsibility of the freelance officer 
seafarers. He said:
There is no problem with our registered seafarers: the problem is with the 
freelance seafarers. They lack a sense of responsibility. Actually, the use of 
freelance seafarers causes problems. They are very difficult to manage. If there 
are no freelance seafarers or no freelance officer seafarers in a crew, the 
management is rather easy. But if there are freelance seafarers among officer 
seafarers, or if the captain is a freelance, the whole crew will not perform well. 
Freelance seafarers are not responsible at all.
The generally poor behaviour of freelance officer seafarers was also berated by 
registered seafarers of Ag2 who worked with temporarily recruited colleagues. One 
captain said:
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The freelance officer seafarers did not work hard. They were difficult to 
manage onboard. They always thought about how to get more money. If they 
found an agency offering a higher salary that day, they would probably give 
up the current job and change to the other job the following day.
In addition, Chinese crewing agencies have no way to know the previous experiences 
or behaviour of these freelance seafarers due to the lack of regulation tools in the 
Chinese seafaring labour market. The Manning manager of Ag2 said:
There is no way to regulate or punish the unprofessional behaviour of 
freelance officer seafarers and there is no record of their behaviour. If one 
agency fired a freelance seafarer, his previous faults would not influence 
whether he was employed by other agencies or ship-owners, which can offer 
even higher salaries. So some freelance officer seafarers show a lack of 
professionalism. This makes the management of crewing agencies difficult.
As a consequence of the lack of proper regulations, the irresponsible behaviour of 
some freelance officer seafarers impedes the development of the foreign manning 
business of the agencies, especially those POCAs which depend heavily on the 
freelance seafarers.
Through the discussion in section 3.3, it is seen that most of the POCAs are not issued 
foreign manning business qualifications by the government. In addition, they depend 
on freelance officer seafarers, who are few in number, lack training and are not well 
regulated. These facts explain why the labour export of the POCAs is on a very small 
scale.
The foreign manning business is dominated by the SOCAs in China, as will be 
detailed in the next section.
3.4 The dominant position of the SOCAs in China’s seafaring labour export
When the fieldwork for this research was carried out in 2008, only fifty-three crewing
agencies were authorised by the Chinese government to man foreign ships, most of
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which were ISCAs and SSCAs (Chinese seafarers’ employment website, 2008). Many 
of them were granted not only foreign manning qualifications by the Chinese 
government, but also financial support to control a large proportion of the Chinese 
seafaring labour resources and provide regular management to their registered 
seafarers (Cheng 2008; Gu 2007). In contrast to the SOCAs, hundreds of private- 
owned crewing agencies (POCAs) had no foreign manning qualifications, and were 
not allowed by the government to cooperate with foreign ship-owners directly. 
Without any support, the POCAs developed on a small scale (Gu 2007, p24; Li 2006; 
Zhang and Zhao 2008). As for FICAs, they were still not allowed to register in China. 
It was regulated that it was illegal for foreign ship-owners to directly recruit Chinese 
seafarers (Huang and Ning 2008, p249; Wu et al. 2006, p39; Zhao and Amante 2003). 
Table 3.1 represents the resources controlled by Chinese crewing agencies of different 
ownerships.
Table 3.1 The Resources of Chinese Crewing Agencies of Different Ownerships
Types of 
agencies
Business
qualifications Seafaring labour resource Management on seafarers
SOCA 
(including 
ISCA and 
SSCA)
Foreign
Manning
qualification
Registered officer seafarers’ 
labour resource (ISCA)
Able to provide training and 
other management to registered 
seafarers
Foreign
Manning
qualification
Registered officer seafarers’ 
and ratings’ labour resource 
(SSCA)
Able to provide training and 
other management to registered 
seafarers
POCAs
No foreign 
manning 
qualifications
No stable labour resource; 
dependant on freelance 
seafarers who are 
insufficiently trained, low- 
skilled and not well regulated.
Not able to provide training or 
other management to freelance 
seafarers
FICA Not allowed to register
The SOCAs dominate the foreign manning business in China due to the advantages 
they enjoy. It was reported that, “between 1979 and 1998, COSCOMAN [COSCO’s 
Manning Agency] employed 150,000 Chinese seafarers for foreign ship owners and 
operators, enjoying the lion's share of the market (60%). MASES follows with a total
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supply of 40,000 during its ten years of business between 1988 and 1998, taking a 
market share of 16%” (Zhao 2000b, p i3-14). Until the 21st century, the dominant 
position of the SOCAs was still evident. At the end of 2006, for instance, China 
dispatched 39,300 seafarers in total. The large SOCAs dispatched more than 70% of 
them (large SSCAs dispatched around 16,000 seafarers (representing 40%) and large 
ISCAs dispatched nearly 13,000 seafarers (33%)). The rest were manned mainly by 
small SSCAs and ISCAs; POCAs played only a minor role (Chart 3.3).
Chart 3.3 The Contribution of Chinese Crewing Agencies of Different 
Ow nerships to the Foreign Manning Business in 2006
■ Large SSC A s □  Large ISCAs 0  Small SSC A s and ISCAs mainly 
Source: Cheng (2008, p324)
3.5 Summary
To discuss the extent of liberalization of China’s seafarer labour market, this chapter 
has explored the development of the Chinese crewing agencies of different 
ownerships and their contribution to China’s labour export.
It is seen that fewer than 60 SOCAs dominate the labour market; the hundreds of non­
state-owned crewing agencies develop on a small scale and play a minor role in the 
business of exporting seafaring labour. This is not the case in other countries with 
market economies. For instance, in the Philippines, in 2003, there were 417 crewing 
agencies of different ownerships on the accredited list of POEA which were actively
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involved in seafaring labour cooperation with foreign shipping companies (Amante 
2003, p52). The facts suggest that the Chinese seafarer labour market is not as free or 
liberalized as some scholars have assumed, but is heavily controlled by the 
government. The state imposing its restrictions on agencies’ ability to man foreign 
ships has limited the increase in rates of the seafarer labour export in China.
It is also seen that most of the Chinese seafarers working in the global seafaring 
labour market are dispatched by fewer than sixty state-owned crewing agencies 
(SOCAs). To see further reasons why Chinese seafarers have not yet swept the 
world’s seafarers’ labour market, my research focuses on the operation of the SOCAs 
that are able to man foreign ships in China. The following chapters will examine, in 
more detail, the business practices and the constraints under which the SOCAs 
operate, and will explore how the management strategies have impacted on the 
seafarers and labour export. By so doing, they seek to provide a deeper understanding 
of the reform of the Chinese seafarers’ labour market and the reasons for the limited 
rate of increase of China’s seafarer labour export. This is achieved with the aid of two 
case studies of a major ISCA and SSCA. Part 2 exams the case of the leading SSCA, 
Agl, while Part 3 exams the case of the leading ISCA, Ag2.
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PART TWO 
CASE STUDY ONE: AG1
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In tr o d u c tio n
A number of crewing agencies have emerged since the 1990s. Many people have 
assumed that these companies, which compete freely in the market, would greatly 
improve the supply of Chinese seafarers to the global seafaring labour market. 
However, China’s seafaring labour export has actually been increasing at a slow speed 
since 2000 (as we have seen in Chapter 1). The main reason for the overestimates of 
likely progress might be that previous scholars overlooked how these crewing 
agencies operate and the extent to which the Chinese crewing agencies have reformed 
into market-oriented companies.
Previous chapters have explored the fact that the Chinese seafaring labour market was 
far from being reformed into a free market. It was also seen that the Chinese SOCAs 
dominated the market and supplied most of the Chinese seafarers working in the 
world labour market. Therefore, Part Two concentrates on the management of a 
SSCA (Agl) and the impacts of its operation on seafarers. It seeks to examine the 
extent of the reform of the agency and explain the decline of the foreign manning 
business since 2006. Specifically, based on fieldwork in Agl in 2007 and 2008, 
Chapter Four describes A gl’s background, explains the extent of A g l’s reform by 
looking at the operation of its parent shipping company (PSC) and analyses several 
issues regarding A g l’s seafaring labour resource. To explain some of the reasons for 
the failure of Agl to effectively exploit the seeming potential of its foreign manning 
business, Chapter Five to Chapter Seven examine the specific management strategies 
regarding seafarer export and the impacts on seafarers. It demonstrates that the reform 
of the Chinese SOCA has given rise to a more complex situation than people have 
assumed, which may cast some light on the analysis of the limited increased rates of 
China’s seafarer export in the 2000s.
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Chapter 4: The reform of Agl and the surplus that is not
In the last twenty years, the Chinese government has implemented a series of methods 
to reform SOEs. The consequent changes of the SOEs have captured the attention of 
scholars. Before looking at the reforms in Agl, we first present a wider picture: the 
reform of Chinese SOEs.
4.1 Limitations of Chinese SOEs’ reform in terms of managerial autonomy 
Despite the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy and the significant reform of the 
Chinese enterprises as discussed in Chapter one, a few western social scientists have 
argued that the reform of China’s SOEs was still limited in terms of managerial 
autonomy and that the government’s interference impeded the evolution of this 
reform.
For instance, due to government restrictions, some SOEs were still paying huge 
welfare bills for workers, which was a burden impeding SOEs’ economic 
development (Gu 2001). In addition, the wage budgets of some SOEs were decided by 
the government, rather than by the companies themselves (Yueh 2004). Furthermore, 
some SOEs still had to maintain a high employment rate at the government’s request 
(Yueh 2004). Because of this, employment decisions could not be made flexibly by 
the enterprises, and consequently, the turnover rate was low among Chinese SOEs 
(Bodmer 2002).
In addition, the government’s support of the SOEs impeded their involvement in 
market competition and, consequently, slowed down the reform of the old 
management strategies that had been applied during the planning-economy period. 
For example, it was found that some SOEs carried out hardly any modem human 
resource selection and recruitment policies (Taylor 2005). As a consequence, many of 
the managers recmited lacked any professional training or had only a low educational 
level, which could have made it difficult for them to apply advanced management 
strategies (Taylor 2005). Furthermore, promotion was not decided according to 
people’s capacity or performance, but was influenced greatly by seniority as before 
(Lewis 2003). It was also found that, unlike companies in the west, the importance of
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harmony still dominated the SOEs’ institutions. This harmony emphasized equal 
treatment among workers, which consequently weakened the personal incentive 
aspect and made the use of different material rewards according to personal 
performance impossible (Lewis 2003).
The slow reform of the SOEs’ management was manifested, from another respect, by 
the maintenance of the traditional administrative ties within the SOE system, which 
gave parent companies strict control over their subsidiaries. Hassard et al (2006) 
found that the subsidiaries were unable to be market-oriented because the parent 
company was in charge of many issues. The hiring and firing of workers in the 
subsidiaries is an example of this. When the subsidiaries hoped to fire a number of 
workers, they had to obtain the permission of the parent company, and when the 
subsidiaries hoped to recruit staff, they had to consider the surplus of the parent 
company first. In addition, issues such as looking for long-term clients and making 
regulations and investment decisions needed the approval of the parent company.
Therefore, the reform of some Chinese SOEs was still limited in terms of managerial 
autonomy. However, what about the reforms in Chinese SOCAs? Have they reformed 
into market-oriented enterprises, as many people expected? This is the focus of 
attention here.
4.2 A gl’s reform
4.2.1 A brief background of Agl
Agl was established in 1995. Before registry, it was the Seafarers’ Resource 
Administration Department of a state-owned shipping company, responsible for 
manning the ships of its parent shipping company (PSC) and operating a manning 
business with other foreign shipping companies.
As a department, it started the foreign manning business in 1982 and managed to 
make the business grow consistently from then on. Until 1995, the department had 
manned ships from a single type at the beginning to up to six types; the tonnage of the 
manned ships had increased from small and medium-sized to hundreds of thousands 
dwt; cooperation extended to Singapore, Korean, French and American shipping 
companies, instead of those located only in Hong Kong, Taiwan and in the Northern
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and Southern A s ia  A rea, as w as the case  at the b eg in n in g . T ab le 4.1 sh o w s the
d evelop m en t o f  th e m anning b u sin ess from  1982  to  1995  b efore  A g l  w a s  registered .
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T a b le  4 .1  T h e  m a n n in g  b u s in e ss  o f  th e  P S C  (fr o m  1 9 8 2  to  1 9 9 5 )
Year Number of
registered
seafarers
Number of 
outsourced 
seafarers
Manned
ships
Cooperative
ship­
owners
Profits from the manning 
business (10,000 yuan)
1982 1619 15 1 1 4
1983 1658 18 1 1 18
1984 1683 77 5 3 63
1985 1753 65 4 3 44
1986 1885 69 4 3 44
1987 1971 51 3 2 85
1988 2130 54 3 3 102
1989 2179 130 6 4 213
1990 2197 148 6 5 220
1991 2287 318 12 6 430
1992 2373 552 21 12 570
1993 2427 600 23 13 660
1994 2419 558 19 9 1090
1995 2370 712 27 14 1214
Source: Zhao et al (1999)
Since the international shipping market had started to collapse in 1992, the PSC was 
suffering from a budget deficit. In this circumstance, profits made by the manning 
business became important to the company in those years. By 1995, the manning 
business had become a pillar of the PSC (Zhao et al 1999, p268).
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Establishing Agl in 1995
Agl was registered in 1995. At the initial stage, there were twenty-two members of 
staff in the crewing agency. Seven of them held high school qualifications, two had 
middle-school qualifications and the rest had a primary school educational level. 
A g l’s organizational structure was rather simple at that time (Chart 4.1).
Chart 4.1 Organization structure in 1995
Director
Business
department
Finance
department
Manning
department
Party Branch 
committee
Source: Zhao et al (1999)
The function of Agl showed mainly in two aspects (Chart 4.2). On the one hand, it 
was responsible for managing the seafaring labour for the PSC and manning its ships. 
On the other hand, it was in charge of the crew manning business with foreign 
shipping companies. However, it did not receive the foreign manning qualification 
until 2000. This was because, in order to protect this newborn business, the Chinese 
government issued only a few foreign manning qualifications to several large SOEs. 
As a consequence, between 1995 and 2000, Agl dispatched seafarers to foreign ship­
owners in the name of one of the several qualified institutions.
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C h art 4 .2  T h e  r e sp o n s ib ility  o f  A g l
Manning ships of foreign 
shipping companies
Manning PSC’s ships 
(Main task)
The responsibility of 
Agl
Source: Zhao et al (1999)
The reason for establishing the crewing agency in 1995 was to implement the 
organizational restructuring reform as a part of the policy of setting up the Group 
Company System (GCS), targeted at establishing the modem corporate system, 
proposed at the 14th Party Congress in October 1992.
According to the spirit of the reform policy, the Seafarers’ Resource Administration 
Department was supposed to be separated from the PSC and become a market- 
oriented, independent company. This was expected to improve the specialization of 
the manning business operation. It also released the PSC from managing thousands of 
seafarers and consequently allowed it to focus on its shipping business. This 
restmcturing reform was also intended to create more job opportunities for the surplus 
managers and surplus seafarers in the PSC. When the firing of workers was prohibited 
by the central government, creating more job opportunities was encouraged.
Despite the intentions mentioned above, Agl was still playing its traditional role as a 
department of the PSC, depending on the support of the PSC and under its control. 
The reason for this are mainly related to the consistent interference of the PSC. The 
following sections will explain these reasons in detail by looking at the extent of the 
reform of the PSC and its intervention in A g l.
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4.2.2 The limited reform of the parent shipping company (PSC)
The reform of PSC was limited, since it had little autonomy to decide the major issues 
of the company. This can be seen from the table below, illustrating how some major 
issues were decided historically (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Historical review of the PSC from 1975 to recent years
Times and 
economic performances Main activities / changes
Decision maker /ratifying 
institution
From 1975 to 1979 
Preparation period
Preparation work in setting 
up the new company
Central government; 
the head office
Setting up PSC’s 
Temporary Party Branch 
Committee
The Organization Department of 
the city council
From 1980 to 1985 
The PSC made a loss and 
was supported by the head 
office
Establishing the PSC The Ministry of Communications (MOC) and the head office
Defining the business MOC and the head office
Setting up the Party 
Branch Committee The head office
From 1986 to 1991 
The profit increased 
continually
Being authorized to 
dispatch and charter ships 
directly
The head office
From 1992 to 2000 
The PSC made a loss and 
was supported by the head 
office
Changing to another 
business The head office
Changing back to the 
original business MOC
In the 2000s 
The PSC made huge profits
Confirming the main 
business MOC
Source: Zhao et al (1999)
In addition, there were other decisions that the PSC was not allowed to make by itself 
(Table 4.3). The ships bought by the PSC were sponsored or at least approved by the 
head office and decisions to sell the ships needed the ratification of the head office as 
well. Additionally, the head office examined the PSC annual fiscal budget, its annual 
business plan and the yearly final economic performance. The head office required the
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PSC to submit its entire net profits each year. Furthermore, the setting up of any land- 
based projects, such as subsidiary companies and a training school, needed the 
approval of the government and the head office. Moreover, the senior managers of the 
PSC were selected and appointed by the head office. Concerning the choice of clients, 
to a large extent, the PSC had autonomy. However, if there was a special order from 
the government or the head office, the PSC still had to follow the order to fulfil its 
responsibility to the nation as a state-owned company. These requirements illustrate 
the restricted autonomy of the PSC and the limited extent of its reform.
Table 4.3 Decision areas that needed to be ratified by the head office in 2008
Main Strategy V Structural
changes
V Buying and selling 
ships
V
Land-based
investment
V Profit allocation V Choosing clients V
Fiscal budget V Annual 
shipping plan
V Personnel and reward 
issues of the senior 
managers
V
Evaluating the entire economic 
performance of the company
V Personnel and reward issues of 
junior managers and seafarers
X
Source: Zhao et al (1999)
Due to the constraints and supports from the head office and the government, the 
PSC’s reforms concerning other aspects did not achieve effective results. The 
restructuring reforms that were intended to separate and liberalise those sub­
businesses from the PSC were an example. The next section will analyse the failure of 
these restructuring reforms concerning the management of seafaring labour.
4.2.3 The failure of the restructuring reform concerning Agl
As mentioned before, the establishment of Agl was according to the economic reform 
policy proposed at the 14 Party Congress in October 1992, in order to reorganize the 
institutional structure and turn the sub-businesses into independent, market-oriented 
economic entities. However, this reform was not implemented successfully in the 
PSC. The reasons for this can be related to the government restriction on sacking 
surplus labour and the benefits and job security enjoyed by the managers.
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4.2.3.1 The interference of the local government
The seafarers’ labour was surplus in the PSC and the surplus rate was sometimes as 
high as one-third of the whole labour force (this will be discussed in section 4.3.2). In 
addition, around 200 seafarers were unable to work onboard ships because, for 
example, they were disabled, injured or ill. However, the government did not allow 
the SOEs to lay off these workers, or else the stability of society would be at risk. 
When talking about the employment of surplus seafarers, the President of the trade 
union (TU) of Agl said:
We need to maintain the stability of society by increasing employment 
opportunities. We are not capitalists. If surplus workers were fired, society 
would not be stable and the director of the PSC would be fired. It is the Party 
leading the company. If you do so [fire the surplus workers], the leaders from 
the head office will instantly crack down on you.
Because of the government interference, the surplus seafarers could not be fired. 
Therefore, Agl could not be separated completely from the PSC, or else it could 
refuse to employ some of the seafarers, at least those who were incompetent; thus, 
many seafarers would be laid off. To avoid this, the PSC had to support the agency in 
every aspect and control its management. When discussing the reform of Agl, the 
vice director of the head office said:
Many surplus, incompetent seafarers cannot be fired... you cannot ask Agl to act 
like market-oriented companies. This is because Agl takes the burden off its PSC 
by employing these surplus seafarers.
4.2.3.2 The benefits and job security of the managers
In addition, the security and benefits that the managers enjoyed, given the support 
provided by head office and the government, made them reluctant to carry out any 
reforms.
Each year, the head office of the PSC set a profit criterion that the PSC had to 
achieve. However, if the PSC’s final profit did not achieve the criterion, the managers
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did not receive any serious punishment; nor did they lose their position, because they 
could blame the market and look for other reasons, such as sacrificing the profits of 
the company for the interest of the state. Since the punishment was rather weak, the 
managers at most would lose some of their bonus. Therefore, the managers of the PSC 
were neither much concerned with increasing profits nor undertaking reforms.
In addition, it seems that the profits of Agl were not important for the PSC, which 
may explain the reason why it ignored the restructuring reform of Agl and the 
development of the foreign manning business. The director of the PSC gave the 
following explanation:
The PSC is making huge profits these years and the profit of the crewing agency, 
which is only 250,000,000 yuan in 2006, is not important for the PSC any more; 
the PSC does not depend on the crewing agency to make money as it did 10 to 15 
years ago when it was in the red.
As discussed above, while ignoring reforms or gaining a low profit will not bring the 
managers problems, implementing reforms could be complicated and could bring 
managers troubles. The former director9 of Agl explained this in the following way:
... the top managers were elderly and were going to retire. They were worried 
that, when reforms were implemented, what if the seafarers caused trouble [like 
strikes or campaigns]? The leaders considered their own income and position. 
When implementing a reform involves some risks and needs the leaders to take 
certain responsibility, they therefore will not do it.
The president of the TU said:
9 He was deprived of the authority of managing the manning business of Agl and transferred to another 
job in the end of 2006 when the foreign manning business was stopped by the PSC (as will be 
discussed later) because he had been engaged in implementing the restructuring reform and developing 
the foreign manning business since 2000 and had developed the business on a significant scale until 
2006 (as will also be seen later). He has now left his job in the PSC and set up his own crew manning 
company.
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Everyone knows the problems of the management but no one talks about it. The 
reason is like this: if nobody changes the management, when problems occur, no 
one will be blamed. This is because the problems have existed for 20 years, and 
have not been caused by any of the current managers. But if anyone reformed 
any strategy, he would take the full responsibility and be blamed for any 
consequences. Therefore, it is safer to keep the current strategies rather than 
reform them.
Consequently, the managers would rather choose to stay safe during the several years 
when they maintained their position and enjoy their benefits rather than implement 
any reform that may involve risks and damage their personal interests.
As a result, the methods for the restructuring reform of Agl designed in the 1990s had 
not been implemented by 2008, when the fieldwork took place. In 1994, when 
preparations for establishing Agl were underway, the PSC had proposed the 
corresponding reform method, ‘simulating the market mechanism at this beginning 
stage by setting up an internal market relationship between the PSC and the crewing 
agency, then gradually separating and finally marketising the crewing agency’. 
However, even today, the ‘simulation’ is still going on. According to the director of 
Agl, there was no simulation or reform at all and the plan was just a slogan. He said:
The internal simulating market means no market. There is no market 
relationship between the PSC and the crewing agency. The PSC affords the 
whole material support of the agency’s seafarers. So when the PSC uses 
seafarers, it does not have to pay the agency fee. Additionally, there is no real 
contractual relationship between the agency and the PSC. There was one 
contract signed by the agency with a department of the PSC; but that was just 
formalistic, without any effects. Under the current relationship, we dispatch 
PSC’s seafarers to the ships of the PSC and other shipping companies. We do 
not have to pay for the use of labour. In all, the agency just needs to guarantee 
the supply of seafarers to the PSC’s ships and safe sailing; there is no market 
relationship.
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The managers do not think that Agl is separated from the PSC or that there is market 
relationship between Agl and the PSC. When I asked about the relationship between 
the PSC and the agency, the HRM manager of Agl said, ‘The managers’ contracts are 
signed with the PSC; we are the PSC’s people...; our salaries and social insurance are 
paid by the PSC also.’ The director of Agl said, ‘Agl is a department of the PSC, 
though it is registered as a company.’ The director of the PSC said, ‘The agency was 
registered as a company by the PSC, which means one of our departments is qualified 
to do business with other companies. To other companies, the agency is a company; 
but for the PSC, it is our department, as everything of the agency is from us.’
Therefore, the government’s restriction and the security enjoyed by the managers 
have led to the failure of the reform to separate the crewing agency from the control 
of the PSC. As a consequence, Agl had little autonomy regarding business operations, 
but acted like an internal department of the PSC, receiving support and constraints 
from the PSC.
4.2.4 The support and constraints of the PSC
Agl has received support from the PSC since its establishment. At the very beginning, 
the PSC decided to register the agency and injected 5,000,000 yuan for Agl to obtain 
the necessary business qualifications. After this, the PSC rented a modem office for 
Agl and bought the office facilities. It also provided all the human resources of Agl, 
from the top - director and managers, to the bottom - seafarers. Except for the peasant 
seafarers, the entire human resource of the agency comprised registered workers of 
the PSC. All the costs of the agency, such as the material support of the managers and 
seafarers, their training costs and even the funding of TU, came from the PSC. When 
Agl made losses, PSC compensated for it. Depending on the PSC, Agl did not have 
to be responsible for its profits and losses.
Agl was also under the strict control of the PSC. With respect to the distribution of 
A gl’s profits, all the net profits had to be submitted to the PSC. Although the PSC set 
a profit criterion that Agl had to achieve, it was still not permitted to make 
independent use of the surplus profits. In addition, the PSC directly controlled the 
employment issues of the senior managers of Agl, such as their appointment, 
contract, promotion and job transfers. The PSC also supervised A gl’s management of
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the employment of junior managers. The material support of the managers of Agl was 
decided by the PSC.
Concerning the specific management strategies of the Agl, such as manning 
strategies, promotion strategies and material support of seafarers, they were also 
regulated by the PSC. If Agl wanted to make any changes to its management 
strategies, it had to obtain the approval of the PSC first. As for other management of 
seafarers, such as seafarers’ training and recruitment, Agl was also required to gain 
the approval of the PSC before it carried them out.
PSC defined that the foremost task of Agl was always to offer the best manning 
services to the PSC’s ships, rather than enlarging the foreign manning business. To 
guarantee the manning service to the PSC’s ships, the PSC controlled the foreign 
manning business scale of Agl by controlling its clients. It was required that A gl’s 
clients and business cooperation details had to be approved by the PSC first before it 
started the cooperation. Because of this, some of A gl’s clients were lost due to the 
restrictions put in place by the PSC. Besides this, the PSC enjoyed priority in 
selecting and employing high-quality seafarers. Although Agl was authorised to 
manage and dispatch seafarers, the seafarers selected by the PSC to work onboard its 
ships were not allowed to be dispatched by Agl onboard ships of other companies.
Therefore, although registered as an independent company, Agl was still under the 
control of the PSC, without autonomy or responsibility for its own profits and losses.
As was the case twenty years ago, Agl employed surplus seafarers. The next section 
introduces the state of seafaring labour in A gl.
4.3 The seafaring labour of Agl
4.3.1 Categories of seafarers in terms of types of contract
An essential part of the economic reform in China was the employment system 
reform, beginning in the mid-1980s. It was intended to replace the previous lifetime 
employment system with a flexible employment system, in order to improve the 
incentive for workers. The use of labour contracts, which was reinforced with the
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implementation of the Labour Law in 1995 and the New Labour Contract Law in 
2008, plays a significant role in the achievement of a flexible employment system.
The labour contract system was first introduced to the PSC in 1990 before Agl was 
established. With the establishment of Agl, seafarers were categorized into three 
types in terms of the types of contract: registered seafarers who concluded permanent 
and fixed-term contracts with the PSC, registered seafarers who concluded fixed-term 
contracts with Agl, and peasant workers who signed fixed-term contracts with the 
local labour bureau.
The vast majority of registered seafarers who concluded permanent contracts with the 
PSC were recruited before 2003, mainly composed of high school graduates, veterans 
from the army, ‘educated youth’ who were once assigned to work in the rural areas by 
the Chinese government during the Great Cultural Revolution, and some college and 
university graduates. At present, many of these seafarers are over forty years old. In 
addition, there are some registered seafarers who signed fixed-term contracts (eight 
years) with the PSC. The registered seafarers who signed contracts with the PSC 
receive social insurance and various kinds of non-wage benefits (this will be specified 
in Chapter 6).
A second group of registered workers concluded fixed-term contracts with Agl. In 
order to let Agl take the responsibility for managing seafaring labour, it was ruled 
that seafarers recruited after 2003 signed eight-year fixed-term contracts with Agl. 
Many of these seafarers were young maritime graduates. The registered seafarers of 
this group are offered social insurance and non-wage benefits.
Thirdly, Agl has recruited peasant seafarers since 1995 through the rural labour 
bureau. The HRM manager explained, ‘it has become increasingly difficult to recruit 
seafarers from the cities in the last 10 to 15 years. That is the main reason why we 
recruit more seafarers from the countryside’.
The cooperation mechanism between the local bureau and Agl was as follows. Each 
year, Agl gave its recruitment plan to the local bureau and selected candidates with 
the help of the bureau. Young people, less than 24 years old, possessing high school
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qualifications and knowing simple English could become candidates. After being 
selected, they would be trained for six months to become ratings or trained for two 
years in college to become officers. The tuition fees were paid by the seafarers 
themselves. After graduation, the seafarers signed fixed-term contracts with the local 
labour bureau. To employ the seafarers, Agl signed contracts with the bureau and 
paid the administration fees.
In 1995, there were 330 peasant seafarers, including 256 ratings and 74 officer 
seafarers. Like the registered seafarers, peasant seafarers had no freedom to choose 
the ships that they worked aboard, but had to follow the assignment of Agl. Unlike 
the registered seafarers, however, peasant seafarers who signed eight-year contracts 
with the labour bureau were not offered any non-wage benefits or social insurance by 
2005. As a consequence of this, peasant seafarers’ material support represented only 
half of the value of the material supports for the registered seafarers (this will be 
specified in Chapter 6).
From the 1980s to 2008, Agl employed surplus seafarers. The following sections will 
focus on this.
4.3.2 Labour surplus in Agl
The problem of surplus seafarers has made its appearance since the 1980s, due to the 
requirement of the government to maintain a high employment rate at that time. By 
2008, the problem of labour surplus was still serious in Agl. This can be seen from 
Table 4.4, which illustrates the surplus rates of seafarers in different years10.
10 T he su rp lus ra tes in th e  th ree  y ears  are  p resen ted  becau se  th e  th ree y ea rs  rep re sen ted  th re e  stag es in the h isto ry  
o f  th e  P S C  an d  A g l .  1982 w as th e  year in  w h ich  th e  P S C  w as ju s t  es tab lish ed  an d  the  eco n o m ic  re fo rm  in C h in a  
w as no t s ign ifican t; 1995 w as th e  y ea r in  w h ich  A g l  w as es tab lished ; 2 0 0 6  w as th e  year in  w h ich  A g l  m an n ed  the 
largest num b er o f  sh ip s in its history.
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T a b le  4 .4  T h e  su r p lu s  ra tes  o f  se a fa r e r s  in  so m e  y e a r s
Year Number of manned ships
Demand of 
seafarers*
Number of seafarers 
on the books Surplus rate
1982 17 612 1619 62%
1995 47 1692 3082 45%
2006 62 2232 3003 25.7%
Note: Wit i 24 seafarers onboard each ship and a backup rate of 1.5, demand of seafarers =
(number of manned ships) * 24 * 1.5
Source: Comprehensive Statistics of the PSC, 1982, 1995, 2006 and 2008
Therefore this SOCA still controlled surplus seafarers. So how did Agl manage the 
recruitment of seafarers? Why was the problem of labour surplus that existed in the 
traditional SOEs before the economic reform still serious in Agl? The following 
sections will explain this.
4.3.3 The management of seafarers’ recruitment
The management of seafarers’ recruitment in Agl was aimed at continuously 
maintaining and increasing the number of registered seafarers. For this purpose, some 
strategies were implemented.
Firstly, to recruit more registered seafarers, Agl did not recruit freelance seafarers. 
The HRM manager said: “all the position are offered to registered workers, not people 
from the outside”. Therefore Agl did not employ freelancers, including freelance 
ratings who were redundant in the labour market, easy to find and cheap to use.
In addition, registered seafarers were asked to sign at least an eight-year contract. To 
motivate seafarers to sign long-term contracts, Agl linked the length of the contract 
with the provision of welfare and working opportunities. The longer the contract, the 
better welfare and working opportunity seafarers would have. For instance, before 
1999, there were two types of contracts. Seafarers who chose permanent contracts 
could enjoy a house allowance while seafarers who signed fixed-term contracts (8 
years) were not given such allowance. Concerning the working opportunity, Agl 
refused to dispatch seafarers who did not accept eight-year or permanent contracts, 
according to the president of the TU.
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Moreover, to increase the number of registered seafarers, more and more peasant 
senior officer seafarers were offered contracts with the PSC since 2005. In 2005, only 
three excellent peasant captains and chief engineers were offered contracts with the 
PSC. In 2006, twenty senior officer seafarers became registered workers of the PSC. 
Besides this, some second officers/ engineers were offered contracts as well. By 2007, 
35% of peasant seafarers who were second officers/engineers or at higher positions 
had become registered seafarers of PSC.
Last but not least, Agl offered new graduates higher wages than the rates in the 
market so as to attract more graduates to work for the agency. It managed to recruit 
around 120-150 students annually from maritime universities.
However, such management was not based on any scientific plan or calculation. 
Concerning the reasons for recruiting a large number of seafarers when there was 
already a labour surplus, only two relevant sentences were found from the year-end 
reports. The year-end report for 2006 mentioned that this recruitment had occurred 
“for the need of the sustainable development of the company” and “to deal with the 
problem of the lack of seafarers”. No more specific analysis or explanation can be 
found as the reasons for recruiting large numbers of seafarers each year.
A Manning manager explained how the recruitment decisions and calculations were 
made in practice in A g l. He said:
After implementing the quality management system, a HRM manager came to 
me. He said ‘there was somebody checking the work and a recruitment plan was 
not made. According to the quality management system, you should do the 
plan.’ I said: ‘We have already finished the recruitment for this year. And you 
are asking about last year’s recruitment plan? Why you are asking me to do the 
plan? I have no idea at all.’ Then he said: ‘As long as you can write up 
something, it will be fine. Last year, we recruited 160 graduates. You can say 
‘according to the need of the manning department for seafarers and the 
development of the fleet, we need to recruit 160 graduates’. Then I wrote 
according to what he said. He submitted the report and passed the examination.
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Data suggest that the recruitment plan was made up by the managers, not based on 
any scientific analysis or calculation. So why did Agl have to manage seafarers’ 
recruitment in this way? Since this question has implications for the extent of the 
reform of Agl, the following section will look at this issue.
4.3.4 Reasons for the management strategies
4.3.4.1 Support from the governmental institutions and PSC
The governmental institutions and PSC encouraged Agl to recruit a large number of 
seafarers and provided support, especially in terms of finance. Because of this, Agl 
was not concerned about the labour costs that resulted from recruiting large numbers 
of seafarers or employing surplus seafarers. The HRM manager of Agl said:
The agency is state-owned. Even if there are too many seafarers, the company 
won’t fire them. Seafarers are the resource of the fleet; employing a large 
number of seafarers is a strategic reservation. The state would not let the 
shipping company or its seafarers’ resource disappear. The state will subsidise 
us. They will retain and support this shipping company, just as they did before 
2001 when the company lost money.
The director of the PSC said:
The labour cost for a shipping company is a rather small part, compared with the 
cost for shipping, like crude oil and ship repairing. Therefore, it does not matter 
how many seafarers are recruited.
Because of the support and encouragement of the head office and the government, 
Agl recruited a large number of seafarers each year.
4.3.4.2 Requirement of governmental institution and PSC
Before the economic reform, the recruitment of workers was centrally planned by the 
government. Due to the aim of full employment at that time, SOEs normally 
employed surplus workers. Although SOEs were given the autonomy to decide on the 
recruitment of workers due to the economic reform, the PSC was still required by the
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government to recruit a large number of seafarers so as to maintain social stability. 
When Agl was established to manage the seafaring labour, the task was taken over by 
Agl.
In the annual work reports for 2006 and 2007, it was emphasized that recruiting a 
large number of seafarers was one of the most important tasks of A gl. The number of 
seafarers recruited each year had become a standard by which to evaluate the work 
performance of the managers. In the year-end report for 2008, A g l’s managers were 
praised by the leaders of the PSC because they had recruited large numbers of 
seafarers. It was said in the report:
The number of recruited graduates who are going to become officer seafarers 
increased from around 80 each year in 2005 and 2006 to more than a hundred in 
the last two years (2007 and 2008). This is a great achievement.
The HRM manager said:
If very few seafarers were recruited, the leaders of the PSC would not be happy 
with our work. They will think there is no achievement in the work and we have 
not accomplished the tasks. The leaders will not ask why we are recruiting so 
many seafarers, but they will mind if we recruit few.
Because Agl had employed a large number of seafarers by 2008, to praise and 
encourage this, Agl was awarded a prize for ‘great contribution to the social stability’ 
by the local government in 2008.
Therefore, managers recruited as many seafarers as possible. The reform of the 
management regarding seafarers’ recruitment was therefore quite limited. Without 
any systematic management, Agl consequently suffered from a labour surplus.
4.3.5 Surplus that is not
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Despite this, according to the managers, there were not enough seafarers to man the 
ships that Agl was responsible for. The HRM manager explained:
Apparently, the number of seafarers is large and we have surplus seafarers. 
However, the seafarers are in short supply, especially high-quality seafarers. The 
agency is faced up with the problem of a lack of seafarers, in fact.
The reason for this, according to the HRM manager, is that while many seafarers 
remained on the books of the company, which made it appear that there was surplus 
labour, many of them were actually being employed in the domestic shipping industry 
and were thus not available for dispatch by Agl. It was also a recurring theme in the 
interviews that a significant number of seafarers11 were in fact working in the 
domestic market.
At the end of 2006, due to the shortage of labour, the PSC required Agl to stop its 
manning business with foreign ship-owners so as to call back the dispatched seafarers 
onboard foreign ships to serve onboard PSC’s ships. This resulted in the shrinking of 
the number of foreign ships manned by Agl and its profits (Chart 4.3 and 4.4; we will 
examine this issue in more detail in Chapter 7).
11 By the nature of this activity, there was no reliable evidence provided by the company concerning the 
number of seafarers who worked in the domestic market while remaining on the books of the company.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter initially provides a brief review of the research into the reform of the 
SOEs. It seems that one of the limitations of the SOEs’ reform can be reflected by the 
lack of autonomy in decision-making due to the interference of the government.
Then the chapter focuses on the reform of A gl. It briefly describes A gl’s history from 
a department to a registered company due to the reform of restructuring the 
organizations. Then it focuses on the effects of the reform and the reasons behind it. It 
is found that Agl did not act as an independent, market-oriented company and the 
reasons for this were closely related to the interference of the PSC, whose reform was 
limited in the sense that certain aspects of its business operation were controlled by 
institutions at higher levels. This may suggest that the reform of the shipping 
companies and crewing agencies was not as complete or as significant as some 
scholars expected (Li and Wonham 1999; Sharma 2002; Wu et al 2007).
The chapter also looks at the situation of the seafaring labour in Agl and analyses the 
reasons for the labour surplus. It is seen that due to the implementation of the contract 
system, seafarers in Agl were categorised into three types based on their contracts. 
Unlike 20 years ago, seafarers of different categories were treated differently by the 
management. However, due to interference from the higher institutions, there was a 
significant labour surplus from the 1980s until 2008. In fact, Agl did not have 
systematic or scientific management regarding the recruitment of seafarers. Supported 
but also constrained by the government and the PSC, Agl had to recruit a large 
number of seafarers each year, although it already employed surplus seafarers. This 
again reflects the limitation of the reform of Agl.
Finally, the chapter exposes the problem of the shortage of seafarer supply and the 
consequent decline of labour export since 2006. To explain this, the following 
chapters consider the reasons for the shortage of seafarers by looking at how seafarers 
were treated by the management. The general form of the argument here is that the 
management strategies of Agl lacked a market orientation in keeping with the 
economic reform and as a result, many seafarers who were on the books of Agl and 
PSC were actually working in the domestic seafarer labour market, which resulted in
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a shortfall in seafarer supply in Agl and thereby constrained the development of the 
foreign manning business. The management strategies regarding seafarers’ export will 
therefore be examined and the impacts on seafarers will be discussed, starting with a 
discussion of the experiences of seafarers as a result of the management of manning, 
training and promotion.
92
C h a p te r  5: T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  m a n n in g , p r o m o tio n  a n d  tr a in in g
This chapter looks at the impacts on seafarers of the management of manning, training 
and promotion. It seeks to contribute to the explanation as to why although there were 
apparently surplus seafarers on Agl and PSC’s books, there was actually a shortfall in 
seafarer supply, especially a shortfall of high-quality seafarers, which impeded the 
development of the foreign manning business.
5.1 The management of manning
As explored above, although many seafarers remained on the books, they were in fact 
working in the domestic shipping market, which resulted in the shortage of seafaring 
labour in Agl and the decline of the foreign manning business. One of the reasons 
why many seafarers in Agl actually worked for other domestic shipping companies is 
that these seafarers had limited working opportunities in Agl due to its manning 
management, which firstly limited working opportunities to a group of selected 
seafarers and secondly had stringent requirements in terms of the working experiences 
of employed seafarers. The following section explains these two factors in turn. 
Initially, it considers why the working opportunities were limited to a particular group 
of seafarers and thereby other seafarers had few working opportunities.
5.1.1 Distribution of working opportunities and reasons
First, the manning management was based on the “fixed ship, fixed crew” (FSFC) 
policy. FSFC can be traced back to the beginning of the 1990s. In April 1991, the 
PSC initially designed the programme (for trial implementation) in accordance with 
the requirements of the MOC. The implementation of this programme was undertaken 
at that time as a strong measure to improve the sense of responsibility of seafarers and 
to strengthen the management onboard ship. After more than 2 years’ preparation, by 
the end of 1993, the FSFC had been implemented onboard the ships of the PSC. Agl 
continued to apply this strategy after it started to manage the seafaring labour.
Based on the FSFC, when seafarers were assigned onboard a ship, they were expected 
to work there consistently. It was not unusual for some seafarers to work onboard the 
same ship from the first day they became seafarers until the day they retired. It was 
regulated that the proportion of seafarers changing to other ships should not exceed 20
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percent annually. The captain, the political commissar and the chief engineer of a 
certain ship should not, in principle, be changed.
As a result of the FSFC, the seafarers who were not linked to any ships got few 
working opportunities from Agl. A HRM manager said, “In the agency, a group of 
seafarers are so tired because they are always called to work onboard ship, while the 
rest have no opportunity at all.” Therefore, the seafarers on the books of Agl and PSC 
were divided into two groups: regularly employed seafarers and underemployed 
seafarers (Chart 5.1).
Chart 5.1 Two categories of seafarers in terms of whether or not they were 
regularly employed by Agl
Two categories of seafarers
Underemployed seafarersRegularly employed seafarers by Agl
The other reason for the concentration of working opportunities to a group of 
seafarers can be related to the effects of personal relationships/Gwarar/. The personal 
relationship was identified by Walder (1986) as one of the features of the institutional 
culture in traditional Chinese factories. He found that in traditional organizations in 
China, the personal dependence of workers on the leaders and the networks of 
instrumental-personal ties were very common and important. Because managers were 
powerful, workers had to cultivate connections with them in many ways in order to 
further their own interests. Such corruption from within, the significance of the 
particularism, distinguished Chinese traditional organizations from the rational-legal 
bureaucratic ones in western societies and contributed to the formation of the image of 
the neo-traditionalism, according to Walder. Currently, the personal 
relationship/Guanxi continues to have significant meaning in Chinese institutions 
(Chen et al 2011; Chua et al 2009; Leunga et al 2011; Perks et al 2008). In Agl, the 
personal relationships of seafarers with Manning managers influenced the interests of 
seafarers in many ways.
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Manning managers in Agl decided the working opportunities of seafarers personally, 
not based on any standard or selection procedure. The President of the TU said:
There is no standard in our company... When Agl selects seafarers, managers do 
not have a specific method. They just casually ask the opinions of other managers 
and seafarers and make final decisions based on their personal opinions... So 
many good seafarers are not given work opportunities because there is no way to 
examine or evaluate them.
According to the interviewed seafarers, their working opportunities were greatly 
influenced by the relationship with the managers. A captain said:
The relationship with the Manning managers is very, very important. It is the 
most important of many important things. If you want to have working 
opportunities or work onboard a ship of good condition, you need to find ways to 
bribe the managers. Then you can work onboard a good ship. It is not difficult. As 
for whether you are competent or not, the manager does not mind.
A 3rd engineer said:
The personal relationship restrained my career development. For instance, I once 
told my Manning manager that I wanted to work onboard ship X and I thought I 
was competent enough. However, I was not given the chance, since I did not have 
a good personal connection. In the end, a seafarer who was less skilful than me 
got the opportunity. This is very unfair but very common. The personal 
relationship is too serious. It is just like it was 20 years ago.
Managers dispatched the seafarers with whom they were personally familiar. A 
Manning manager explained:
When some seafarers remain onboard the ship that I am in responsible for two or 
three times, I can get to know them and I will use these seafarers continuously, 
because I know them better than other seafarers. Additionally, we can gradually
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build up a good relationship. Every time they finish a trip, they will ask me to go 
out for dinner. We gradually become friends. So whenever I need to assign some 
seafarers onboard, I can remember them more easily than others. Whenever there 
is a chance, I will give it to these seafarers first.
The seafarers also perceived that it was easier for those who had regular working 
opportunities to maintain and improve their relationships with the managers than 
those who were not given such working opportunities, because the seafarers in the 
former group were in a better financial position. A chief officer complained:
Although there are a large number of seafarers, those who can be provided with 
work opportunities are rather limited. Those who always have working 
opportunities have more money. Therefore, they can bribe the managers much 
more and ultimately get more work opportunities. This is a vicious circle. As you 
know, some seafarers treat managers to very luxurious restaurants. They are the 
same age as me and they always have onboard opportunities. So they are richer 
than me. In this agency if you don’t go onboard often, that means you have no 
working opportunity there. I wish I could be dispatched by Agl and work 
onboard ships for ten months. If so, I could earn 20,000-30,000 yuan per month 
and I wouldn’t care about bribing managers 3,000-5,000 yuan, treating them to 
dinner or bribing them with ten packages of cigarettes. This is the problem of the 
state-owned company and it cannot be made right. Seafarers all complain about 
this. It is true.
Therefore, the working opportunities were in the hands of the seafarers who had good 
personal relationships with the managers. The ex-director of the crewing agency 
evaluated the management of the A gl:
When some seafarers are fixed to a ship, Manning managers just use those 
seafarers...These seafarers are selected not because of their skills or work 
performance but through personal relationships with the managers. Those 
employed seafarers work hard to develop and strengthen their relationships with 
managers, which makes the management very unprofessional. Consequently, 
many good seafarers are left unused.
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The Chair of the TU said:
We have many good seafarers. But they are not employed because they have 
never been given a chance. Managers just stick to employing a group of seafarers 
with whom they are familiar and personally connected. Managers can reject a 
new seafarer without considering his quality or giving him a chance. If there is 
any shortage of officer seafarers in this agency, it is definitely related to the 
method of selecting and dispatching seafarers.
Due to the FSFC policy and the interference of the personal relationship/Gw<mn, the 
onboard working opportunity was fixed to a group of seafarers.
5.1.2 Difficulty of re-employment
In Agl, it was difficult for the seafarers who were not regularly dispatched to be re­
employed by the agency because of the high requirement in terms of working 
experiences of employed seafarers, which has been applied by the PSC since the 
1990s.
For instance, it was required that if a captain were to be employed onboard a 150,000 
tonnage ship of the PSC, he had to have at least four years’ working experience 
onboard ships of 150,000 tonnage. If he did not have this experience, he had to have 
at least more than two years’ work experience onboard ships of 100,000 tonnage and a 
return-sailing apprentice experience onboard a 150,000 tonnage ship before he could 
be employed as captain. For a chief engineer, the requirement was still high. It was 
regulated that if a chief engineer were to be employed onboard a 150,000 tonnage 
ship, he must have worked onboard a 150,000 tonnage ship before. If he did not have 
this experience, he had to have at least twelve months’ working experience onboard a
100.000 tonnage ship and have a return-sailing apprentice experience onboard the
150.000 tonnage ship before he could be employed as a chief engineer. The quality 
requirements for employed seafarers of other ranks were also high. It is regulated that 
unless seafarers had already gained working experience onboard the ship to which 
they were going to be assigned, they had to accumulate six to twelve months’ work
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experience onboard ships of smaller size and had to have one year’s apprentice 
experience onboard the assigned ship before they could be formally employed.
Therefore, as a result of FSFC policy and A g l’s traditional requirements for seafarers’ 
experiences, only those who were regularly employed and hence had rich working 
experiences were eligible and qualified to be dispatched by Agl. The seafarers who 
were not fixed to any ships and hence lacked the required sailing experience were 
consequently restrained from being employed by Agl. These apparently surplus 
seafarers actually worked onboard national ships12 leading to the situation in which 
although there were apparently surplus seafarers on the books, in reality, because 
substantial numbers were working onboard domestic ships, there was actually a 
shortfall in available labour, resulting in a decline in the foreign manning business.
In addition, the poor management of seafarers’ training contributed to the shortage of 
high-quality seafarers, which influenced the foreign manning business negatively. The 
next section considers this.
5.2 Training management
The training school was in charge of the land-based training of seafarers. It was 
established in 1993 by the PSC, under the management of its training department. The 
school had a training building with ten classrooms. It employed fifty-four teachers in 
2008 and trained around 600 seafarers for the PSC annually. In 2006, due to the 
restructuring reform, the school was registered as an independent school by the PSC. 
In spite of this, the training school still functioned as a department of Agl, being 
directly supported and controlled by the PSC. Therefore, as before, it trained seafarers 
for the PSC without charging tuition fees. In addition, the staff of the school, 
including the president, were registered employees of the PSC. Unlike the private 
schools in the market, A gl’s training school did not have to be responsible for its 
business result.
12 T he seafa rers w ho  h ad  few  w o rk in g  o p p o rtu n ities  in A g l w orked  in th e  d o m es tic  m arket. T o  tak e  these  
opportun ities , se a fa re rs  h ad  to  p ay  10%  o f  th e ir  f irs t m o n th ’s w age to  A g l  to  o b ta in  th e ir  sea fa rin g  d o cu m en ts  
(w hich  w ere k ep t by  A g l  w h en  th e  se a fa re rs  w ere  on  leave). A g l  pa id  th e ir  leav e  w ages, v a rio u s k in d s  o f  n o n ­
w age ben efits  and  soc ia l in su rance .
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This section initially focuses on land-based training, particularly considering 
seafarers’ views about the management of training opportunities, the setting of 
training courses and the teaching quality of teachers, and then discusses the influences 
on seafarers of the ocean training. It explains how the management of seafarers’ 
training contributed to the shortage of high-quality seafarers and thereby influenced 
the seafarer export negatively.
5.2.1 The management of land-based training opportunities
According to the policy of the PSC, training opportunities for seafarers were arranged 
based on a schedule, which was made “through the discussion and evaluation of the 
managers of the ship management department of the PSC, the safety and technology 
department of the PSC, the shipping business department of the PSC and the crewing 
agency” (A gl’s Internal Journal, 2008, p5). However, according to the Training 
manager of Agl, the management of the training opportunity of seafarers was not 
based on any systematic plan. As a result, some seafarers were trained repeatedly 
while others hardly got any training. The President of the TU introduced and 
commented on the method of selecting training candidates:
When there is a training opportunity, in many cases, it is the Manning managers 
who look for training candidates, not based on any schedule but randomly. The 
managers normally call seafarers on leave and ask whether they are available or 
not. The seafarers who are free at the time will come and take the training 
opportunity. Because of the lack of any plan, some seafarers undertake the same 
training several times, while others are not trained at all.
A rating who is related to a Manning manager said:
Sometimes, when I am on leave, the Manning manager calls me to take some 
training. I had already done those modules several times and I don’t want to do 
them again. But considering my relationship with the Manning manager and 
considering that he consistently gives me good working opportunities, I cannot 
refuse him. So I take the lessons.
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In addition, it was regulated that the training opportunities were only provided to 
seafarers who were fixed to work onboard PSC’s ships based on the FSFC. The 
outsourced seafarers and underemployed seafarers were excluded from the training 
program. A chief officer dispatched to work for a foreign shipping company by Agl 
said:
There is no training when I am on leave. Working onboard foreign ships, I am 
not trained by the PSC training school. Being afraid of accidents, PSC only 
organizes training for seafarers working onboard its ships. PSC does not care 
about the quality of hundreds of seafarers working for foreign shipping 
companies.
A peasant rating said:
I know the registered ratings are given training and they can get certificates that 
enable them to work onboard ships. In addition, there are English courses at least 
once a year, lasting for 1-2 months each time. I have never joined in such 
training. I saw they were trained and also heard this from my work-mates who 
are registered ratings.
This suggests that due to the lack of systematic management, the training 
opportunities were not equally spread among seafarers in Agl. While some seafarers 
were given repetitive training, others had little or no opportunity for training. This 
negatively influenced the improvement of the quality of seafarers and thereby 
contributed to the shortage of high-quality labour.
5.2.2 The setting of the contents of land-based training courses 
When examining the contents of training courses from 2004 to 2008, it was difficult 
to find any courses related to hard-skill/operational training or soft-skill training. 
When talking about operational training, the HRM manager said:
Seafaring requires a lot of operational work. It is important for seafarers to get 
enough training in the use of equipment onboard ships before actually working at
100
sea. However, concerning the training in the use of some equipment onboard 
ship, we mainly show seafarers videos to give them some general idea.
A 2nd officer said:
The land-based training does not emphasize improving the skills that are needed 
in work at sea. We only watch videos and see how some operations should be 
done. But we never do any practical training ourselves. You know, watching is 
quite different from hands-on practice.
When talking about the soft-skill training, a 1st engineer said:
We do not have training concerning soft skills. Sometimes, I need to work with 
foreign seafarers. So I want to learn about foreign cultures and how to get along 
with foreign seafarers; I also want to know about some of the advanced 
technologies used onboard foreign ships. But I can hardly get such information 
from training.
In fact, soft skills, such as communication skills, are very important for us, living 
in a confined environment, far from the land. However, we are not given such 
training.
Therefore, it was suggested that although hard skill training and soft skill training are 
important for seafarers, they were not given sufficient training to improve these skills.
5.2.3 The quality of teaching
Some seafarers, especially the officer seafarers, also complained about the quality of 
the teachers. They thought the poor quality of teachers might be another reason for the 
poor quality of training, which contributed to the shortage of high-quality seafarers in 
Agl and thereby influenced the foreign manning business negatively.
The teachers in the school consisted of former captains and chief engineers and some 
teachers who did not have seafaring experience. According to the HRM manager, the
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school did not provide regular training for the teachers. Teachers taught based on the 
training books and their personal experiences.
Concerning the training of the teachers, some officer seafarers highlighted a number 
of problems in the interviews. The first problem is related to the fact that teachers’ 
knowledge is not up-to-date. A chief officer said:
The intention of establishing the training school is to help to improve the quality 
of seafarers. However, teachers are still talking about old knowledge from old 
books in spite of the fast development of the shipping market. They talk about 
theories that are absolutely outdated. Many teachers have sailing experience. But 
the problem is that they have not worked onboard ships for many years. There 
are some teachers who have not worked onboard ships for twenty years. 
Therefore, what they talk about is not really relevant to the current situation. I 
could not learn much from them.
A second engineer said:
The quality of teachers in the training school is generally low. Some of them 
were once seafarers, but they have not worked onboard ships for many years. 
There are some operations and knowledge that they cannot remember or 
understand clearly. Many teachers are unable to explain themselves clearly. Most 
of them just read the books in class and repeat what the books say.
Secondly, some seafarers complained that certain teachers, especially those without 
sailing experience, were lacking in professional knowledge. A chief engineer said:
You know, some teachers are not very good. They have no experience. Many of 
them have never touched a ship. Once a teacher, talking about chemical ships, 
said ‘You should not work onboard chemical ships because the air of these ships 
is polluted with poisonous gas’. In fact, as a teacher, he should not have said 
such irresponsible things. In addition, if he does not know better, he should not 
be teaching here.
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A  secon d  en g in eer  said:
At some English classes, few people know English. The English teacher is no 
good. He had many pronunciation and spelling problems. I don’t think his 
English is as good as mine, and attending the classes is not helpful in improving 
my English.
Unlike the officer seafarers, some ratings seemed satisfied with the training. For 
instance, one rating said:
We are trained in the PSC’s school. Many of the teachers are former captains or 
chief engineers. They are scholars and have high salaries. Unlike them, we are 
workers, selling our labour. I can learn from the teachers. They are rich in 
experiences and I can learn from these experiences.
The difference in attitudes between officer seafarers and ratings can be explained to 
some extent by the following two aspects. Initially, at least some considering that 
ratings’ work is low skilled, manual labour, there may be much less knowledge to be 
updated for the ratings than for the officer seafarers; hence, ratings have fewer 
concerns with and lower requirements for training than do officer seafarers. In 
addition, freelance ratings outside the SOEs have few, if any, free training 
opportunities provided by any institution (Han 2008; Huang and Ning 2008). This 
may also explain why the ratings in Agl seemed more satisfied with the training than 
did the officer seafarers.
Through the discussion, it seems that the training opportunities were not 
systematically spread among seafarers, key skills were not included in the training 
contents and the quality of teaching was not satisfactory. Therefore, the land-based 
training seems not to be very helpful in improving the skills of seafarers, which led to 
the shortage of high-quality seafarers and thereby impeded the development of the 
seafarer export. The next part considers the training organized at sea and how it 
influenced the quality of seafarers.
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5.2.4 Training at sea
According to a training document, the ocean training was designed to improve the 
skills of seafarers comprehensively, including training in the use of equipment 
onboard ship, emergency procedures, the study of international conventions and 
safety documents, English training, occupational health and safety and the cargo- 
handling.
However, the training plan was not well implemented at sea. One of the reasons for 
this might be that much of the attention of the ocean training was devoted to coping 
with maritime inspections, such as those from the shipping companies and Port State 
Control, concerning the implementation of maritime codes and regulations. The 
reason for this was that the results of the examinations could directly influence the 
reputation and business of the shipping company and the personal interests of 
seafarers.
To perform well in these examinations, preparatory work was carried out in advance, 
according to seafarers. Captains held meetings to motivate seafarers spiritually and to 
assign specific tasks to each seafarer. Seafarers were called together to watch DVDs 
of previous examinations onboard other ships and to analyse these examinations and 
learn from them. In addition, seafarers were asked to undertake specific practices that 
were aimed at improving the skills on which each of the seafarers was probably to be 
examined.
Some seafarers complained that the ocean training did not improve their skills. A third 
engineer said:
Some training was only organized for the examinations. There was nothing more. 
Such training can help us to some extent, but it cannot cover the important skills 
that are needed in daily work.
A second officer said:
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When the ocean training is held, the captain often reads out certain documents. 
Before the examination, the captain reminds us of some important issues. Such 
training cannot improve our skills, but is just for the examination.
A commissar also suggested in the annual work report 2007 that: “we need more 
training and practice at sea, but not meetings that emphasize important skills to cope 
with examinations”.
In addition to coping with maritime inspections, the poor implementation of the ocean 
training plan is also related to the heavy workload of seafarers. Some seafarers 
complained that when the workload onboard ships became heavy, training turned into 
a burden and they could not learn much from it. A rating said:
We study international conventions and practice fire fighting and first aid skills 
every Wednesday afternoon. Training sessions are also organized on Saturdays. 
Such training is compulsory. I have to attend. But you know, we work very hard 
and we feel very tired. So now I feel bored when I think about the training. Its 
effect is not very good as a consequence.
It is therefore suggested that seafarers were disaffected with the training at sea and the 
ocean training seems not to be very helpful in improving the skills of seafarers. 
Seafarers in Agl lacked certain important skills and their overall quality was not 
satisfactory.
5.2.5 Consequences of the training management
If we look at the results of the sea inspections from 2005 to 2007, it is easy to see that 
the mistakes made by seafarers during work at sea increased year by year (Chart 5.2).
105
C h a rt 5 .2  T h e  n u m b ers  o f  th e  m ista k es  o f  ea ch  c a teg o ry  fro m  2 0 0 5  to  2 0 0 7
160 >- 
140 -  
120 -  
100 -  
80 -  
60 -  
40 -  
20  -  
0 -
s a f e ty  n a v ig a t io n  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  p o l lu t io n
m a n a g e m e n t  s a f e ty  e n g in e  p r e v e n t io n
d e p a r tm e n t
Source: A g l’s Working Report by the Department of Training
In addition, in the annual reports, the director exemplified some problems repeatedly 
found from seafarers’ work at sea:
When we examined the work of seafarers at sea, we found that many seafarers, 
including officer seafarers, were not familiar with or able to skilfully operate the 
equipment and devices onboard ship, even some life-saving and fire-fighting 
equipment. In addition, there was lack of training concerning first aid in confined 
environments. We need to do that as well. Furthermore, it is found some officers 
did not clearly understand the use of radar and some second officers were unable 
to operate the foam pump properly. Last but not least, the poor English of 
seafarers and the lack of training of chief officers concerning coping with ballast 
water are also problems with our seafarers.
The director of Agl was concerned about the training management and the quality of 
seafarers. In the interview, he said:
We are facing the problem of a lack of high quality officer seafarers. The supply 
of high quality seafarers cannot satisfy the demand of the fleet, which is
M i l
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■  2006
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developing very fast at the moment. English is still the major problem for many 
seafarers. However, the training seems not to be effective to solve these 
problems. And there is also a lack of a studious and self-motivated learning 
atmosphere among seafarers.
Therefore, it was suggested that the land-based training and ocean training were not 
helpful in improving the quality of seafarers. This contributed to the shortage of high- 
quality seafarers in Agl, which negatively influenced the development of the foreign 
manning business.
In addition to the lack of high-quality seafarers due to the poor management of 
training, the shortage in A gl’s labour supply is related to some regularly employed 
seafarers working temporarily for other domestic shipping companies as was 
discussed in Chapter 4. The following section explains some of the reasons for this. It 
considers the impacts on seafarers of the management of seafarers’ promotion. Other 
management strategies and the consequent impacts on seafarers and the implications 
for the foreign manning business will be considered in the following two chapters of 
Part Two.
5.3 Promotion management
Before 1989, Chinese seafarers did not have to take any form of examination in order 
to be promoted. They were promoted directly by the company, on the basis of firstly, 
the recommendation of the commissar and captain onboard ship, and secondly, the 
approval of the secretaries of the Party Branch and leaders of the departments of the 
company. Since China was elected as a Class A Party of the International Maritime 
Organization in 1989, it has had more communication and cooperation with related 
international and regional organizations. Accordingly, an examination and assessment 
system for seafarers’ promotion has been introduced. Since 1989, Chinese seafarers 
have been required to take training and examinations in order to be promoted by the 
Chinese Maritime Bureau (CMB). After they pass the examination and get their 
certificate of competency of a higher rank, they are promoted after completing the 
apprenticeship.
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However, seafarer’ promotion in Agl was much more complicated than this. To be 
promoted, seafarers not only had to earn their certificate of competency (COC), but 
also had to be “appointed” by the company, and then gain approval of the captains 
and Manning managers and satisfy the additional requirements of Agl before they 
were given an apprenticeship opportunity. Such management had been implemented 
since the 1990s and caused the slow promotion of seafarers in Agl. The following 
parts will explain this management and its consequences in detail.
5.3.1 Appointment by the managers
Initially, the practice of traditional SOEs before the examination system was 
introduced in China was to appoint seafarers to be promoted by the managers. It 
involved the following procedures:
1) Seafarers submitting a form signed by the leaders onboard ship, which recommends 
them to take training and examinations for promotion;
2) Taking and passing an exam;
3) Working onboard ship in their original position;
4) Preparing application documents for promotion, including a promotion application 
form (signed by the captain), skills evaluation form (signed by the captain), and a 
sailing experience report;
5) Agl examining seafarers’ English level, certificates of competency, application 
documents and working report;
6) Agl submitting the candidates’ documents to the heads of eleven departments of 
the agency and the PSC;
7) Agl calling a meeting to discuss and make appointment decisions;
8) Agl publicizing an “appointment notification document” with a big red title.
Such management was still applied by Agl in 2008. There were some drawbacks to 
this management, which consequently delayed seafarers’ promotion. For instance, the 
appointment meetings were only held twice a year. However, seafarers could take in 
examinations online once a month. In addition, only 20-30 seafarers could be assessed 
at each meeting. When around 100 seafarers passed the examination each year, half of 
the seafarers had to wait at least six months for the next assessment. As a result, some 
seafarers who passed the examination may not be evaluated / appointed in time. The 
TU President commented on this management and explained the reasons. He said:
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Appointing seafarers to be promoted by the leaders of the company was the 
management system applied before China’s economic reform. Now, with the 
implementation of the maritime inspection system administrated by the Maritime 
Bureau, few companies [few POCAs and ISCAs] retain this management. But in 
Agl, nobody changes it. Everyone is afraid of the possible negative consequences 
of abolishing this procedure. So it is still used and prevents many seafarers from 
being promoted.
After seafarers were appointed by the PSC, if they wanted to be promoted, they were 
required to obtain the approval of the captains and the Manning managers with whom 
they worked.
5.3.2 The role of captains and Manning managers
Before the economic reform, captains did not have the absolute power onboard ship 
and the status of the captain onboard ship was lower than that of the commissar. On 
March 30th 1988, the Contract Responsibility System was implemented in the PSC 
and the reform of the management system onboard ships was carried out as well. In 
mid-December 1988, the Captain Responsibility System was executed onboard the 
ships of the PSC.
The Captain Responsibility System reformed the old system - ‘captain under the 
leadership of the Party Branch, political commissar in charge of the ship’ - which had 
been implemented for several decades before 1988. The reform emphasized the 
central leading power of the captain and the supervisory role of the Party Branch 
onboard ship. The political commissar consequently became the deputy head of the 
ship and was directly responsible to the captain.
Because of the power of captains and commissars, they played an important role in 
the promotion of seafarers in Agl. Captains and commissars evaluated the 
performances of seafarers, wrote reference letters and signed application forms for 
promotion. After receiving the documents, Manning manager dispatched the seafarers 
to work as apprentices in the new position. After this, the seafarer was formally 
promoted.
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In 1991, the PSC implemented the regulation that if problems arose onboard ships, the 
captain would be punished administratively and economically and the Manning 
manager who had dispatched the seafarers would be responsible for the problems as 
well.
When captains needed to take full responsibility for any mistakes onboard ship, they 
consequently became reluctant to let inexperienced seafarers work with them. Since 
newly promoted seafarers lacked experience in the new position, the captains did not 
support the promotion of seafarers in Agl. A second engineer relayed his experience 
when he was promoted from a rating to a third engineer years ago:
The captain did not promote me because he was afraid of taking responsibility for 
the possible consequences. After a trip, I went to the managers and asked about 
my delayed promotion. I said that if the captains intentionally refused to promote 
me, I would be unable to work any longer. Then the Manning managers said: 
‘This is the regulation of SOE and we can do nothing to change it.’ You know, I 
also worked for foreign shipping companies. The advantage of their management 
is that people do not shirk responsibility. Captains have the authority to promote 
seafarers. If there are problems at sea, the shipping company will deal with them 
according to law, rather than push the responsibility onto the captains. As a result, 
captains dare to promote seafarers in foreign shipping companies. But in Agl, this 
is not the case. Therefore, while the captains working for foreign ships-owners 
dare to promote seafarers, the captains in Agl dare not.
Like the captains, Manning managers avoided promoting seafarers when they had to 
undertake the responsibility for their manning decisions due to the regulations. The 
ex-director of Agl explained when talking about the promotion management:
If there is an accident, the director of the PSC or the Head Office will first ask the 
Manning manager whether the dispatched seafarers have worked in the position 
before or whether the seafarers have adequate experience. If not, the leaders will 
ask the managers why they dispatched those new, inexperienced seafarers.
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There have been some bad examples when Manning manager have faced negative 
consequences because they dispatched newly promoted seafarers. Manning 
managers have now learned to avoid these mistakes. This is the problem with the 
institutional system. Under this system, seafarers cannot be promoted in time, as it 
is delayed.
A first engineer said:
The promotion in Agl is too slow. In this SOE, if seafarers were not promoted for 
a long time, no one would be responsible for or punished because of this. The 
promotion of the seafarers is not related to the wages or the interests of the 
managers. However, if some seafarers are promoted and an accident happens, 
managers and the leaders onboard ship will take the responsibility. Therefore it is 
difficult for seafarers to get promoted.
Therefore, many seafarers had to wait for a long time to be promoted in Agl. A 
Manning manager said:
For fewer accidents and less responsibility, Agl uses a lot of experienced 
seafarers. As a result, after being appointed, the seafarers really do not know how 
long they have to wait to get promoted. Many seafarers work onboard small ships 
for several years and work onboard old ships for several years, so as to accumulate 
experience and to be qualified to work onboard the ships of the PSC that they are 
assigned to.
The problem of the slow promotion of seafarers had already captured the attention of 
the senior managers of the PSC. In a year-end report, the director of the PSC 
encouraged captains and Manning managers to train and promote seafarers. He said:
We offer proper rewards to the captains who can take the responsibility to train 
and promote new seafarers. Land-based managers should also change their 
attitude so as to promote and dispatch more competent seafarers. Managers should 
not be so concerned about their position and career development that they dare not
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dispatch newly promoted seafarers. Managers should be brave enough to take 
responsibility for the development of the PSC.
Despite this encouragement, the Manning managers and captains remained reluctant 
to promote new seafarers due to the old regulations and the consequent responsibility 
that they had to undertake. Consequently, seafarers experienced slow promotion. 
Because of this, some of them worked for other domestic shipping companies to attain 
promotion and to accumulate sailing experiences in their new positions. This 
contributed to the shortfall of seafaring labour in Agl, which constrained the 
development of seafarer export in practical terms.
In addition, the slow promotion of seafarers can be related to certain regulations of 
Agl. The following section explains this.
5.3.3 Additional regulations
There were also some additional regulations on the promotion of seafarers in Agl. For 
instance, it was regulated that seafarers with higher education could have better 
promotion opportunities. Consequently, some seafarers could not be promoted in time 
because their educational level was not high enough. Some seafarers thought this was 
very unreasonable. A 2nd officer said:
Agl will not promote seafarers like us. The Manning manager explained that 
when there were many seafarers with bachelors’ degrees from famous maritime 
universities in the agency waiting for promotion, those of us who did not have 
higher qualifications should wait. So to maintain the dignity of the company, 
seafarers with a higher educational background are to be promoted first. However, 
this is nonsense, because the technical secondary school qualification is approved 
by the CMB as granting officer status. And I, along with those seafarers with high 
qualifications, passed the same examination for promotion held by the CMB and 
earned a COC. So Agl restraining my promotion because of my educational 
qualification is unreasonable. The regulation and management system of Agl is 
just so outdated. I am very disappointed with it.
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In addition, Agl intentionally slowed down the promotion of seafarers by restricting 
the seafarers from taking training courses and examinations for promotion. Restricting 
seafarers from participating in training and examinations was a management strategy 
during the period of the 1990s when the promotion of seafarers was planned by 
companies. At that time, seafarers were not allowed to apply for training or 
examinations without a supporting letter from the company. In recent years, the 
restriction has been abandoned by the CMB and it has allowed seafarers to apply for 
promotional training by themselves and to sit the examinations online every month.
However, Agl still retains the traditional restrictions. The certificate and training 
management department of Agl (Zheng Pei Bu) undertook this task. It examined the 
educational level and sailing experience of seafarers, decided who could take part in 
the training and examinations and signed up the selected seafarers.
It was the policy of Agl that when there were surplus seafarers at certain ranks based 
on the A gl’s books, the promotion of seafarers to those ranks had to be delayed. For 
instance, chief officers and first engineers would not be promoted for three or four 
years after they had earned their COC at a higher rank because there were surplus 
captains and chief engineers on the books. Seafarers thought such restrictions were 
unreasonable, but they could do nothing about it. A chief officer said:
The agency implements its plan by sacrificing the benefits of seafarers, by 
restraining seafarers from taking training and examinations. As a result, seafarers 
are dissatisfied with the management. The agency even claims that chief officers 
will not be promoted within three years after getting the certificates of 
competency. This is very unreasonable.
5.3.4 The slow promotion of seafarers
As a result of the management, seafarers complained about the slow promotion in 
A gl. A 2nd officer said:
Promotion in Agl is too slow, and not reasonable. There is too little opportunity 
for seafarers. Agl should try its best to promote seafarers when they earn COC of 
higher rank. We feel very angry about the management of promotion. Many of my
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classmates working for Agl are not given opportunities to take the promotion 
examination to attain COC as chief officers. However, most of my classmates 
working for other agencies and domestic shipping companies have worked as 
captains for seven or eight years.
Some seafarers from Ag2 also talked about the slow promotion in Agl when they 
were asked about the promotion management in their agency. A Captain from Ag2 
said:
Promotion in Agl is very slow. I know a seafarer who took an examination for the 
rank of captain at the same time as me six years ago. He is still working as a chief 
officer. Promotion in Agl is just too slow.
A Manning manager of Ag2 said:
I know some seafarers in Agl and it is not unusual for them to wait for four or 
five years to get promoted. Seafarers have no way to deal with it.
Due to the slow promotion in Agl, some seafarers worked for other domestic 
shipping companies, which contributed to a shortfall in seafarer supply in Agl and 
thereby constrained the development of the foreign manning business.
5.4 Summary
This chapter looks at the management of manning, training and promotion and the 
impacts on seafarers. It is found the management strategies lacked reform, which 
resulted in problems such as limited working opportunities for many seafarers in Agl, 
low-quality training and slow promotion. Because of this, many seafarers sought job 
opportunities in the domestic shipping industry, which contributed to the shortage in 
seafarer supply in Agl, particularly the shortfall of high-quality seafarers, and resulted 
in the decline of the foreign manning business (this will be explained in more detail in 
Chapter 7).
Specifically, concerning manning management, it was seen that the onboard working 
opportunity was fixed to a group of seafarers due to the FSFC policy that has been
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applied since the beginning of the 1990s and to the interference of the personal 
relationship/Gwtfwxz between the regularly employed seafarers and the managers. The 
seafarers developed relationships with managers by bribing them, in return for which 
managers provided working opportunities for these seafarers. The lack of reform of 
the FSFC policy and the lack of rationalization in the institution imply the limited 
extent of the reform in Agl. In addition, because of A g l’s very stringent requirements 
on seafarers’ working experiences, it was difficult for the seafarers who were not 
regularly dispatched by Agl to be re-employed when there was a shortage of 
seafarers. As a consequence of this form of management, these seafarers had to look 
for working opportunities in other domestic shipping companies. This partly explains 
the shortfall in seafarer supply in Agl, which impeded the development of the 
manning business with foreign ship-owners.
Concerning the management of seafarers’ training, it seems that land-based training 
opportunities were not systematically distributed among seafarers, land-based training 
concerning important skills was not included in the training contents and the quality 
of teaching was far from satisfactory. In addition, A gl’s ocean training plan was not 
implemented well because much of the focus of the ocean training was on how to 
cope with maritime inspections, and also because of the heavy workload of seafarers 
at sea. Therefore, it was suggested that land-based training and ocean training did not 
significantly improve the quality of seafarers and this contributed to the shortage of 
high-quality seafarers in Agl, which consequently constrained the development of the 
seafarer export. The problems with the training management reflect the limitation of 
A gl’s reform.
With respect to the management of seafarers’ promotion, this aspect also lacked 
reform. Specifically, the appointment of promoted seafarers by managers, which as 
the method used in the traditional SOEs in the 1980s, was still applied in Agl, and it 
proved to delay the promotion of seafarers. In addition, the old regulations concerning 
the responsibility of captains and Manning managers for dispatching newly promoted 
seafarers were still carried out in Agl. Consequently, captains and Manning managers 
did not act positively in seafarers’ promotion in order to avoid possible consequences 
and punishment. This further contributed to the slow promotion of seafarers. Last but 
not least, Agl had added additional regulations concerning seafarers’ promotion,
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which made the promotion of seafarers even more difficult. As a result of this 
management, seafarers in Agl suffered from slow promotion and some regularly 
employed seafarers sought promotion opportunities by working for other domestic 
shipping companies. This contributed to the shortage of seafaring labour in Agl and 
thereby resulted in the shrinking of the foreign manning business.
Seafarers were also confronted with other problems as a result of A g l’s management 
strategies. The following chapter focuses on the impacts on seafarers of the 
management of material support and thus identifies other reasons for the labour 
shortage and the consequent decline of the seafarer export in Agl.
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C h a p te r  6: T h e  m a n a g e m e n t o f  m a te r ia l su p p o r t
It has been assumed that the high wages in the global seafarer labour market would be 
one of the driving forces that accelerate the development of China’s seafarer export 
(Wu, 2004a, Wu, et, al. 2007). This chapter challenges this point by explaining that 
the wages of the Chinese seafarers dispatched onboard foreign ships are not 
necessarily higher than those of seafarers working in the domestic seafarer labour 
market. This is done by looking at the management of seafarers’ material support in 
Agl and analysing the reasons for the low wages of officer seafarers. This chapter 
also considers the consequences to seafarers of the reforms of the payment system in 
Agl.
The discussion aims to add further explanations to the reasons why some regularly 
employed seafarers in Agl temporarily worked for other domestic shipping 
companies, which caused a shortage in labour supply and consequently constrained 
the development of the foreign manning business.
6.1 The reasons for the low wages of officer seafarers
The wages of officer seafarers in Agl were generally lower than those in the domestic 
seafarer labour market. Table 6.1 shows the average wages of seafarers of different 
ranks in the market and in Agl in May 2008.
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Table 6.1 The wages of seafarers of different ranks in the market and in Agl (per 
month/yuan)
Ranks of seafarers Average wages in the market Average wages in Agl
Captain / chief engineer 70-80,000 50,000
Chief officer/1st engineer 50-60,000 30,000
2nd officer/engineer 20-30,000 15,000
3 rd officer/ engineer 15-20,000 10,000
Source: Comprehensive Statistics of Agl (2008)
The reasons for the low wages in Agl can be related to the following four factors - the 
control of the head office over the input for the material support of managers and 
seafarers; the large number of managers and their good material support; the high cost 
of the welfare of seafarers and the high wages of ratings. The relationship of these 
four aspects is presented in Chart 6.1. Since the poor remuneration is one of the 
important reasons why some seafarers worked onboard ships belonging to domestic 
shipping companies, the following sections explain each of the four aspects, 
respectively.
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Chart 6.1 Factors influencing the wages of officer seafarers and the internal 
relationship
The welfare of seafarers
The wages of ratines
The wages of seafarers
The wages of officer seafarers
The material support of seafarersThe material support of managers
The gross input for the material support of managers and seafarers
6.1.1 The control of the head office
The gross input for the material support of seafarers and managers in Agl was 
regulated by the head office of the PSC.
In theory, the PSC was allowed to submit an application to the head office to adjust 
the amount of the input. However, the application procedure can be so bureaucratic 
and time-consuming that the PSC had never submitted such a request since its 
establishment, according to the director of the PSC.
In addition, the head office did not allow the PSC or the agency to improve the input 
by using its profits. The director explained:
The salaries and welfare of managers and seafarers are adjusted by the head 
office every two years. If the head office requires the company to achieve a net 
profit of 5 billion yuan but we actually have 7 billion at the year end, we are still 
not allowed to use the surplus - 2 billion yuan - to improve the welfare and 
wages of workers.
119
Because of the control of the head office, neither PSC nor Agl was able to increase 
the salaries of officer seafarers in line with changes in the labour market.
Since 2004, the payment of Chinese officer seafarers in the domestic labour market 
has increased rapidly (Han 2008 p26; Ma and Xu 2008 pi 17). In contrast, the head 
office has only increased the payment of seafarers twice, with a moderate increase in 
January 2005 and a dramatic increase (52%) in January 2007. Despite the increase in 
2007, as a result of the implementation of the New Tax Policy in 2007, seafarers in 
Agl started to pay 20% to 30% of their wages in tax. Consequently the officer 
seafarers in Agl have received lower wages than seafarers in the national market 
since 2004. The director of the PSC said:
We cannot increase the wages of seafarers according to the situation in the 
labour market because the input for the wages is controlled by the head office. 
So when the wages of officer seafarers have been increasing every six months or 
even every three or four months in the market since 2004, we are unable to catch 
up with that rate. We always lag behind.
In addition, it is an unwritten rule of the SOE that the wages of workers are not 
supposed to reduce much or fluctuate too often, but keep an increasing trend. So 
that is another constraint on the increase of the wages of seafarers.
Therefore, under the control of the head office, the input for the material support of 
the seafarers and managers cannot be adjusted flexibly according to changes in the 
labour market, which consequently contributes to the low wages of officer seafarers in 
Agl.
6.1.2 High material support of managers and their large numbers
When the input for the material support of the seafarers and managers was fixed by
the head office, the material support of the managers influenced the benefits of
seafarers directly. The following section discusses the management of the material
support of the managers to explain the low wages of officer seafarers from another
perspective.
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6.1.2.1 The good material support of managers
Before the 1990s, managers earned much less than seafarers. A senior officer seafarer 
recalled that in the 1980s, when he earned four hundred yuan per month at sea, land- 
based managers earned only forty yuan. Therefore, many people preferred to work at 
sea rather than doing land-based managerial work at that time.
However, with the deepening of the economic reform, this situation changed. The 
material support of managers has been improving due to managers’ role in managing 
the company. Although I did not obtain the exact amount of the managers’ salaries, 
the ex-director of Agl and some seafarers provided an estimated annual income for 
managers in different positions (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 The annual income of the managers in different positions
Position Annual income (yuan)
Director and Secretary of the Party Committee Over 400,000
Vice-director and President of the TU 300,000-400,000
Senior managers (the head of each department) 250,000- 300,000
Managers in other positions 150,000-250,000
Clerks 60,000-100,000
Source: Estimates from the ex-director of Agl and some interviewed seafarers
As a result of this increase, the salaries of managers became higher than the wages of 
most of the seafarers. For instance, the annual income of a second officer / second 
engineer working at sea for seven months was around 100,000 to 150,000 yuan. This 
was higher than the salaries of clerks, but lower than the salaries of most of the 
managers, as seen in Table 6.2. This suggests that only the captains/chief engineers 
and chief officers/first engineers, representing less than 20% of the seafarers in Agl, 
have similar or higher annual wages than most of the managers. More than 80% of the 
seafarers received lower wages than the managers.
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In addition, managers can enjoy the welfare that seafarers are offered, such as social 
insurance and other benefits (which will be further discussed in section 6.2.3). As well 
as this, the managers have non-wage benefits that are not offered to seafarers. For 
example, managers are considered first when it comes to the distribution of the year- 
end bonus. As a result, there are some years when seafarers do not receive a bonus. 
The Manning manager explained, “While managers get a year-end bonus almost 
every year, the bonus for seafarers can not be guaranteed.”
Managers were also entitled to other benefits that were not provided to the seafarers, 
such as free lunch, gas allowance for their cars (800 yuan per month), inter-city 
communication allowance (300 yuan per month), gift cards for big shopping malls 
and study and travelling opportunities to places of interest, both inside and outside 
China. The managers were satisfied with the welfare and activities organized by the 
agency, especially with regard to travel. When talking about working in this SOCA, 
the HRM manager said:
The welfare in the SOEs is always good, much better than other types of 
companies, such as the private-owned companies or foreign invested companies. 
That is the reason why many people prefer to work for the SOE.
The working atmosphere in this agency is great. Every month, activities are 
organized, such as climbing hills at some places of interest, picking fruit in 
commercial gardens, visiting places with good views. These activities are 
fantastic. Also we can bring our families with us. Of course, we do invite some 
seafarers to join us.
These activities were not, however, provided to most of the seafarers. A second 
officer said:
The managers can travel to different places every month and can take their 
families for free. Seafarers are never treated like this. Only a few seafarers who 
are connected to the managers are invited to join in, because to get enough 
funding, these activities are organized in the name of seafarers. Most of the 
participants are managers and their families. I have never been invited to join
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because I am young and I am not personally related or familiar with anybody in 
the company.. ..Many elder seafarers, the experienced ones, do not expect to join 
either. Everyone knows how it works and the chance for our seafarers is small.
In Agl, such high wages and good welfare were provided to a large number of 
managers.
6.1.2.2 The large number of managers
An important part of the economic reform of Chinese SOEs is the streamlining of the 
institutions, which aims at cutting out surplus personnel and increasing the 
competitiveness of the enterprises. Despite the reform policy, the problem of surplus 
managers was not solved in Agl. When talking about streamlining the institution, the 
director of the PSC said:
In fact, it is very difficult to reduce the number of managers. Concerning the 
reform of the company, the biggest problem is with the reform of the HRM. In 
fact, we have already established more than ten subsidiary companies and have 
tried to assign some less-skilled managers to work there. However, due to the 
lower salaries and welfare in the subsidiaries, these managers complained: why 
am I being sent to work in the subsidiaries? How can you tell I am less capable 
than others? So it is very difficult to make these decisions.
In fact, during these years of reform, there have been more positions and more 
managers in this company, rather than less. Whenever the head office sets up 
new departments or the government requires us to organize activities, we must 
establish corresponding departments. Some old departments that are not very 
helpful to the business cannot be abandoned either, such as the Party Branch, the 
Party’s commission for inspecting discipline, TU and the Youth League 
Committee. Our twelve subsidiary companies are also required to have these 
departments. Therefore, we have more departments and more people now. In 
fact, to do our business, where a Japanese company may need to employ only 
fifty people, we may need two hundred.
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In Agl, there were twenty-two staff in 1995. By 2008, thus figure had increased to 
fifty-two. When explaining the large number of managers, the vice director of the 
head office said:
The SOEs are not completely profit-oriented organizations. In addition to 
managing the business, they have large departments, such as the Party Branch, 
TU and Youth League Committee, to ensure that the SOEs fulfil their social 
responsibilities. These are at the cost of the SOEs as well and not insignificant.
Seafarers thought the large number of the managers and their high material support 
influenced their material support in a negative way. The words of a third engineer 
provide an example:
There are too many managers. They do not have to work as hard as us, but they 
get many more benefits than us. Much money that should have been spent on 
our seafarers is actually spent on the managers. We seafarers meet the needs of 
the managers through our hard work. They have good salaries and welfare at the 
expense of the interests of seafarers. In fact, some departments are not useful, 
but are an affectation. For example, the secretary of the Party’s commission for 
inspecting discipline cannot really inspect or supervise the director because they 
are appointed and paid by the director. Other departments, such as the Party 
Branch, TU and Youth League Committee, are the same. If departments like 
these could be cut, we seafarers would definitely have better wages.
When part of the regulated input by the head office was used for the material support 
of managers, the rest was for the material support of seafarers, including their welfare 
and wages. The next part looks at the management of seafarers’ welfare to explain the 
low wages of officer seafarers further.
6.1.3 The high cost of seafarers’ welfare
Before the economic reform, Chinese SOEs offered workers a whole package of 
welfare benefits. For instance, workers lived in houses that were provided by their 
companies. Workers visited doctors who worked in the hospital that was also owned 
by the companies. Workers’ children went to schools that were owned by the SOE for
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free and after graduation they normally succeeded to the work of their parents. As for 
food and daily necessities, companies distributed ration coupons to workers. Without 
the existence of the market at that time, companies provided all-encompassing welfare 
to workers. This full welfare provision of the SOEs during the planned economy 
period has been criticized for resulting in a heavy burden to the companies and 
contributing to their poor economic performance.
In the mid-1980s, China started the reform of the welfare system, which aimed to 
change the situation by shifting the responsibility for welfare provision from SOEs to 
a combination of government, company and individuals. Additionally, a social 
insurance system was established in China.
In line with government regulations, Agl set up social insurance account for 
registered seafarers and paid the fees for that it was obliged to cover. Different 
standards were applied in different cities in China. The higher the city’s GDP, the 
higher the social insurance standard set. The PSC paid for the welfare of seafarers 
according to the highest standard. The annual cost for the social insurance of seafarers 
represented as much as 47% of the cost for the wages of seafarers, including 
retirement pensions (20%), medical service (14%), working injury (0.8%), maternity 
leave (female workers 0.2%), unemployment (2%) and public accumulation funds for 
the houses of seafarers (10%)). Except for the House Accumulation Fund, the 
company’s input for insurance could not be used by seafarers directly, but went to the 
government as a social pooling fund and was used by the government to support 
people in society who joined the insurance scheme.
In addition, the PSC invested nearly 10% of the cost of seafarers’ wages to provide 
other non-wage benefits, such as a free kindergarten for workers’ children, home 
heating reimbursement in winter (120 yuan per month), free physical examinations 
and work-related reimbursement and so on. In 2007, the company invested more than
300,000 yuan, introducing four pieces of modem equipment to its Workers’ Hospital 
so that managers and seafarers could have more free physical examinations, according 
to the HRM manager.
125
Therefore, due to the economic reform in China, the SOEs no longer fully supported 
the workers as they had done thirty years ago. However, a large sum of money, as 
much as 57% of the cost of seafarers’ wages, was spent on social insurance and the 
other non-wage benefits of seafarers in A gl.
In addition to the support of employed workers, the PSC spent a large sum of money 
in offering good welfare and benefits to retired workers and their families. Thus 
support was even better than that for the registered workers. The medical service 
serves as a good example.
Since the “free medical service” provided by the old SOEs before the economic 
reform in China has been abandoned, workers currently have to pay for part of the 
medical service under the social insurance system. It was regulated that registered 
workers could claim for 50% of their costs only if they spent more than 2,000 yuan (if 
the cost was under 2000, workers had to pay all the money). For retired workers, 
those under 70 years old could claim for 70% of the cost if they spent more than 1300 
yuan, while those aged over 70 could claim for 80% if they spent more than 1300 
yuan (if the cost was under 1300 yuan, retired workers had to pay the full sum). As for 
the retired cadres who joined in the communist party before the establishment of P.R. 
China on 1st October 1949, they were entitled to support at the highest standard. They 
could get a full refund no matter how much they had paid for medical services (Table 
6.3). Therefore, retired workers could claim more than registered workers when they 
spent less.
Table 6.3 Claim for medical service fees
Workers Age Reimbursement Condition
Registered workers Less than 55 50% of the cost Spend more than 2,000 yuan
Retired workers 55-70 70% of the cost Spend more than 1300 yuan
Retired workers Above 70 80% of the cost Spend more than 1300 yuan
Retired cadres Any age 100% of the cost Any amount
Source: A g l’s internal magazine (2008)
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Concerning housing issues, retired workers were entitled to more Workers’ Housing 
Monetary Allowance than employed workers. As for the house heating allowance, it 
was regulated that if the retired worker passed away, his family could still claim the 
same allowance from the company. Retired cadres could always receive an allowance 
of the highest standard and their families could still claim the highest allowance from 
the company if they died.
Therefore, the seafarers and managers reflected the view that the PSC’s welfare cost 
was huge, which negatively influenced the wages of seafarers. The director of the 
PSC said:
Actually, we input rather a large sum of money for the wages and welfare of 
seafarers. As a big SOE, I am confident that we spend more than any other 
company or agency in the city on workers’ welfare. However, because we are 
state-owned, we also have to implement the government’s policy and take care 
of retired workers and their families. This is the tradition of the SOE. Providing 
welfare is a big cost, as everyone knows, and this directly influenced the 
competitiveness of the wages of our officer seafarers in the market. I know 
many domestic companies avoid paying welfare by reporting low seafarers’ 
wages to the government. Instead, they use the money to increase the wages of 
seafarers. So the wages of those seafarers are higher than ours. However, we 
cannot do it. We have to pay for the high welfare to fulfil our social 
responsibility.
Agl spent a large amount of money on the welfare of seafarers. The retired workers 
benefited most from this. Many seafarers stated that they did not want to resign from 
Agl because they wanted to be entitled to these benefits after retirement (we will 
discuss this in more detail in Chapter 11). However, the high cost for the welfare of 
seafarers unavoidably reduced the input for the wages of currently employed 
seafarers. When the money put in was to pay for the wages of both officers and 
ratings, ratings’ high wages became another factor that contributed to the low wages 
of officer seafarers.
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6.1.4 The high wages of ratings in Agl
When Doeringer and Piore explain dualism of the labour market in the western 
societies, they write:
The labour market is divided into a primary and secondary market... Jobs in the 
secondary market, in contrast, tend to have low wages and fringe benefits, poor 
working conditions, high labour turnover, little chance of advancement, and 
often arbitrary and capricious supervision (1971, p. 165).
They also see that there is little chance for secondary workers to work in the primary 
labour market over their life course (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, p. 167).
During the last three decades in the west, the level of labour segmentation has 
increased with the extended internal hierarchies as a result of the changes of 
organizational structure and employer-employee relationships, in which jobs become 
more contingent amd work arrangements more non-standard (Hudson, 2007, p. 290). 
Workers with certain characteristics (e.g. race, sex, immigration status and types of 
work arrangement) are more likely to be employed in the ‘bad/secondary’ jobs at 
different levels of the organization and in different forms. They are divided and easily 
exploited (Beck 1998, p261; Hudson 2007, p 289-290; Peck 1996, p 52-53).
These descriptions fit the situation of the redundant, low-skilled freelance ratings in 
the Chinese seafarer labour market very well, a large majority of whom come from 
the countryside and are employed on temporary terms, doing manual work for low 
wages, and are excluded from the ACFTU and easily exploited (Han 2008; Huang and 
Ning 2008; Huang 2908; Yin et al 2008).
However, the situation for registered ratings in Agl was much better than that of the 
ratings in the labour market. The ratings in Agl were offered permanent contracts 
with the PSC, enjoyed social insurance at the highest standard and non-wage benefits 
that were almost the same as those of the registered officer seafarers. Over and above 
this, they received much higher wages than ratings in the labour market. The ratings 
in Agl were very satisfied with their material support. An AB said:
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Ratings are happy with the earnings in this company. It is higher than those in 
other shipping companies or crewing agencies. It is higher than that in Ag2. So I 
have never heard of any rating resigning from Agl. Here, we can have good 
welfare and wages and never be fired. If we were to leave the agency, we would 
not have such high wages or job security.
When talking about the reasons for the high wages of ratings, interviewed managers 
and seafarers commonly referred to the phrase “the working-class” as an explanation. 
The HRM manager explained:
Over 70% of the registered ratings are over 45 years old. We need to take care 
of the elder comrades. It is the tradition of SOE that the working-class is the 
“elder brother”. Therefore, although the wages of the ratings outside the SOE 
are low, we still take care of our ratings, providing them with good wages and 
welfare. After all, we are all the working class.
The Vice Director of the Head Office said:
Ratings receive rather high wages and welfare. This is not market-oriented. We 
do this because we want to take care of our elder comrades. This is the tradition 
of the SOE.
Some officer seafarers complained that the high wages of ratings contributed to their 
own low wages. A chief officer said:
The wages of ratings in Agl are high. This disobeys the rule in the labour 
market. We officer seafarers should have been given higher wages because there 
is a shortage of us in the market and we need much longer training and face 
much greater costs than ratings. We are high-skilled workers, so we should 
receive higher wages. But now officer seafarers’ wages in Agl are lower than 
the rates in the domestic market. But ratings’ wages are higher. The company 
just uses the money that should be for officers to subsidize the ratings. This is 
very unreasonable.
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Therefore, the four elements in Agl - the head office control over the material support 
of managers and seafarers, the large number of managers and their good material 
support, the high cost of the welfare of seafarers and the high wages of ratings - 
contributed to the low wages of the officers seafarers. Officer seafarers were very 
unhappy with their material support, as we will see in the next section.
6.2 Officer seafarers’ assessments of their material supports
Considering the management of wages, officer seafarers in Agl were dissatisfied. A 
chief officer said:
We are not happy because our wages are much lower than those of seafarers in 
other companies [domestic shipping companies]. We are wondering why our 
wages are so low when we do the same jobs as seafarers in other companies and 
we are capable of accomplishing every task without causing any accident or 
trouble. It is not like thirty years ago when everyone worked in the SOE and 
earned the same amount of money. Now our classmates and friends work for 
different companies. When I learn that they earn 40,000 a year and I earn only 
20,000,1 feel very disappointed.
Among the officer seafarers, peasant officer seafarers’ dissatisfaction was more 
significant than that of registered officer seafarers because the peasant officer 
seafarers received lower wages and fewer non-wage benefits than did the registered 
officer seafarers, though they might do the same jobs.
Compared with the officer seafarers, peasant seafarers were not paid when they were 
on leave. Nor were they offered a year-end bonus. In terms of non-wage benefits, 
peasant seafarers were not provided with any until 2005, when the PSC started to pay 
for some of their social insurance (only work injury insurance and medical service 
insurance, without a retirement pension or other insurance). In addition, the standards 
of insurance for peasant seafarers were based on the standards at the places where 
peasant seafarers’ hukou were registered and consequently were much lower than 
those of registered seafarers.
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According to the HRM Manager, the value of the material support of peasant 
seafarers was at least 50% less than that of registered seafarers. Many peasant 
seafarers expressed the view that they wanted to become registered seafarers so as to 
have better material support. When Agl started to offer the registered worker’s 
contract to the peasant seafarers, as we have seen in Chapter 4, many peasant 
seafarers leapt at this opportunity. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.
As discussed above, officer seafarers, especially the peasant officer seafarers, were 
not satisfied with the low material support offered by Agl. This adds further 
explanations as to why although seafarers remained on the books, many of them 
actually worked in the domestic shipping market, which consequently constrained the 
development of the supply of seafarers for the global labour market.
In addition to the low wages, seafarers expressed concerns with the way that Agl 
managed their wages. The next part will look at the reform of the management of 
seafarers’ payment and the impacts of this reform on seafarers. This aims to continue 
to explain some of the reasons for the shortfall in seafarer supply in Agl and the 
shrinking of the seafarer export.
6.3 The reform of seafarers’ payment
6.3.1 The reforms of the structure of seafarers’ payment
Some reforms were implemented regarding the payment of seafarers. One of the 
reforms was abandoning equal treatment and enlarging the wage gaps between 
officers and ratings in the 1980s.
Before the reform, the wages of seafarers were in line with the requirements of the 
state and local governments. Seafarers of all ranks were paid almost equally. For 
instance, the wages of ratings and officer seafarers were almost the same, 200 to 300 
yuan. Commissars’ wages were the highest, around 400 yuan. From the beginning of 
the 1990s, the wages of seafarers started to be linked to their onboard positions and 
the wage gap between officers and ratings began to grow. From then on, seafarers 
increasingly realized the meaning of the “hierarchy” onboard ship and the difference 
between being an officer and a rating. A chief officer said:
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Before 1990, if you wanted to become an officer seafarer, it was easy. You did 
not have to take any examination, but were appointed by the company through 
submitting an application form. Since the payments were almost the same at that 
time, many people did not apply for the position of officers. But now [after the 
economic reform] they very much regret it because of the big wage gap between 
officers and ratings, which was very hard to imagine twenty years ago.
The other reform concerning seafarers’ payment is related to the structure of 
seafarers’ wages since 2003. Studying western HRM, the head office tried to link the 
wages of seafarers to their performance through the reform.
In 2003, the fixed wage system - composed of a basic position wage and a sailing 
allowance - was replaced with a new system, composed of a fixed wage and a 
performance wage. The performance wage represented 30-35% of the wages of 
seafarers and was composed of two parts, the fixed performance wage (80% of the 
basic performance wage) and flexible performance wage (20% of the basic 
performance wage). The basic performance wage of seafarers was based on the 
condition of the ships and the sailing passage. The larger the ships and the further the 
sailing passage that seafarers worked onboard, the higher the basic performance 
wages they would receive. For example, the basic performance wage of seafarers 
working onboard a 160,000 tonnage ship sailing on an American and European lane 
can be two to three times higher than that of a 59,000 tonnage ship sailing within 
China or around the Asia area. The following chart shows the difference of the basic 
performance wages of seafarers at different ranks working onboard new, big ships 
sailing on the American and European lane and working onboard old, small ships 
calling at Chinese ports (Chart 6.2).
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Chart 6.2 The performance wages of seafarers of each rank working onboard 
two types of ships (yuan)
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The positions onboard ship
Source: Comprehensive Statistics of Agl (2008)
In 2005, a specific method to evaluate the performance of seafarers was created, 
called the “ship ranking management method”. Every six months, a group of 
managers went onboard ships and assessed the management of the ships and 
seafarers’ working performance. Indicators included maritime accidents and the 
results of maritime inspections, safety management, repair and maintenance of the 
ship, cost control and comprehensive management. Based on these assessments, ships 
were given different indexes13. In addition, the performance wage was divided into 
three parts: fixed performance wage (60% of the basic performance wage), crew- 
performance wage (35% of the basic performance wage multiplied by the indexes that 
were the results of the ship ranking management method) and individual special 
awards (5% of the basic performance wage).
13 The assessment and indexes
Class/rank (from high to low) 1 2 3 4 5
Index 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8 0
IV rh ol
□ The ship over 
160,000 tonnage 
sailing on the 
American and 
European lane
■ The ship less 
than 60,000 
tonnage,calling 
at ports 
within/around 
China
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In 2007, another two parts, overtime wage and leave pay, were added to the payment 
system. In addition, the three components’ proportions of the performance wage were 
changed, with proportion of the fixed performance wage being reduced to 45% and 
the proportion of the crew-performance wage being increased to 50% of the basic 
performance wage.
By 2008, the wages of seafarers in Agl included 1) fixed wage, representing 45% and 
including the basic position wage, sailing allowance, onboard overtime wage and 
leave pay; 2) performance wage, representing 55% of the wage of seafarers and 
including the fixed performance wage (45%), crew-performance wage (50%) and the 
individual special award (5%).
6.3.2 The impacts on seafarers
6.3.2.1 Fixed ships, fixed wage
Despite the reform, seafarers’ wages were much more closely related to the condition 
of the ships that they were assigned to due to the FSFC policy than to their 
performance. The seafarers assigned onboard ships in poor condition received lower 
wages than did those onboard ships in good condition. This can be seen from the 
analysis of each part of the fixed wage and the performance wage, as follows.
Concerning the fixed wage, the leave pay and sailing allowance were the same for all 
seafarers. The basic position salaries and overtime pay were multiplied by different 
indexes that were influenced by the types, tonnages and sailing passages of the ships 
that seafarers worked onboard (Table 6.4).
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Table 6.4 The indexes of different ships
Tonnage
Types of ships
Type A Type B Type C
10,000 to 59,000 1.00 0.9 0.8
60,000 to 99,000 1.05 1.00 0.9
100,000 to 160,000 1.20 1.05 1.00
Over 160,000 1.30 1.10 1.05
Source: Comprehensive Statistics of Agl (2008)
Therefore, seafarers who were assigned to work onboard new and large ships had 
higher positions and overtime pay, and hence higher fixed wages, than those onboard 
small ships.
As for the performance wage, 45% of this component was the fixed performance 
wage, which was equal to 45% of the basic performance wage that was set based on 
the condition of the ships, as discussed above. Therefore, seafarers working onboard 
large, new ships had higher basic performance wages and hence higher fixed 
performance wages.
The crew-performance wage was equal to 50% of the basic performance wage 
multiplied by the index that was the result of the ship ranking management method. 
Therefore, the higher the ranks to which ships were evaluated, the higher the crew- 
performance wage seafarers would get. However, by looking at the results of the nine 
assessments of twenty-eight ships made between 2003 and 2007, it was found that 
new, large ships in good condition were given high ranks, but old ships and those in 
poor condition were at low ranks (Chart 6.3, Table 6.5).
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Table 6.5 The assessments of the managers on the ships from 2003 to 2007
Years that the ships have been used till 2008
l 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 14 16 23 25 26 X
Number o f  the ships 2 2 5 3 1 2 2 1 5 1 1 1 1 1
Total times being 
assessed between 
2003-2007
4 7 29 23 8 16 16 7 38 8 7 6 4 3
Average ranks from 
2003 to 2007
1 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.9 2 2 .9 2 .8 2.1 2.8 3 2 .5 Y
Note: The assessment of the ships was implemented from July 2003, twice a year. Therefore from July 2003 to July 2007, 9 
assessments were carried out by the company in total. But every time, not all of the 28 ships were assessed because of different 
reasons, such as the ship was not used in that year or the ship could not call at the port for evaluation.
Source: A g l’s Annual Work Report (2003-2007)
This point was also reflected by interviewed seafarers. A first engineer had this to say 
when talking about the management of the wages:
The condition of ships that you work onboard decides your wages directly. For 
the new ships, there are fewer problems and fewer repairs needed, and you could 
improve the condition of the ship without doing as much work as is required 
onboard ships of poor condition. With old ships and those with many problems, 
no matter how hard we work it is still difficult to meet the requirements. There 
are just too many problems, too much repair and maintenance work, and you
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could not make everything perfect. For some old ships, even a layman could tell 
that they must be at the lowest rank or unranked because the condition is just too 
bad.
Therefore, seafarers working onboard new, large ships could earn high crew 
performance wages as a result.
Concerning the individual special contribution wage (representing 5% of the basic 
performance wage), it was for seafarers who made significant contributions, such as 
protecting the interest of the country, the company and the ships, saving human life, 
significantly increasing the profits or reducing the cost of the company and winning 
prestigious awards at the national level for the company. Because of the high 
standards, only 10 to 20 seafarers won this award each year. For most of the seafarers, 
this part of the wage was unavailable. Because of this, individual special contribution 
wage did not reflect the performance of seafarers in their daily work.
Therefore, seafarers who were assigned to work onboard new and large ships could 
have higher performance wages than those onboard small ships. It is suggested that 
seafarers’ wages were not related to their performance, but to the condition of the 
ships. The President of the TU said:
Despite the reform of the wage structure, the wage is much less influenced by 
the performance of seafarers than the condition of the ships that they work 
onboard. When seafarers are assigned to work onboard certain ships, their wages 
have almost been fixed already.
Because of this management, the seafarers fixed onboard small ships and those of 
poor condition as a result of the FSFC policy suffered from lower wages no matter 
how hard they worked. When combining all the parts of the wages together, the 
differences of the wages between seafarers working onboard big, new ships and small, 
old ships could be significant. For instance, the payment of a 2nd deck/engineer 
officer working onboard a 50,000 tonnage ship was not as high as the wages of an AB 
working onboard a 300,000 tonnage ship. And the salary of a captain onboard 50,000 
tonnage ship was only 50% of the payment of a captain working onboard large ships.
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Seafarers thought the management of the payment was very unfair. For instance, a 2nd 
engineer said:
You know, no matter what kind of ship you work onboard, you do almost the 
same kinds of jobs. But onboard the bad ships, you could work very hard but earn 
very little. It is very unfair.
6.3.2.2 Hiding problems from the management and extra workload and pressure 
The management of seafarers’ payments also caused other problems to seafarers. 
Based on the “ship ranking management method”, when managers assessed the 
management of the ships, the work injuries of seafarers during their work at sea were 
taken into consideration. As a result, some seafarers concealed problems that occurred 
onboard ship and reported as few injuries as they could. A 2nd engineer told his story:
A sailor fell from the bridge of the ship and broke his legs. The injured seafarer 
should have been sent to hospital immediately. But if the managers know this, 
the crew-performance wages of the whole crew would have been deducted. In 
addition, the injured seafarer would receive a double punishment because he had 
made the mistake. So everyone onboard wanted to conceal this from the 
management. The senior officers explained that this was because they wanted to 
save money for the ship-owners. We know that was not the reason. It is because 
the leaders were afraid the company would find out about the injury and 
decrease the rank of the ship.
In fact, many problems are hidden onboard ship due to such management. There 
were more and more problems that could not be reported to the management and 
we felt more and more miserable about working onboard ship. It is just like the 
case of the injured seafarer. Because he broke his leg, the performance wages of 
the whole crew were cut. If you were his workmates, you would not be happy 
with the management because it is nonsense that part of your wages was 
deducted due to other people’s accidents. No one wants to see other people hurt 
or in trouble. In addition, it is more unreasonable to deduct double the amount of
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the crew-performance wage from the injured seafarer’s wage. He has been 
unlucky enough.
In addition, some seafarers resented the “ship ranking management method” because 
they felt that the managers’ inspections added to their workload and pressure. A rating 
said:
In fact, the inspection of the international maritime organizations is more than 
enough. But the PSC inspections are more critical and detailed than those of the 
international organizations. The PSC inspection team is composed of managers 
who are not very important to the company, so they have a lot of time to stay 
onboard ship. Every time, the inspection lasts for a whole day. When the leaders 
are onboard, we have to accompany them and provide them with good services 
in every way. It is very tiring. We cannot do other work. When they leave, we 
have to face other inspections from maritime institutions. After this, we have to 
do a lot o f preparation for the coming sailing. As a result, when we get only 
three days at ports after 42 days’ continual sailing at sea, we really want to go on 
land and have some rest. But we are unable to do so when the inspection teams 
come. We are very disappointed. We are human beings and we need to buy food 
and touch the earth...
Seafarers’ disaffection with the way that Agl managed their wages also contributed to 
the fact that some seafarers looked for jobs in other domestic shipping companies, 
which negatively influenced the development of the foreign manning business of Agl.
6.4 Summary
This chapter initially discusses the fact that the wages of officer seafarers in Agl were 
generally lower than those in the domestic seafarer labour market. It seems that the 
reasons for the low wages are related to the following four aspects. Firstly, because of 
head office control over the input for the material support of the seafarers and 
managers, Agl could not be flexible in adjusting the material support of seafarers. 
This contributed to the low wages of officer seafarers in Agl when the wages in the 
labour market increased rapidly in the 2000s. Secondly, the managers in Agl enjoyed 
good material support. In addition, there were a large number of managers, due to the
139
reform’s failure to streamline the institution. Consequently, the large number of 
managers and their good material support had a negative impact on the material 
support of officer seafarers. Thirdly, a large proportion of the input for the material 
support of seafarers was spent on the welfare of seafarers, which consequently 
reduced the wages of currently employed seafarers. Fourthly, the ratings in Agl 
received much higher wages than ratings in the labour market, which also contributed 
to the low wages of officer seafarers. These four aspects reflected the limitation of the 
reform of A g l’s management, as a result of which the officer seafarers, especially the 
peasant officer seafarers, received lower wages than the officer seafarers who worked 
in other domestic shipping companies. Because of this, some seafarers in Agl worked 
temporarily in the domestic shipping industry and were thus not available for dispatch 
by Agl, which consequently constrained the development of the seafarer export.
This chapter also considers the impacts on seafarers of the reforms of seafarers’ 
payment, which was intended to motivate seafarers by linking their wages to their 
performance. However, the reform failed to achieve this because the wages of 
seafarers were much more strongly influenced by the condition of the ships to which 
they were bound by the FSFC policy than by their performance. As a result, seafarers 
working onboard ships in poor condition suffered from low wages no matter how hard 
they worked. In addition, seafarers considered this form of management to be an 
obstacle to the reporting of problems and managers’ inspections added more pressure 
to seafarers’ already demanding workload. This adds further explanations as to why 
some seafarers in Agl worked for other domestic shipping companies, which resulted 
in the shortfall of seafarers and the decrease of the foreign manning business.
In all, the wages of the Chinese seafarers dispatched onboard foreign ships through 
Agl are no longer necessarily higher than those of seafarers working in the domestic 
seafarer labour market. Seafarers in Agl, especially officer seafarers, were dissatisfied 
with their low wages and with A gl’s management of their payment. Consequently, 
some seafarers looked for jobs in other domestic shipping companies that offered 
higher wages than they would get in Agl. This negatively influenced the development 
of the foreign manning business.
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The next chapter continues to explore the reasons why the seafarers in Agl worked in 
the domestic shipping industry and thereby were not available for dispatch by Agl, 
which constrained the supply of seafarers for the international market. This is done by 
looking at how the managers treated the seafarers and how the TU represented 
seafarers’ interests. Finally, it discusses the decline of the manning business with 
foreign ship-owners in Agl in detail.
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Chapter 7:
The relationship between managers and seafarers, the role of the Trade Union 
and the manning business
This chapter adds further explanations as to why many seafarers who remained on the 
agency’s books worked temporarily in other domestic shipping companies, which 
resulted in a shortage of seafarers in Agl and consequently constrained the 
development of the foreign manning business. It firstly discusses seafarers’ 
dissatisfaction with the way in which managers treated them and analyses the reasons 
for managers’ behaviours in Section 7.1. It then considers the role of the TU in 
representing the interests of seafarers in Section 7.2. The discussion explains that the 
TU failed to protect seafarers’ interests and to improve their position, which 
contributed to the lack of work incentives for seafarers in Agl and resulted that some 
seafarers looked for job opportunities in the domestic seafarer labour market. At the 
end of the chapter, the shortage of seafarers in Agl and the decline of the foreign 
manning business are considered in Section 7.3 and 7.4, respectively.
7.1 The relationship between managers and seafarers and the management of 
managers’ employment
Seafarers talked about their dissatisfaction with the way that managers treated them. A 
first engineer said:
The business of Agl belongs to the state, not to a person. The profits are for the 
state; the company cannot go bankrupt. Managers do not care about how well 
seafarers work, whether ship-owners are satisfied or whether the company has 
high profits, because these are not related to their personal interests. They think 
about themselves. Although the seafarers make profits for the agency, managers 
still feel that they are not important and have to please and bribe them. I have a 
relative who has just graduated and intended to work in this company. But I 
stopped him because if he worked here, he would only dawdle everyday like the 
managers and this is very harmful for a young person.
A 3rd officer said:
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There were only twenty-two people in the agency when it was established. 
However, now there are more than fifty because so many idle people are 
recruited. The material support for the managers is very good. There should be no 
problem. However, the problem is whether the managers are qualified to have this 
treatment, whether they have done something good for seafarers or think about 
the interests of seafarers and whether they have done their duties. If they had 
done well, I think they would have deserved better treatment. However, the thing 
is that they do not care about seafarers or the development of the company. When 
the managers take bribes, they only think about themselves.
Some seafarers complained about the managers’ bad attitude towards them. A captain 
said:
The managers were in strongly hierarchical positions and there was no equality 
between managers and seafarers. The managers, especially the young ones 
without seafaring experiences, feel that they are in a privileged position and they 
can order us about. Often, they seem arrogant, without much respect for us. So 
the relationship between managers and seafarers is very bad now.
The behaviour of the managers can be understood to some extent if we look at the 
issues of the employment of the managers.
Managers at the same rank in Agl had similar salaries. At each rank, there were five 
grades. The longer the managers worked for the company, the higher the grades and 
salaries they were offered. The payment of the managers was rather fixed. Although 
the structure of the salaries of managers included the basic salary (60%) and 
performance salary (40%), the performance salary was influenced not by the 
performance of the individuals but the annual economic result of the PSC’s shipping 
business, which, according to the managers, was related to factors such as the state of 
the shipping market and global economy, government policy, currency exchange rates 
and safe sailing at sea rather than their own efforts.
The managers’ annual bonus was also related to the economic results of the shipping 
business. If the PSC made less profit than required by the head office, the managers’
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bonus would be low. However, even if the PSC earned more profits than required by 
the head office, managers could not get a higher bonus than the amount regulated by 
the head office because the PSC was not allowed to use the surplus profit itself.
In Agl, there was no method to systematically supervise or evaluate managers’ 
performance. Managers worked in a relaxed and enjoyable environment. I could still 
remember how shocked I was on visiting Agl when I saw how relaxed the managers’ 
work was. Most of the time, they chatted with each other, made jokes or surfed the 
internet. Their lunch was free, in a modem, luxury restaurant. After this, some 
collective activities were organized, such as rope skipping, hiking, playing Ping Pong 
and dancing. As seafarers described it: “the managers seem have nothing to do, just 
chatting or reading newspapers, drinking tea. Unlike us, the managers have no 
pressure from work. The company is like an old people’s home.”
Therefore, it seemed that managers’ performance was not effectively evaluated or 
supervised and their wages were rather fixed, and were not closely related to their 
contributions. When talking about the reform of the material support of managers, the 
President of the TU said: “it is still the traditional ‘communal pot’. There is no 
incentive, no reform.”
In addition, managers’ recmitment retained the old practices, influenced greatly by 
personal ties. Newly recruited managers were given eight-year contracts and the rest 
were entitled to permanent working status. Because of the importance of personal 
relationships in the managers’ recmitment, an interesting phenomenon occurred in 
Agl in that whenever a new director was appointed, some managers in important 
positions were then assigned to other jobs; some seafarers who were helping with 
managerial work on a temporary basis were fired. In the meanwhile, a batch of new 
managers who were related to the new director was recmited. For instance, in January 
2007, Agl changed its director. As a result, by August 2007, around 40% of the 
managers had gradually been changed. A motorman who lost his job in this process 
told his story:
Every new sovereign brings his own courtiers. The seafarers like me and those
who do not have strong social backgrounds were fired when the new director
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came. The explanation given by the new managers was that there were too many 
people in my department. In fact, the work in my department was not easy and 
there were only three people there. As a result, I was fired first. Two months later, 
the other two guys were fired. However, now there are three newly recruited 
people working in that department. I heard from a seafarer weeks ago that the 
person who replaced me made a big mistake, cancelling some important company 
data. But he can still work there. And he can earn a much higher salary than me. 
When we worked there, the salaries were only 1,000 yuan per month because we 
were not registered workers. But now the new workers get 3,000 yuan per 
month.. .If I was connected to someone powerful, I would still have been working 
in the company and earning more than them. Actually, as far as working 
capability is concerned, I am no worse than them.
A chief officer seafarer who had previously done manning work was also fired in this 
process. He told his story:
I don’t want to go back to the agency now because I feel very disappointed. In 
fact, I could leave the agency, but I just need a good explanation. When I was 
leaving, the reason given by the new managers was that there was a lack of 
seafarers onboard ship and that the company needed to streamline the personnel 
so seafarers in managerial positions should work onboard ship. I could have 
accepted that arrangement. However, I found that it was not the case. The man 
who replaced me was still a seafarer, graduating from the same maritime 
university as me, and he did not have to work onboard ship. He could sit there 
and scold my classmates. In this circumstance, why should I return to the 
company? I feel as long as you are connected to someone powerful, you can have 
a good life and you do not have to work hard, but there is no hope in the agency 
for me.
Because of the important role of personal relationships in the management of 
managers’ recruitment, some recruited managers did not have seafaring or maritime- 
related experience. In 2008, this represented almost half of the managers and many of 
them were young graduates. Some seafarers complained that these managers lacked 
professional knowledge and communication skills. A chief engineer said:
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Due to the change of the director, many previous managers were replaced by new 
people. After doing some work with them, I found that many of the new 
managers knew little about their work or about the work at sea. Some young 
ladies had just graduated from university and had never been onboard ship. They 
know nothing about the work on the deck or in the engine room, but they are 
required to manage manning. How can they manage the work?
Furthermore, the management of managers’ promotions was not based on a 
systematic evaluation system, but largely depended on the impression of the leaders. 
The director of the PSC said when introducing the promotion management of 
managers:
We have an evaluation system, but there are just too many teams and nobody can 
remember them. So we just follow the traditional method and make decisions 
according to our impressions of their daily performance. If you like the guy, then 
you promote him.
Moreover, sufficient professional training was not provided to the managers. The 
training plan was developed by the agency and approved by the head office annually. 
According to interviewed managers, the training regularly organized included moral 
education, lessons on the spirit of the Party and some training concerning basic 
computer operation. Little training was organized with regard to improving the 
professional knowledge of managers or their skills at work. According to the 
interviewed Manning manager, newly recruited managers learnt their skills and 
knowledge from the elder managers through personal teaching, helping and guidance 
(chuan, bang, dai in Chinese) during their everyday work.
The lack of reform concerning the management of managers may partly explain 
seafarers’ dissatisfaction with the behaviour and treatment of managers. Such 
dissatisfaction contributed to the fact that many seafarers who remained on the books 
of Agl worked temporarily in the domestic shipping industry, which resulted in the 
shortage of seafaring labour in Agl and the decline of the foreign manning business.
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The next section considers the role of the TU in representing seafarers’ interests to 
continue to explain some of the reasons for the shortage in seafarer supply in Agl and 
the decline of the foreign manning business.
7.2 The trade union in Agl
According to the Trade Union Law in the PRC, all trade unions in China must belong 
to the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and under its leadership. The 
ACFTU is the only national trade union federation in China, under the strict control of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The role of the ACFTU has been researched by 
a number of scholars. Evidence has shown that the ACFTU is not successful in 
representing workers’ interests due to the given political framework. This section 
initially considers this issue, before discussing the specific case of the trade union in 
Agl.
7.2.1 Preface Research on the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
Metcalf and Li (2005) argue that despite the large number of members and the 
activation of laws to promote collective contracts, these laws are hollow and the 
ACFTU is nugatory, for the following reasons. Initially, it is difficult to develop 
collective interests among workers. This is associated with the separation of the 
ACFTU and the Chinese trade unions at different levels from workers and the unions’ 
scant regard for workers’ interests. This is also associated with the exploitation of 
workers and income inequality among workers and with the failure of the Party-state 
to recognize the conflict between labour and capital. Secondly, it is related to the 
inferior position of the unions in the enterprises and the relative unimportance of 
collective contracts and tripartite institutions. Thirdly, the ACFTU and the Chinese 
unions merely function as a transmission belt to convey government policies to 
workers and promote the implementation of the policies by enforcing labour 
disciplines. Without the autonomy or the ability to organise collective actions, it is 
therefore hard for the ACFTU and the Chinese unions at different levels to represent 
workers (2005, p7-8).
Taylor and Li (2007) argue that the Chinese ACFTU is not a union, but a state organ, 
for the following three reasons. Firstly, the definition of the role of the ACFTU in 
China is to protect worker’s interests and also the interests of the nation state.
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Therefore, when the development of the market economy and the promotion of 
capital’s interests to accelerate economic growth become the target of the state, the 
ACFTU is in a difficult position and it puts worker interests second to the national 
interest. Secondly, there is no effective electoral system for union officials, who are 
more often than not appointed by the enterprises. Thirdly, the ACFTU is the only 
legal union in China, which is completely controlled by and depends on the single 
party - the CCP. The ACFTU works for the party to maintain social stability and 
displace conflicts (2007, p707-708). Therefore, the ACFTU is a political organization, 
rather than a union of workers.
In the study of Chinese trade union, Warner (2008) sees that China’s ACFTU is a 
union, but without bargaining power or autonomy. It is suggested that although the 
ACFTU has been reformed to a limited extent due to the increased interactions of 
Chinese institutions with international organizations as a consequence of the open- 
door policy, divergence from western unionism remains more characteristic of the 
ACFTU than convergence (2008, p i53). In China, workers have no right to strike; the 
independent union is suppressed; internal union dissent is not encouraged. This is 
related to the structure of the system, in which the CCP dominates Chinese industry 
and the ACFTU, which is the only one legal union in China. In such a context, when 
the building of a harmonious society is emphasized by the state, the ACFTU works 
hard for social integration instead of looking after the interests of workers (2008, 
pl48-l 50).
These studies are valuable in terms of understanding the nature of the ACFTU. 
However, they neglect the issue of how workers regard the union. In the latest study 
of the ACFTU, Nichols and Zhao (2010) focus on workers’ views of the union by 
studying three SOEs in the Chinese auto industry. The authors see that although 
workers are dissatisfied with the ACFTU, they perceive that unionism is necessary. 
Workers’ disaffection with the unions is not limited to the lack of social activities and 
welfare support offered by the unions, but also related to the fact that workers have 
little opportunity to be involved in decisions about companies’ management. The fact 
that management has different interests from workers is an important driver of 
workers’ disaffection with the union.
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By reviewing the literature, it is evident that the ACFTU is not successful in 
representing workers’ interests due to the political framework in China. The following 
contents focus on the trade union (TU) in Agl, explain why the TU has failed to 
perform adequately and discuss seafarers’ views about their union. This contributed to 
the explanations as to why seafarers sought jobs with domestic shipping companies 
and consequently were not available for Agl to supply to the international market.
7.2.2 The TU of Agl and its structure
The TU of Agl has existed since the establishment of the agency. It was under the 
direct management of the PSC’s TU. The cooperation mechanism between the two 
TUs was like this: the TU of the PSC initiated the activity, controlled the whole 
process and provided funding; then the TU of Agl did most of the operational work, 
including organizing seafarers, renting venues and reporting progress.
The TU of Agl was also under the management of the managing director within Agl. 
The status and treatment of the President of the TU was the same as that of the vice 
director of Agl, higher than other senior managers, such as the heads of the 
departments of manning and training.
The union still maintained its traditional structure. There were seven full-time 
workers: a chair and six members of staff. However, the union election was not held 
in accordance with the Chinese TU Law. According to the law, the process should be 
as follows: the representatives of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) should be elected 
by the workers and staff from different work units. The number of representatives 
should be equivalent to 8-10 per cent of the total number of workers in each unit. The 
representatives from each unit form a group and a candidate is elected from each 
group for membership of the TU committee. The Chair and Vice Chair are elected by 
members of the TU committee.
However, in Agl, the workers’ representatives of the TUC were not elected by 
seafarers, but selected casually by the Manning managers from the seafarers who were 
on leave. A retired Manning manager said:
149
The chair and the representatives of the TUC should have been elected by 
seafarers, but in this agency, it is not the case. Many people who attend the TUC 
are not representatives, but are selected by the managers from the seafarers who 
are on leave. According to the TU, the selected seafarers are expected to be tame 
and clever, understanding exactly what they should and shouldn’t say. They 
should agree with the management, without expressing any different opinions.
The members of the TU committee were not elected either, but were appointed by the 
director. Therefore, the union committee was formed by the Heads of the Departments 
of Finance, HRM, Manning, Party Branch onboard ship, Training and Equipment 
management. The Chair was the Head of the Seafarers’ Management Department. 
However, in order to make the union appear legal, a TUC was held anyway. A 
seafarer who attended the congress described the situation:
Managers sit on the stage. They read out the names of the candidates and ask us 
if there is any disagreement. In five seconds, when nobody answers, the 
members of the TU are decided.
In addition to the land-based TU, there were union teams onboard each ship, which 
were under the leadership of the commissar. Before the economic reform, when 
massive motivation and ideology were important in China, the commissar, who was 
responsible for the moral and political work, held a very high status. At that time, it 
was the commissar who took charge of the ship, rather than the captain. Currently, 
however, since the Chinese government has transferred its focus to the development 
of the economy, few shipping companies employ commissars, with the exception of 
several large SOEs.
In Agl, there were still fifty-six commissars. Although the captain took over the 
absolute power of managing the ship, commissars still had the high status they had 
held thirty years ago. For instance, commissars had great power to influence 
seafarers’ promotion. In addition, commissars received high wages, three to four 
times those of ratings and lower only than those of captains and chief engineers. The 
commissars onboard ships were responsible for the TU, organizing activities onboard
150
ships, protecting the property of the company and reflecting seafarers’ views and 
problems to the TU, according to the Chair of the Union.
Concerning the member density of the TU in Agl, 540 registered managers and 2200 
registered seafarers were included, but around 900 peasant seafarers were excluded. 
This contradicts the demand raised by the ACFTU, which requires TUs to include as 
large a number of workers as possible. The President of the TU did not give any 
explanation for this.
7.2.3 The role of the TU in Agl
The TU still retained its traditional role of organizing entertainment activities and 
providing welfare for workers. The President of the TU believed that the ultimate aim 
of his job was to facilitate management. He said: “the function of the TU does not 
change. We perform a ‘logistics service’ for the management”.
The main activities organized for seafarers by the TU included trips to thermal 
springs, physical examinations, sports matches and labour-skill competitions. In 
addition, with the help of the TU, a seafarers’ library was established in 2004. 
Furthermore, visiting seafarers and their families on certain traditional festivals was 
an important work of the TU. Whenever the Traditional Spring Festival comes, the 
President of the TU and staff visited around 50 seafarers’ families, giving gifts and 
money to poor families (on the Spring Festival 2008, 800 yuan were given to each of 
the visited families). They also went to the local ports and visited the seafarers who 
were working onboard ships, bringing them books and food. The funding for these 
activities came from the PSC, representing as much as 2% of its input for the material 
support of workers. The President of the TU said:
We can organize such activities because of the support of the PSC. I don’t think 
any other company in this city can invest so much money or organize so many 
activities as us. So you can see how great it is for seafarers to work in the SOE.
Concerning representing the interests of seafarers, the TU achieved little. When some 
seafarers were assigned onboard ships in poor condition and suffered from low wages, 
and when some could not get promotion for years, the President of the TU expressed
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his disagreement with the management strategy, but he made no effort to improve 
matters.
Over and above this, the President of the TU and the members of the union committee 
worked out methods to control seafarers. In 2006, when the agency found that some 
seafarers were working for other agencies, the President of the TU suggested the 
strategy of detaining the performance wage of seafarers (55% of their total wage) to 
prevent them from doing so. According to his suggestion, if any seafarer was found to 
be working for other agencies or intended to leave the agency, his previous year’s 
performance wage would be deducted from his wages. However, as a result of the 
consequent dissatisfaction of seafarers and the possible social instability, this 
suggestion of the president was not adopted.
When talking about the duty of representing the interests of seafarers, the president 
explained:
In China, the TU can only endeavour to organize entertainment activities and 
improve the welfare of workers. It’s impossible for the TU to fight against the 
company. The workers cannot spend their money to support the TU. The 
workers cannot pay for the salaries of the TU members. All the money comes 
from the company. So we cannot fight against it.
In addition, the right of seafarers to participate in discussions about the company’s 
management was not protected by the TU. It is regulated that the making of policies 
that are closely associated with the interests of workers should require the agreement 
of the representatives on the TUC before the policies can be put into action. Since 
80% of the union members were seafarers, the large majority of the representatives on 
the congress should have been seafarers. However, according to the president, such 
meetings were mainly attended by managers, with very few seafarers. He explained:
Around 20 people attend each meeting. They are mainly managers. Seafarers are 
in the minority because it is not convenient for them to attend. According to the 
regulations, the people who attend the meeting should have been representatives 
elected by seafarers and managers. In fact, we invite the members of the TU
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committee and a few more managers of the company to attend. Such meetings 
are not taken very seriously.
7.2.4 The assessment of the TU
The President of the TU was very satisfied with his work because he thought he had 
managed to help with the work of the managers. He said:
Sometimes when the families of seafarers fall sick and ask the seafarers to come 
home, several other managers and myself go to see the patient and take them 
fruit and flowers, and sometimes money. If they live outside the city, I ask 
seafarers in the local area to visit the patient as my representatives. The families 
of the seafarers, especially peasant seafarers, are very moved and consequently 
stop asking the seafarers to return home. So the task of the TU is like this - 
keeping the stability of the seafarers’ team and helping managers to solve 
problems. And I think we have done a good job.
The other managers’ assessments of the work of the TU were also positive. Like the 
President of the TU, other managers thought the union helped with their work and 
provided good support to seafarers. The HRM manager said:
The TU has been engaged in the provision of support to seafarers and their 
families. This is very important for our work. I think the TU has been doing 
well.
Seafarers’ assessment of the TU was not so positive. They felt that they were almost 
unconnected to the TU and that it meant little to them. A third engineer said:
The function of the TU is to organize entertainment, convey condolences to 
injured seafarers and visit some seafarers’ families on special occasions. 
However, these are for only a small group of privileged seafarers. For most of 
the seafarers, we are not related to the TU in any way. Twenty years ago, on 
traditional festivals, we were given food by the TU, like rice, flour and eggs. But 
now, these benefits are only available to the managers, not seafarers. The TU’s 
function today is only to buy us a few books and visual products when we work
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onboard ship. There is not much difference between the existence and non­
existence of the TU.
When talking about the role of the TU in representing workers’ interests, seafarers 
complained a lot. Here is an example from a 2nd officer:
The role of the TU? I can tell you two stories that happened to seafarers and 
almost everyone in this agency knows; then you will see the answer. One 
seafarer’s mother got cancer and asked the TU for help, but the TU did not help 
much and the mother of that seafarer died. Another story is that because two 
buildings built by the government blocked the road out of a seafarers’ house, 
they complained to the corresponding government department, which ordered 
the TU to deal with this problem. As a result, the TU did not help the seafarers, 
but asked them to stop complaining.
So you see the TU did not represent the interest of workers. It actually helped 
the government and the management to resolve their problems. It is not a 
workers’ union but the party’s. The president is not elected by workers but 
appointed by the management; the money for the TU is not raised by seafarers, 
but given by the company. The TU is not independent but depends on the 
management. I think that’s an explanation.
A 3rd engineer said:
In 2005, the news came out that the wages of seafarers were going to increase. 
However, this did not happen until 2007 and the actual increase was much 
smaller than we expected - our wages were still lower than that in the labour 
market. However, the wage increase scheme was actually approved by the TUC. 
Many seafarers want to know: when the scheme was set up, where was our TU? 
Where were our representatives? During the negotiation between capital and 
labour, what did the TU do for seafarers?
In addition, seafarers thought that they could not influence the policy-making of the 
company. A chief officer said:
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The making of the policies is not the business of seafarers. Nobody asks our 
opinions... The TUC is just formalistic. No one cares about the opinions of 
seafarers.
In fact, even if seafarers had different opinions from the management, they dare not 
tell them, because this could bring very serious consequences. A rating said:
The managers do not listen to seafarers. If you tell the truth, they will probably 
refuse to assign you to work onboard ship for years. Because of the welfare you 
have to pay, which is more than the wages when you are on leave, you will not 
have any income, but will actually owe the company several hundred yuan at the 
end of each month. In this case, how do you survive and which family can bear 
this? So you can only bear with the management. Normally, when we are angry 
or have different opinions, we just joke about it at parties with seafarer friends 
and they do not take it seriously, because even if you say it, you can change 
nothing.
A 2nd engineer said:
No seafarer reflects their opinions to the managers as long as they still want to 
work here, keep their rice bowl and have a place to rely on when they retire. If 
they told managers their opinions, they would probably make them angry and 
would not be given working opportunities. So it is huge harm without any 
benefit.
Several seafarers joked about a seafarer who had made suggestions to the TUC and 
received bad treatment from the managers as a result. They thought that seafarer was 
stupid.
Unlike the various activities organized for the managers, as mentioned in section 
6.1.2.1, the TU did not organize many activities for seafarers. The most common 
activity held for seafarers was the free trip to the thermal spring. Seafarers were bored 
with it. A third officer said, “It is the only activity held regularly by the TU for
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seafarers. The accommodation there is not good; the food is not delicious. So when 
you’ve been twice or three times, you do not want to go any more.” The President of 
the TU also said, “Seafarers are tired of going on the tour because they have been too 
many times”.
When talking about the union teams onboard ships that were under commissars’ 
leadership, seafarers did not think that the commissar could really help them. Under 
the pressure of coping with maritime inspections and hard work at sea, seafarers 
thought the commissars who still kept the traditional role were useless and were 
surplus onboard ships. In addition, because of the power of the commissar, seafarers 
had to work hard to maintain good relationships with them in order to have good 
career prospects. This made the work at sea even harder. A 2nd engineer said:
The role of the commissars has not changed. They do political work and spread 
the spirit of the party. They have high status and high salaries. Although they do 
not know anything about seafaring work, they still supervise and manage us. And 
you must maintain a good relationship with them, or else you will have trouble 
when you want to be promoted. I know a first engineer who wanted to take the 
promotion training and examination to become a chief engineer. However, 
because he did not have a good relationship with the commissar, he was not 
allowed to apply for the promotion. Such stories are not unusual.
A 2nd officer said:
The commissars do not do any work onboard ship. They are very relaxed. They do 
not care about seafarers or help us. When they are happy, they may help to clean 
the ship or help the cook. If they are not happy, they just sit in their cabin and 
write short articles, spreading some new spirit of the government, or reporting 
how seafarers positively respond to the new policies and advocate government 
decisions. These articles are to be published in the company’s internal journal.
Seafarers with different types of contracts showed different evaluations of the TU. 
Comparatively, peasant seafarers were less satisfied with the TU than were the
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registered seafarers because they were not the members of the TU and consequently 
could not enjoy its benefits. A peasant seafarer complained:
I have less wages and welfare than the registered workers. I cannot join in the 
activities organized by the TU, such as thermal spring tours or sports matches. I 
wish I were a member of the TU. At least that would make me feel that I am 
treated equally to the urban people in some way. But we are excluded by the 
TU. Peasant seafarers are at the lowest level of society. Nobody cares about us.
In addition, seafarers at different ranks gave different comments on the TU. 
Comparatively, registered ratings were more satisfied with the TU than were the 
registered officer seafarers because the ratings in Agl were generally satisfied with 
their material support and job security, considering the condition of redundant ratings 
in the labour market (Han 2008; Huang and Ning 2008; Huang 2008; Yin et al 2008).
Therefore, it is suggested that the TU played little role in representing workers’ 
interests due to the political framework in China. Seafarers were dissatisfied with the 
limited help of the TU. Due to the lack of work incentives and in the absence of a 
mechanism for improving their position, many seafarers worked temporarily for other 
domestic shipping companies, which caused the shortage of seafarers in Agl and 
consequently impeded the development of seafarer export. The following sections 
firstly discuss the shortage of seafarers as a result of the management of Agl in detail 
and then consider the consequent changes to seafarers’ employment relationships and 
the foreign manning business since 2006.
7.3 The shortage of seafarers in Agl
In Agl, the loss rates of seafarers were apparently as low as around 3% from 2004 to 
2008. However, the real loss was much greater because although many seafarers 
remained on the books of Agl, they actually worked temporarily in other domestic 
shipping companies when they were on leave and therefore were not available for 
dispatch by A g l14. The reason for this can be related to seafarers’ dissatisfaction with 
the management, such as little promotion opportunity, low training quality, low wages
14 The reason why they did not resign from Agl will be explained in Chapter 11.
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and problems with the management of payments, poor treatment from managers and 
also the limited role played by the TU in representing seafarers, as explored in this 
and the previous chapters.
With respect to the seafarers who quit, most of them were young officer seafarers with 
higher education who had been working in Agl for less than ten years, according to 
the HRM Manager. As well as the reasons that we will see in Chapter 13, the 
resignation of A g l’s young seafarers is related to the particular management of the 
agency.
Initially, cadets in Agl had to wait a long time for training opportunities. Each year, 
Agl recruited more than a hundred maritime graduates. However, the training 
opportunity for cadets was not sufficient. A Manning manager said, “new gradates 
normally have to wait for at least half a year to get a training opportunity in our 
company.” When talking about the training opportunities for cadets, a chief engineer 
said:
In 1987, when I was recruited, I waited eight months at home for a training 
opportunity onboard ship. The situation is still the same. Getting a training 
opportunity is still difficult for the young cadets.
The Vice Director of the Head Office analysed the reason as follows:
Providing maritime graduates with training has been a big problem for a long time 
in China. This should have been the duty of maritime educational institutions, but 
because these institutions do not have ships, the responsibility is shifted to the 
shipping companies. Based on the ship-building regulations in China, ships lack 
cabins, life-saving facilities and spare space for cadets. Therefore, the training of 
cadets is difficult to implement. The normal way is to let cadets replace current 
sailors.
Concerning cadets’ training at sea, Agl still retained the traditional management 
applied by the PSC in the 1990s. According to the CMB’s 2008 regulations, cadets 
were required to do twelve months’ training onboard ships and complete the required
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training tasks. However, in Agl, they were assigned to do ratings’ jobs due to the lack 
of space for cadets onboard ships, as the vice director of the head office said. 
Normally, a cadet was assigned by Agl to work at sea for three months as a cadet, 
nine months as an ordinary seaman and several years as an able seaman before being 
promoted to the role of officer seafarer.
Such management resulted in several problems. Initially, cadets could not be trained 
well at sea when they were assigned to do ratings’ jobs. A captain said:
In this company, recruited graduates are not given the opportunity to learn the 
knowledge that helps them to become good officers, but are set to work as ratings. 
As a result, even after two or three years’ training at sea, many cadets still do not 
know the work of officer seafarers. This is really a big waste of human resources. 
It also seriously reduces the enthusiasm of young graduates for the seafaring 
career.
A 3rd officer said:
The company always says that young people should be trained to do very low- 
skilled work so as to develop solid skills. But you know, when you are asked to do 
the ratings’ jobs, knocking off the rust, mixing and applying paint, repetitively and 
every day, you forget bit by bit what you learnt at school about the work of 
officers on the bridge. So such training is completely meaningless.
In addition, it took a very long time for cadets to be promoted to 3 rd officer/engineer. 
A chief engineer said:
In our company, after the training period, cadets are arranged to work as ordinary 
seamen if there is a vacancy. Then they are assigned to do the work of able 
seamen, normally for three to four years. As a consequence, they have to work as 
sailors for at least five years before becoming officers. It is too long.
Last but not the least, cadets were offered low wages. In the first three months of 
training, they earned half as much as an ordinary seaman. For the following nine
159
months, the wage of cadets was equal to that of an ordinary seaman. After this period, 
when they were doing the work of able seamen, they earned the wage for that 
position. This was still less than half of the wages of 3rd officer/engineer.
Young officer seafarers were very unhappy with this management, and as a result, the 
young seafarers represented the vast majority of those who resigned from Agl. A 29- 
year-old third officer said:
In 2003, twenty of my classmates were employed by Agl. So far, 60-70% of them 
have resigned. They do not work for Agl because there are no good opportunities. 
Some young seafarers who were employed by Agl several years before and after 
me work for other agencies as well.
Cadets’ management in Agl also resulted in difficulty with recruiting graduates from 
local maritime institutions. According to the HRM manager of Agl, in the 1990s, the 
company recruited seventy to eighty seafarers from local maritime institutions each 
year. In the early 2000s, the number fell to fifty to sixty. In 2006, it recruited only 
eleven graduates and in 2007 the number decreased to six. The HRM manager said:
Students at the local maritime college know all about the management of our 
company, so very few of them want to work here. Every year, it is difficult for us 
to go to the local maritime schools to recruit graduates. Our recruited graduates 
mainly come from other cities because they do not know the management of our 
company as clearly as the students from the local schools and recruitment is 
easier.
This point was confirmed by the TU President. He said:
With the disappearance of the work assignment by the central government in the 
planned economy, it has become very hard for us to recruit graduates from local 
schools. Recruited seafarers are mainly from maritime universities in other cities.
Therefore, many young seafarers were unhappy with the management in Agl. Many 
of them resigned as a result. Although the rate of resignation was relatively low (3%)
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in Agl, the hidden loss was significant due to the fact that many seafarers who were 
on the books actually worked in domestic companies. As a result, Agl faced a 
shortage of seafarers and its foreign manning business was negatively influenced. The 
following section discusses this in detail.
7.4 The changes of seafarers’ employment relationships and the foreign manning 
business
To deal with the labour shortage, the PSC ordered Agl to stop its foreign manning 
business and called the dispatched seafarers back to serve onboard PSC’s ships. 
Blamed for dispatching too many seafarers onboard foreign ships, the ex-director of 
Agl was assigned to work in another department by the PSC. This resulted in great 
changes of seafarers’ employment relationships and the foreign manning business 
after 2006.
7.4.1 The changes of the seafarers’ employment relationships
7.4.1.1 The management of seafarers’ employment relationships before 2006 
Before 2006, seafarers could be categorized into three types based on their contracts, 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The registered seafarers recruited before 2003 were 
contracted to the PSC, mainly entitled to permanent workers’ status; registered 
seafarers recruited after 2003 were registered on the books of Agl, with eight-year 
fixed-term contracts. In addition, from 1995, some peasant seafarers were recruited. 
They signed fixed-term contracts with local labour bureaus (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Three Groups of seafarers before 2006 (categorized according to the 
types of contract)
Group one: 
PSC’s seafarers
Group two: 
A gl’s seafarers
Group three: 
Peasant seafarers
Time of 
recruitment
Recruited before 
2003
Recruited between 
2003 and 2006
Since 1995
Employer Contract with 
PSC
Contract with Agl Contract with Local 
labour bureau
Number of 
seafarers in 2006
1513 829 661
Source: A gl’s Department of HRM
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The working locations of the three groups of seafarers are shown in Chart 7.1 
Chart 7.1 Working locations of three groups of seafarers before 2006
Box twoBox one
Group three: 
Peasant seafarers
Group one: PSC’s 
seafarers
Group two: A g l’s 
seafarers
Onboard PSC’s ships Onboard Ships of foreign 
shipping companies mainly
Source: A gl’s HRM Department
7.4.1.2 The management of the seafarers’ employment relationships after 2006 
At the end of 2006, due to the labour shortage, the seafarers previously working 
onboard ships of foreign shipping companies (Box Two) were called back to work 
onboard PSC’s ships (transferred to Box One). In addition, many of the peasant 
officer seafarers were offered eight-year contracts in 2007 and became registered 
workers of the PSC, working onboard PSC’s ships.
In July 2007, the Seafarers’ Statute 2007 was implemented, which requires that 
seafarers must sign contracts with the shipping company that they actually work for. 
As a result, the PSC offered the seafarers in Group Two (who had previously signed 
contracts with Agl: see Table 7.1) contracts with the PSC. As a result, few seafarers
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registered on A g l’s books. This has brought great changes to the manning business 
with foreign shipping companies since 2006.
7.4.2 The shrinking of the manning business with foreign ship-owners
7.4.2.1 The manning business before 2006
Before 2006, there were three sections in the Department of Manning (Chart 7.2). 
Each of them was responsible for a group of clients.
Chart 7.2 The organizational structure of Agl before 2006
Director
President
of the TU
Director
Deputy
Deputy
Director
Office
Manning section three
Manning section two
HRM Department
Administration Department
Finance department
Manning section one
Seafarers’ Control centre
Quality controlling office
Information department
Party
Branch
secretary
Certificate and training department
Source: A gl’s Department of HRM
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Manning Section One was responsible for manning the ships of the PSC. Seafarers 
attached to this section were the registered workers only. As more and more long-term 
cooperation with large European and American shipping companies was established 
from 2000 onwards, Manning Section Two was set up specifically to serve these large 
foreign shipping companies.
Manning Section Three, a very small section, focused on assigning seafarers onboard 
the ships of small national shipping companies. Such cooperation was short-term; the 
condition of most of the ships was not good; the salaries offered were low and the 
management of the ship-owners was unprofessional to say the least. One manager 
called this section an ‘asylum’. This is because the seafarers in this section were those 
who had been rejected by other sections - for instance because of seafarers’ bad 
tempers, low skills or poor sailing records. Sometimes the managers in Agl did not 
provide information about working opportunities and seafarers had to look for ships 
themselves. Agl charged 10% of seafarers’ monthly wage for permission to work 
onboard ships.
In general, comparing the three sections, some key features are concluded below 
(Table 7.2).
164
Table 7.2: Some general features of the three manning sections before 2006
Manning 
Section One
Manning Section 
Two
Manning Section 
Three
Clients The PSC
Long-term 
cooperation with 
large foreign shipping 
companies
Short-term 
cooperation with 
small national 
shipping companies
Manning style Whole crew Whole crew Half set of crews or individuals
Agent fees None High Low or average
Cooperation period N/a Long (can be as long as 10 years)
Short-term 
(sometimes per 
voyage)
Condition of ships Normal Good Bad
Rationale and 
discipline Normal High Low
Concerning the three sections’ contributions to the profit of the agency, Manning 
Section One contributed nothing, since Agl did not charge fees for manning the 
PSC’s ships because there was no market relationship between Agl and its PSC. 
Similarly, Manning Section Three contributed very little profit, since there was not 
much cooperation with small national shipping companies before 2006.
Manning Section Two was therefore the main source of A g l’s profit (Table 7.3). For 
example, in 2006, twenty-four ships from thirteen large foreign companies were 
manned and 606 seafarers were outsourced by Manning Section Two. Additionally, it 
dispatched 244 seafarers to work onboard twelve joint-venture ships. In all, 850 
seafarers were employed to work onboard 36 ships and 25,000,000 yuan was earned 
by Manning Section Two, which was more than double the profit in 1995 (12,140,000 
yuan).
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T a b le  7 .3: P r o fits  e a r n e d  b y  ea ch  o f  th e  th r e e  M a n n in g  S e c tio n s  in  2 0 0 6
Section one Section two Section three
Profits (yuan) 0 25,000,000 Very little, not recorded
Source: Director’s work report 2006
7.4.2.2 The manning business after 2006
At the end of 2006, due to the lack of seafarers, Agl terminated more than 75% of its 
cooperation with large foreign shipping companies by order of the PSC. The number 
of ships manned by Manning Section Two dropped from twenty-four in 2006 to five 
in 2007 and ten in 2008 (please refer to Chart 4.3 on Page 91).
On giving up the business with big foreign ship-owners, A g l’s profit in 2008 
decreased by 60% of that in 2006, falling to less than the profit in 1995 (Chart 7.3). In 
2007, Manning Section Two ceased to exist, merging with Section Three to become 
the Outsourcing Section (Chart 7.4).
Chart 7.3 Profits of the foreign manning business in 1995, 2006 and 2008 (yuan)
-25:000:000-
1995 2006 2008
Years
Source: A g l’s Annual Report (2006, 2007 and 2008)
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Chart 7.4 The organizational structure of Agl after 2006
Director
President
of the TU
Deputy
Director
Deputy
Director
Human Resource Department
Manning Section One
Party
Branch
secretary
Office
Outsourcing Section
Administration Department
Quality control office
Finance department
Information department
Seafarers’ Control centre
Certificate and training department
Source: A g l’s Department of HRM
After 2006, the function of Agl was to provide training and practicing opportunities 
for seafarers working onboard PSC’s ships, instead of developing the foreign manning 
business. To serve PSC better, Agl moved back to the PSC office under the 
management of the HRM department. If we look at the development process of Agl, 
it seems that after fourteen years’ restructuring reform, it did not become an 
independent, market-oriented economic entity, but went back to what it had been
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before registering as a company in 1995. The reform regarding Agl failed and its 
foreign manning business did not grow, but shrank.
7.5 Summary
This chapter adds further explanations as to why many seafarers in Agl worked for 
other domestic shipping companies, which resulted in the shortage of seafarers in Agl 
and consequently impeded the development of the foreign manning business. It was 
seen that seafarers were not satisfied with the way in which managers treated them, 
The reason for this could be related to the limited reform of the management of the 
managers’ employment due to the support from the PSC and the head office, as we 
have seen in Chapter 4. Specifically, managers’ salary was rather fixed, influenced by 
age and the economic condition of the company. Like the situation during the 
‘communal pot’ period, without a supervision or evaluation system in Agl, the 
contribution and performance of managers was not examined and was consequently 
very unclear. In addition, the recruitment of managers was influenced greatly by 
personal ties / Guanxi. Managers’ promotion and rewards were based on the personal 
impressions of the leaders. Furthermore, systematic professional training was not 
provided to the managers. The lack of reform of the management in these aspects may 
partly explain seafarers’ dissatisfaction with the managers’ unprofessional behaviour 
towards them, which contributed to the explanations as to why seafarers sought jobs 
with domestic shipping companies and consequently were not available for Agl to 
supply to the international market.
The failure of the TU in terms of protecting seafarers’ interests and improving the 
work incentives also contributed to the fact that many seafarers on the agency’s books 
worked in the domestic shipping industry, which constrained the development of the 
seafarer export in Agl. It is suggested that the union officials who also undertook 
managerial work in the agency did nothing to protect the workers’ interests, help 
seafarers to contribute to policy-making or improve their working opportunities, 
promotion opportunities and wages - factors that affected seafarers’ interests directly. 
Even worse, they developed strategies to help the management to control seafarers. It 
might be true that the TU of Agl spent more money than the unions of other agencies 
to improve the welfare of seafarers and to organize entertainment activities. However, 
most of the seafarers did not benefit much from this spending.
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Therefore, in spite of remaining on the books of the PSC and Agl, many seafarers 
worked temporarily for other domestic shipping companies due to their dissatisfaction 
with A gl’s management, as discussed in this and the previous two chapters. In 
addition, many young seafarers resigned from Agl because they were confronted with 
problems due to the management of cadets, such as limited training opportunities, 
slow promotion and low wages. Because of the reasons, there was actually a shortfall 
in available labour in A gl.
To secure a supply of high-quality seafarers for the PSC’s ships, the PSC ordered Agl 
to stop its foreign manning business and call the dispatched seafarers back to serve 
onboard the PSC’s ships. This brought changes to the seafarers’ employment 
relationship - many of the seafarers who had registered on A g l’s books and had been 
dispatched by Agl onboard foreign ships were assigned to work onboard PSC’s ships. 
As a result, Agl had few seafarers to export and its cooperation with large foreign 
shipping companies dropped by 75%. Agl was no longer engaged in developing its 
foreign manning business but was instead responsible for the training and 
apprenticeship of the seafarers working onboard PSC’s ships.
As we saw earlier, however, the root cause of the failure to develop the foreign 
manning business was that despite the reform of Agl since 1993, the agency was still 
supported and constrained by the PSC, instead of becoming an independent, market- 
oriented economic entity. It did not significantly reform its management and thereby 
failed to retain seafarers to work for it. When there were not enough seafarers at the 
end of 2006, Agl terminated its cooperation with many large foreign shipping 
companies by order of the PSC. Consequently, A g l’s foreign manning business did 
not develop on a large scale. In other words, the nature of Agl as a subsidiary seems 
to have been an important reason for the decrease of labour export. What, then, about 
independent state-owned crewing agencies? Part Three will describe another SOCA, 
Ag2 -  an independent state-owned crewing agency (ISCA) with 26 years’ history -  
and analyse its operation and the consequences for labour export.
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PART THREE 
CASE STUDY TWO: AG2
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In tr o d u c tio n
Part three focuses on the management of an independent state-owned crewing agency 
(Ag2) that is not affiliated to or under the control of any shipping company. It seeks to 
examine how this agency operates its foreign manning business and what the 
consequences are for the business and for seafarers. From this case, we can see that 
the reform of Chinese SOCAs has given rise to a more complex situation than people 
have expected, which may add further reasons for the limited rate of increase of 
China’s seafarer export.
There are three chapters in Part Three. Chapter Eight provides a background of Ag2. 
It introduces Ag2’s history and considers the reform of the management strategies 
regarding labour contracts and material support and their impacts on seafarers. Since 
the resignation of officer seafarers severely impeded the development of the foreign 
manning business in Ag2 since the mid-2000s, Chapter Nine and Ten aim to analyse 
the reasons for the limited increase of the labour export by discussing why many 
officer seafarers resigned in Ag2. Specifically, Chapter Nine focuses on the 
management of seafarers’ material support and explains why seafarers in Ag2 
received low wages, which resulted in their resignation. Chapter Ten adds further 
explanations to the reasons for the resignation of seafarers by considering how 
seafarers were treated by the management; how the TU in Ag2 protected seafarers’ 
interests and contributed to the improvement of the employment conditions and work 
incentives of seafarers.
171
Chapter 8:
A brief history of Ag2 and its management of labour contract and material 
support
This chapter aims to provide the background to Ag2. It looks at its history, introduces 
the basic situation of its seafaring labour and considers how Ag2, as an independent 
state-owned crewing agency, has reformed its management strategies to develop its 
foreign manning business by discussing the management strategies regarding labour 
contracts and material support, respectively.
8.1 Brief history of the Ag2
8.1.1 Initial stage: 1985-1990
Ag2 was set up in the autumn of 1985 by the municipal government. At that time, the 
seafarer manning business was completely new and there were only a handful of 
crewing agencies in China, all of which were state-owned. On the government’s 
initiative, Ag2 was established with members of the boards of five local institutions. 
The Deputy Mayor of the city at that time was elected as the first chairman. Since its 
establishment, Ag2 has provided a professional manning service to foreign clients, 
operating its business independently.
As a newly established agency, Ag2 experienced some difficulties at first. At that 
time, Ag2 had no seafarers. To develop its business, it had to borrow trained seafarers 
from other state-owned shipping companies. In addition, because foreign ship-owners 
had no knowledge about Chinese seafarers, seafarers dispatched by Ag2 were 
arranged to do jobs in lower positions. For instance, many junior officer seafarers 
worked as ratings and some captains were assigned second officers’ jobs. 
Furthermore, foreign ship-owners would not accept an entire Chinese crew because 
they had not earned a good reputation. Consequently, Ag2 dispatched only a few 
dozen seafarers a year during the 1980s, who worked onboard the same ships with 
seafarers from other countries such as Britain, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. In the process, they learnt from the western management 
and culture and improved their skills in English and professional operations.
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Nowadays, some of these seafarers have become senior officers, the backbone of the 
agency, while others have become the senior managing staff of Ag2.
Despite the small numbers of seafarers dispatched in the early years, the manning 
business’s profits were extremely high. The director recalled that in the 1980s, the 
agency could take at least 80% of the wages paid to seafarers by foreign companies. 
One 63-year-old chief engineer who joined the agency when it was established said:
In the 1980s, like 1985-6, people who did land-based jobs could earn only 30-40 
yuan per month, but because we worked onboard foreign ships, we could earn 
hundreds. I remember my first wage was 220 yuan in 1985; then I got 145 dollars 
and then 400 dollars in the following years. So seafaring was rather a good job at 
that time. However, our high wages were only a very small proportion of the 
wages provided by foreign ship-owners. Take my position, for example: A chief 
engineer was offered more than 2000 dollars by a foreign ship-owner per month, 
but I only got 1% of that the first time and then less than 20% afterwards. All the 
rest of the money went into the agency’s pocket.
Consequently, despite the difficulties, Ag2 was profitable at first.
8.1.2 Growth stage: 1991-2001
In accordance with the orders of the local government, Ag2 merged with a SOE in 
1991 and became a branch of it. Although Ag2 still operated its business 
independently, Ag2’s management was supervised by the head office for the local 
government and some of the agency’s major issues were controlled by the head office, 
such as the appointment of the director, the distribution of the profits and the year-end 
bonus of the senior and junior managers.
During this second stage, the business of Ag2 was experiencing rapid growth and it 
had become one of the best crewing agencies in China by the end of the 1990s. The 
main reason for this might be related to the management strategies of the agency in 
the following aspects.
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Firstly, Ag2 focused on improving the quantity and quality of seafarers. From 1992, 
Ag2 started to recruit new graduates to build up its own pool of seafarers. Annually, 
70-100 graduates of maritime universities and colleges were recruited. In addition, it 
provided good training to these seafarers. Five ocean-going vessels from the head 
company were used as training and practice bases for seafarers. Furthermore, a 
training system was designed to offer registered seafarers’ comprehensive and 
practical training so as to maintain a high standard of competence in the English 
language, navigational skills and professionalism. This training was carried out in 
Ag2’s ‘training centre’. There were modem classrooms and advanced training 
facilities. Registered seafarers could attend a series of lectures free of charge.
Secondly, Ag2 adopted relatively advanced methods to manage the employment of 
seafarers. At a time when the economic reform in 1992 was not deep in China and 
most Chinese workers were provided with the ‘iron rice bowl’, it was remarkable that 
Ag2 had established a relatively market-oriented employment relationship with its 
workers by signing fixed-term contracts, evaluating their performance and sacking 
individual seafarers15 for bad behaviour. The HRM manager of Ag2 said, “From the 
beginning, our agency did not offer the ‘iron rice bowl’. If a seafarer did not work 
well, he would be fired.”
With growing cooperation with foreign ship-owners and an increasing reputation, 
since 1993, Ag2 was trusted by these owners to dispatch an entire crew. In the 
meantime, Ag2 started to expand its business by serving more types of ships and by 
cooperating with clients from more countries than before. By 2001, it had supplied 
hundreds of thousands of officer and rating seafarers onboard over two hundred 
vessels from more than ten countries, with types of vessel served including general 
cargo ships, bulkers, log carriers, Ro-Ros, container ships, woodchip carriers, cruisers 
and oil tankers.
8.1.3 Stagnant stage: 2002-2008
In this stage, which began in 2002, Ag2’s business development reached a plateau and 
its supply of seafarers to the international seafaring labour market showed a limited
15 Sacking a large number of seafarers was still not allowed by the government.
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increase since the mid-2000s. According to the director, the reason was related to the 
serious resignation of officer seafarers (Chart 8.1) and hence a shortage of them.
Chart 8.1 The Loss Rates of Officer Seafarers in Ag2 (from 2002 to 2008)
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Source: Ag2’s Department of HRM
To explain the limited increase of seafarer export since 2002, the study seeks to 
discuss some of the reasons for the resignation of officer seafarers by considering the 
impacts on them of the management. Before this, it initially discusses how Ag2 
reformed its management strategies and operated the foreign manning business by 
looking at the management regarding seafarers’ contracts and material support. It 
argues that Ag2, as an independent state-owned crewing agency, reformed its 
management and kept it market-oriented; the management strategies made the 
employment system flexible and successfully strengthened Ag2’s control over 
seafarers. Here it starts with the discussion of issues of labour contract.
8.2 Four categories of seafarers in terms of their types of contracts 
The labour contract system was implemented in Ag2 in 1992. The management of the 
labour contract divides seafarers into four categories in terms of their types of 
contracts (Table 8.1).
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T a b le  8 .1  C a te g o r ie s  o f  se a fa r e r s  a n d  so m e  o f  th e ir  fe a tu r e s  in  A g 2
Contract types
Categories
of
seafarers
City
hukou
Non­
wage
benefits
Free to 
choose 
employers
Number 
in 2008
Long
term
contract
Labour Contract 
(15 years, 
followed by 
fixed-term, 5-8 
years)
Registered
officer
seafarers
and
ratings
Yes Yes No
373 (282 
officer 
and 91 
ratings)
Peasant Officer 
Seafarers’ 
Manning 
Contract (15 
years, followed 
by fixed-term, 
5-8 years)
Peasant
officer
seafarers No No No 327
Tempor­
ary
contract
Per-voyage
contract
Freelance
officer
seafarers
and
ratings
Yes & 
no No Yes 979 (of 
whom the 
large 
majority 
were 
ratings)
Officer 
seafarers 
borrowed 
from other 
crewing 
agencies
Yes & 
no
Not from 
Ag2, but 
from the 
original 
agency
No
No
contact
Not offered 
contract
Peasant
ratings No No No
Around 
100-200 16
8.2.1 The first type of seafarers: registered seafarers
Firstly, registered officer seafarers and registered ratings with urban hukou were 
offered a labour contract that was regulated by the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security of the People’s Republic of China.
16 The company refused to provide the number. This number was estimated by interviewed seafarers.
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Among registered seafarers, registered officer seafarers represented a large proportion 
of this group (87% in 2008). Some of them were assigned to Ag2 through the 
government’s employment plan in the 1980s; some joined in Ag2 because they had 
left their former shipping companies for various reasons, such as resignation and the 
bankruptcy of the companies. There were also some graduates who were directly 
recruited from maritime universities and colleges.
Registered ratings represented a small proportion (13% in 2008). Most of these ratings 
were over 45 years old, and were recruited in the 1980s. They had various 
backgrounds, such as soldiers, unemployed workers and fishermen. Since 1990, the 
agency had reduced the number of registered ratings recruited each year because of 
the redundant ratings in the labour market. After 2000, it no longer recruited regular 
ratings.
All registered seafarers registered hukou in the city. Ag2 set up social insurance 
accounts for them in the city and paid part of their social insurance regularly. In 
addition, the registered workers were offered other benefits, such as home heating 
allowance, maternity/paternity pay, gifts and subsidies on national holidays, 
reimbursement of examination costs, training and TU membership.
Ag2 regulated that all registered seafarers were forbidden to sail without its 
dispatching order. The agency also offered registered workers long-term contracts so 
as to retain them. Ag2 asked registered seafarers to sign fifteen-year contracts when 
they were initially employed. According to the New Labour Contract Law in 2008, 
these seafarers were entitled to permanent status. However, after fifteen years, the 
agency still asked seafarers to sign new fixed-term contracts of five to eight years, 
otherwise Ag2 would refuse to issue their books. Consequently, the seafarers only 
worked for Ag2 on a long-term basis.
8.2.2 The second type of seafarers: peasant officer seafarers
A second group of seafarers was peasant officer seafarers who signed a “Peasant 
Officer Seafarers’ Manning Contract” with the agency. Peasant officer seafarers were 
recruited when they finished high school; then Ag2 paid their tuition fees so that they
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could attain officers’ certificates in maritime colleges and universities (this sort of 
recruitment is called “daipei” in Chinese).
Ag2 controlled the peasant seafarers by asking them to sign a fifteen-year contract, 
called the “Peasant Officer Seafarers’ Manning Contract”, when they were recruited. 
This contract required that after these seafarers graduated and became officer 
seafarers, they must work for Ag2 for at least fifteen years and return all training fees 
to the agency. This fifteen-year contract was different from the one offered to 
registered seafarers because the “Peasant Officer Seafarers’ Manning Contract” was 
designed by Ag2 without the supervision of the government. Consequently, peasant 
officer seafarers did not register at the local labour bureau and their employment was 
not known or protected by any government department.
Without urban hukou, Ag2 did not set up social insurance accounts for peasant officer 
seafarers or provide them with any of the benefits offered to registered workers. To 
further control the peasant officer seafarers, Ag2 promised that when they became 
senior officer seafarers (gained their chief officer or 1st engineer competency 
certificates), the agency would help them to convert the rural hukou to an urban one 
and the peasant officer seafarers could become registered officer seafarers, being 
offered formal contracts, social insurance and other benefits. However, transferring 
hukou was not easy and Ag2 had only transferred seafarers’ hukou twice since its 
establishment, in 2004 and 2008 respectively, and only 50 peasant officer seafarers 
had been granted their urban hukou. Consequently, a large percentage of the peasant 
officer seafarers were still unable to sign a formal contract or enjoy any of the benefits 
that were offered to registered workers. Despite this, many of the peasant officer 
seafarers were working loyally in Ag2 and waiting for an opportunity (this will be 
specified in Chapter 11). This is because no other agency in the city could help them 
with transferring hukou and because having urban hukou was very important for the 
peasant seafarers and their families. Without urban hukou, the peasant officer 
seafarers and their families were confronted with many problems. A peasant chief 
officer who was recruited by Ag2 in 1994 talked about his experiences.
Without urban hukou, like other peasant seafarers, Ag2 did not offer him a formal 
contract, social insurance or other non-wage benefits from 1993 to 2008. In 2004, he
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attained his certificate of competency as chief officer. However, in 2008, when he was 
interviewed, his hukou had still not been transferred. This not only reduced his 
material benefits but also brought problems for his family. For instance, his daughter 
was accepted by a primary school in the city on condition that the family paid tuition 
fees that were ten times higher than those of students with urban hukou; despite these 
high tuition fees, she could not be recruited as a registered student (in Chinese, this is 
called jiedu sheng). She would be confronted with the same problem in the future, in 
middle school and high school education. In addition, without urban hukou, his wife 
was unable to work in the city because her job could not be transferred from the 
countryside to the city. Furthermore, none of his family members could use the 
medical services provided by the government under the social insurance project; 
retirement pensions would also be a problem for them in the future.
8.2.3 The third type of seafarers: temporary seafarers
The third group of seafarers in Ag2 were temporary seafarers, including freelance 
ratings, freelance officer seafarers and some officer seafarers borrowed from other 
large state-owned crewing agencies. The contracts of the seafarers were issued on a 
per-voyage basis, and were drawn up by the agency in the name of the ship-owner.
Seafarers of this category were not offered employment contracts or non-wage 
benefits. However, to reflect the price in the domestic labour market, the temporarily 
employed officer seafarers were given several hundred dollars more wages than the 
regular workers (registered and peasant officer seafarers) because of the shortage of 
officer seafarers in the labour market. In addition, the higher the rank, the larger the 
gap. For instance, freelance and ‘borrowed’ captains could receive 300-400 dollars 
more per month than captains in the first two groups. In contrast, because of a surplus 
number of ratings in the market, temporary ratings received lower wages than 
registered ratings.
8.2.4 The fourth type of seafarers: peasant ratings
The fourth group of seafarers in Ag2 were peasant ratings, who were faced with many 
problems. Due to the peasant identity, peasant ratings, like peasant officer seafarers, 
were not offered social insurance or any non-wage benefits. Worse than the peasant 
officer seafarers, peasant ratings were not given contracts of any form or promised
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that they would become registered workers under certain conditions. In addition, 
worse than the temporary seafarers, peasant ratings were not given the freedom to 
choose other employers. As a consequence, peasant ratings worked for the agency for 
indefinite periods without non-wage benefits or contracts. In addition, the wages of 
peasant ratings were lower than those of temporarily employed ratings, which in turn 
were lower than the wages of registered ratings.
During the interviews, one migrant rating told me his experiences. He was 38 years 
old and had been bom in a village. After he graduated from high school in 1995, he 
was enrolled by Ag2 with the help of his brother, who was a friend of the HRM 
manager. After six months’ maritime study, he attained all the necessary seafaring 
documents, which were processed by Ag2. In 1997, when he was assigned to work 
onboard ship for the first time, he was informed verbally by the manning manager that 
he had become a peasant seafarer of the agency. Since this was just verbal 
information, he was not given any employment contract by the agency. He had 
worked for the agency for eleven years, but it had not set up a social insurance 
account for him or provided him with any benefits beyond his sailing wage. He just 
knew that he had become a migrant seafarer for Ag2 in 1997; he was not allowed the 
freedom to choose other employers; he needed to work for the agency for an 
indefinite number of years. But he knew that when the agency did not need him 
anymore, he would be fired immediately.
In order to develop the foreign manning business, Ag2, an independent state-owned 
crewing agency, implemented the labour contract system to increase the flexibility of 
management and to lower the costs. Seafarers in Ag2 were categorized into four types 
based on the categories of their contracts. Unlike the situation under the planned 
economy, the seafarers were no longer treated equally and the peasant ratings were in 
the poorest condition compared with seafarers of other types.
In addition, Ag2 reformed the management of seafarers’ material support, which 
strengthened management control over seafarers. The following section discusses this.
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8.3 The management of sailing wages
The material support of seafarers encompassed their sailing wages and welfare. As 
mentioned in the last section, welfare was only offered to registered seafarers, and 
included the social insurance and the other non-wage benefits, such as pay while on 
leave, processing and updating seafarers’ certificates, home heating allowances and 
the reimbursement of part of medical fees and kindergarten fees for seafarers’ 
children, work-related travel expenses within China, training and interview fees, 
physical examination fees and 50% of working uniform fees.
This section focuses on the sailing wages of seafarers. It discusses the structure of the 
sailing wages, to see how the management linked pay to the performances of seafarers 
and consequently strengthened its control over the workers.
The structure of the sailing wages of seafarers was designed in 1985 when Ag2 was 
established. It has still not changed much. The sailing wage comprised the basic wage 
and overtime pay. The basic wage represented a large percentage, 95% of the sailing 
wage of the officer seafarers and 90% of that of the ratings.
The basic wage of seafarers was regulated by Ag2 after taking a certain amount of 
money out of the wages paid by ship-owners for the labour of seafarers. Seafarers of 
the same rank were given the same basic wages, except for temporarily employed 
officer seafarers, who earned several hundred dollars more than registered and peasant 
officer seafarers. Unlike basic wages, overtime pay was influenced by complex 
factors, such as the amount of work that seafarers actually did onboard ships, the 
cargo transported, the type of ship and the management of the shipping companies. 
For example, transporting wood might earn more overtime pay than working on a 
bulk ship due to the extra colligation fees found on wood carriers. In addition, the 
overtime pay could be greatly impacted by the agreement between the agency and the 
ship-owner. On some occasions, Ag2 allowed the ship-owners not to pay seafarers 
overtime. As a consequence, some seafarers complained in the interviews that they 
were paid less than seafarers dispatched by other agencies, though they did the same 
job.
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However, it is not the case that all of the sailing wage will definitely be paid to the 
seafarers. In terms of the way wages were paid, the sailing wage was divided into two 
parts (Chart 8.2).
Chart 8.2 Structure of the sailing wage of seafarers
Sailing wage
1. On-board wage. 
Seafarers can get 
this part of the 
wage at sea 
(representing 80%- 
50% of the sailing 
wage)
2. EBF
This part of the wage is 
given after the sailing task 
under some conditions 
(representing 20%-50% of 
the sailing wage)
Source: Ag2’s Department of HRM
One part was called the ‘On-board Wage’. Seafarers could get this part of wage when 
they worked onboard ship. The other part was called the ‘Ensuring Behaviour’ fee 
(EBF). The proportion of the EBF in the sailing wage increased with rank because 
seafarers at higher ranks were more skilful, having more opportunities in the labour 
market and requiring more time to cultivate than those at lower ranks. For example, 
the EBF of a rating represented less than 20% of his total sailing wage. But for 
captains, the EBF could be as high as 50%. The EBF was retained by the agency 
when seafarers were working at sea and returned after they had finished a trip on 
fulfilment of two conditions.
The first condition was that seafarers must successfully finish the sailing task, without 
being fired by the ship-owner. Since Ag2 was responsible for preparing the air tickets 
for seafarers, it paid for their airfares in advance. If a seafarer was fired at sea, the 
ship-owners would not reimburse the agency for the travel expenses of that seafarer
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and consequently Ag2 would have to pay seafarers’ travel fares itself To guarantee its 
profits and also to control seafarers, if seafarers were fired at sea, the EBF was 
detained by the agency to compensate for the travel fees. Therefore, seafarers were 
compelled to work hard onboard ship.
Another condition was that seafarers must submit all their documents to the agency as 
soon as they finished their work at sea. This was intended to prevent seafarers from 
working for other crewing agencies and strengthen the dependence of seafarers on the 
agency (the impacts on seafarers of the management will be specified in Chapter 12).
Therefore, to develop the foreign manning business, Ag2 reformed the management 
of material support, which successfully linked pay to the performances of seafarers 
and consequently strengthened its control over the seafarers. With the deepening of 
the reform of the Chinese shipping industry, great changes happened in the Chinese 
seafaring labour market after 2000. In response to this, Ag2 adjusted its management 
of material support of seafarers. The next section will look at this change and the 
consequent impacts on seafarers of different ranks and backgrounds.
8.4 Improving material support in the 2000s
The wages of officer seafarers in the Chinese seafaring labour market have increased 
continuously since 2000 because of their shortage in labour market.
In the 2000s, especially since 2005, the domestic shipping market has flourished. 
Thousands of non-state-owned shipping companies emerged. Many of them had only 
one or two old ships, operating business as “single-ship owners” (Zhao, 2002, P2). 
They did not employ stable seafarers due to the small scale of their business but 
depended on freelance seafarers in the market. However, many small shipping 
companies struggled to employ officer seafarers due to the poor condition of their 
ships and a shortage of officer seafarers in the labour market. To deal with this 
problem, the small non-state-owned shipping companies continuously increased their 
wages to attract officer seafarers to work onboard their ships. When talking about how 
small ship-owners had managed to increase the wages of officer seafarers in the 
Chinese labour market, the Manning manager of Ag2 said:
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The small ship-owners, who have emerged in recent years while the shipping 
market is good, initiated the increase of officer seafarers’ wages. To save 
money, many of them bought old ships in poor condition, which made it 
difficult to find seafarers to work for them. Because of this, the small ship­
owners increased their wages a lot so as to attract seafarers to work for them.
In addition to the operation of the small ship-owners, medium and large Chinese 
shipping companies expanded the scale of their business in the 2000s and hence 
increased the demands for seafaring labour. Therefore, these companies increased the 
wages of seafarers as well. Consequently, it was reported that the wage of Chinese 
officer seafarers has almost doubled since 2005 in the Chinese domestic seafaring 
labour market (Han 2008, p26; Ma and Xu 2008, pi 17). The director of Ag2 said, 
“The wage of officer seafarers in the national seafaring labour market has increased 
monthly or even weekly. In the previous four months [from January to April 2008], 
captains’ wages have increased by 300 dollars. It increased too fast.”
To respond to the changes in the market, the sailing wages of registered and peasant 
officer seafarers in Ag2 have increased since 2002 at an average rate of more than 
20% each year. The higher the rank, the faster the increase. For instance, in 2003, a 
third registered officer with Ag2 was given 800 dollars, but by 2008 this figure had 
increased to 1700 dollars. In 2003, a captain was given 1800 dollars by Ag2; by 2008 
the wage had jumped to 4300 dollars, increasing around 2.5 times.
In addition to the increase of sailing wages, some non-wage benefits offered to 
registered officer seafarers have increased as well. For instance, the leave wage has 
increased from 280 to 350 yuan per month since 2008. The housing accumulation 
fund has also improved by around 50 yuan.
One of the consequences of the increase of officer seafarers’ material support is the 
sacrificing of the interests of ratings and cadets.
By using limited sums of money to increase the material support of officer seafarers 
to the greatest possible extent, the increase in the wages of ratings was severely 
limited. The business manager of Ag2 said:
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Sometimes when manning officer seafarers, we lose money. The higher the 
rank, the more we lose. For instance, sometimes when the ship-owner promises 
to give a captain 3,500 dollars, the captain asks for 3,600 dollars. It is worse 
when using freelance seafarers who request wages according to the market price, 
300-400 dollars higher than what we give to registered workers. So we cut 
ratings’ wages to bridge this gap. Because there are surplus ratings in the labour 
market, we can reduce their wages a lot.
Consequently, the wages of registered ratings of different ranks have only increased 
by 20 to 60 dollars since 2000. The wages of freelance ratings and peasant rating 
remain almost unchanged. Ratings were very unhappy with this. A motorman said:
You know, it is unfair. When we ratings earn 500 dollars monthly onboard ship, 
they [the officers] earn at least 1500 dollars. When our wage increased by 50 
dollars last November, the wages of 3rd officers increased by at least 500 dollars 
and other officer seafarers have even bigger increases, of what is more than a 
month’s wage of us.
In order to find more money to increase the wages of officer seafarers, the non-wage 
benefits of ratings were also reduced. A sailor said:
Reimbursement is harder to get now than before. For instance, in the past, if we 
had to take a visa to Beijing, the agency could reimburse our train fare and also 
pay us 10 yuan allowance per day. Though that was not much, at least we did 
not have to pay all the expenses ourselves. But now, we can’t get any 
reimbursement if we have to take a visa to Beijing. It is the same with the 
physical examination fees, which we also have to pay ourselves.
In addition to decreasing the material support of ratings, to further reduce the cost of 
ratings, ordinary sailors (OS) were replaced by cadets, who were assigned to do OSs’ 
jobs but without paying cadets wages. The Training manager said:
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OSs’ jobs were cut, and they have been replaced with cadets, who are not paid 
wages. We only give them 50 dollars per month as an allowance, which is the 
same as no wage. But the cadets have no other choice. If they do not accept 
these arrangements, they won’t be able to gain their certificates of competency 
as officers.
Therefore, Ag2 has made great efforts to increase officer seafarers’ wages to keep 
pace with the changes in the market since 2002. In the process, however, the benefits 
of ratings and cadets have been greatly impaired.
8.5 Summary
This chapter provides a background of Ag2. Initially, it describes its history. It is seen 
that after the foreign manning business experienced a slow increase in the 1980s and 
rapid growth in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the business showed 
only small increase as a result of the resignation of a number of officer seafarers since 
2002 .
With respect to Ag2’s management regarding seafarer export, it is seen that Ag2, as 
an independent state-owned crewing agency, reformed its management and kept it 
market-oriented. To reduce labour costs and increase the flexibility of management, 
Ag2 implemented the labour contract system. Seafarers were divided into four types 
based on the types of contracts and were treated differently by the management in 
terms of material support, leaving the seafarers, especially peasant seafarers, in a 
weak position.
The management of material support in Ag2 successfully linked payment to 
performance. With the implementation of the EBF, seafarers had to work hard 
onboard ship and submit all their certificates to the company when they came ashore, 
otherwise they would lose part of their wages. This also strengthened management 
control over seafarers.
In addition, the management of material support was market-oriented and flexible. 
With the rapid improvement of the wages of the officer seafarers in the labour market 
since 2002, Ag2 responsively increased the material support of the officer seafarers.
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In order to keep up with the changes in the labour market, the interests of ratings and 
cadets were greatly impaired.
The analysis in this chapter may suggest that Ag2, as an independent state-owned 
crewing agency, implemented reformed management strategies and developed its 
foreign manning business in a market-oriented way. This might give the impression 
that this independent agency is no different from liberalized companies in the west. 
However, it is too early to reach such a conclusion. As introduced in Section 8.1, the 
foreign manning business in Ag2 showed limited increase since 2002 due to the 
serious resignation of officer seafarers. So why did many officer seafarers resign from 
Ag2, which consequently impeded the development of the seafarer export? What were 
the consequences for seafarers of Ag2’s operation of the foreign manning business? In 
order to explain the limited increase of the seafarer export in Ag2, the following 
chapters consider these questions.
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Chapter 9: Poor material supports and its reasons
This chapter looks at the management of seafarers’ material support and explains why 
officer seafarers in Ag2 received poor support. It aims to analyse some of the reasons 
why many officer seafarers resigned in Ag2, which consequently impeded the 
development of the labour export. It starts by describing the low material support of 
officer seafarers in Ag2 and the perceptions of seafarers in this regard, and then 
focuses on the reasons for this poor support. Through this discussion, it considers the 
extent of the reform of this independent state-owned crewing agency.
9.1 Low material support and seafarers’ assessment
9.1.1 Low sailing wages
Although Ag2 has made great efforts to increase officer seafarers’ wages to keep pace 
with the changes in the market as seen in section 8.4, the wages of Ag2’s officer 
seafarers were still lower than the average rate in the international and national labour 
market.
Compared with the wages in the international seafaring labour market, the Manning 
manager of Ag2 thought the wages of the officer seafarers in Ag2 were very low (see 
also Zhao 2000b; Yin et al 2008, p i99; Zhao and Amante 2003). He exemplified that 
while the European and American captains earned 8,000 to 10,000 dollars per month, 
the wage of a Chinese captain in Ag2 working onboard the same type and size of ship, 
sailing on the same route, was under 5,000 dollars. As for officer seafarers at other 
ranks, the wage gaps between foreign officer seafarers and those in Ag2 were even 
larger. In many cases, the wages of the officer seafarers in Ag2 represented only one 
third or one quarter of the wages of the foreign officer seafarers, according to the 
Manning manager.
One of the reasons for this might be that unlike the TUs in many of the foreign 
countries, the ACFTU has not signed any collective contracts with international 
organizations such as the ITF. This means that when Chinese seafarers work in the 
international labour market, they are not protected by any international organizations 
or unions. Consequently, they cannot receive wages of a proper standard.
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Ag2’s seafarers’ wages were lower than the rate in the Chinese seafaring labour 
market. The gaps can be seen from Table 9.1 (under the condition that seafarers were 
working onboard ships of the same type and size and sailing on the same route). 
When talking about the wage of the officer seafarers in Ag2, the Manning manager 
said, “the wage of our officer seafarers is not high: it is equal to or lower than the 
average rate in the domestic market.”
Table 9.1 The wages of seafarers at each rank in Ag2 and those offered in the 
national seafaring labour market (dollars/per month)
Wage offered by Ag2 Market wage Gap between market and Ag2
January 2007 May 2008 May 2008 May 2008
Captain 3300 Around4300 Around 4900 600
Chief engineer 3200 Around4200 Around 4800 400
Chief officer/ 
first engineer 2150
Around
3100 Around 3600 500
Second
officer/engineer 1800
Around
2500 Around 2900 400
Third
officer/engineer 1300
Around
1800 Around 2300 500
Rating 540 Around 600 Around 800 200
Source: Ag2’s Department of HRM and the interview with the Manning manager
9.1.2 Low non-wage benefits
In addition to low wages, the non-wage benefits provided by Ag2 to registered 
seafarers were also relatively low. For instance, item 29 of the Seafarers’ 
Administration Statutes 2007 requires that seafarers on leave should be paid more 
than the average social wage. However, when the average wage was 700 yuan in 
2008, Ag2 paid registered seafarers only 350 yuan per month.
In addition, Ag2 paid less money than the regulated amount for seafarers’ social 
insurance. According to the regulations, the monthly social insurance of seafarers 
should be equal to the previous year’s average wage in each month multiplied by the
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accumulation of the percentages. If this average wage is higher than the highest 
standard that is set by the government, the standard will be used to calculate the 
insurance. Senior officer seafarers’ wages were normally higher than the standard. 
However, Ag2 paid social insurance based on the local lowest social average wage, 
which was as little as only 10% of the highest standard. As a result, seafarers received 
low social insurance.
Peasant ratings and peasant officer seafarers were in a worse position than the 
registered seafarers: while being offered the same sailing wages as registered 
seafarers, peasant seafarers were not given any of these non-wage benefits.
9.1.3. Seafarers’ assessments of the material support
Seafarers were very unhappy with their material support. A registered 2nd engineer 
said:
My wage is 500 dollars less than the wage in the domestic shipping market. My 
social insurance paid by this agency is also small. I have never checked the 
insurance card or expected that such a small amount could give me any help.
A peasant rating said:
I am not satisfied with my wage. It should be higher. As a rating, my wage is 
now 600 dollars, only half that of other ratings who earn 1200 dollars working 
for other domestic shipping companies. Though my wage was increased last 
November, the increase was tiny: just 60 dollars. You know, I felt very upset 
when I found out that other ratings were offered twice as much money by their 
companies when we are doing the same job.
Some registered officer seafarers expressed special concern about their non-wage 
benefits, especially their social insurance. A captain said:
We captains will receive only 800 yuan per month after we retire. But in 
COSCO, a rating can earn 3000 yuan per month after retirement. The social 
insurance fee paid by this agency is too small.
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A  c h ie f  o ff ic e r  said:
I never expect to use the housing accumulation funds to buy any house, as I can 
only accumulate 6000 yuan after working for 10 years. Such a small amount of 
money is just enough for one square meter of a cheap house in the city.
Therefore, seafarers were dissatisfied with their material support. This is likely to be 
one of the reasons for the accelerated growth of the loss rates of officer seafarers since 
2002 (see Chart 8.1), which led to the shortage of seafaring labour in Ag2 and the 
limited increase of the foreign manning business (this will be explained in more detail 
in Chapter 10).
So why could Ag2 not offer competitive wages and benefits to officer seafarers, 
which led to the resignation of officer seafarers and eventually the limited increase of 
the foreign manning business? The main reason is related to the requirement of the 
head office on the profits that Ag2 has to submit, which forced Ag2 to take a sum of 
money out of the seafarers’ wages and consequently restrained Ag2 from paying 
seafarers a market rate. In addition, the reduced quality of seafarers due to the changes 
of the management strategies since the mid-2000s made it difficult to increase 
seafarers’ wages by foreign ship-owners. The following sections specify the two 
reasons, respectively.
9.2 Reason one: wage deduction
The foremost reason for the low material support of officer seafarers can be that Ag2 
took a sum of money out of the seafarers’ wages in order to increase its profits.
Deducting part of seafarers’ wages to achieve high profits was a tradition in Ag2, 
which made the manning business very profitable. With the increasing wages of 
Chinese seafarers in the domestic market since 2000, Ag2 has reduced these 
deductions in order to adapt to the market rates. The director explained:
In the 1980s, when we negotiated crew’s wages with foreign ship-owners, at 
least 80% of the wage could be detained by the agency as profit. In the 1990s,
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the proportion fell to 50%. In the first half of the 2000s, it fell again, to 30%; 
now, only 15% of seafarers’ wages can be taken by the agency. All of the 
remaining 85% is given to seafarers as wages. Our net profits have decreased in 
recent years.
Despite this concession, in the current market condition that officer seafarers are in 
short supply and their wages are increasing fast, the traditional operation of Ag2 -  
deducting part of seafarers’ wages -  has left the agency unable to pay competitive 
wages. The Manning manager of Ag2 said:
Some small private crewing agencies in the domestic market are different from 
us. They are more flexible. They give seafarers the full wages that the ship­
owners have paid during the period of labour shortage. They try their best to 
satisfy the seafarers’ needs. As long as those agencies ultimately make profit, 
they can bear with low profits. They are more flexible, more market-oriented.
So why is it that Ag2 cannot act like the small agencies but has to deduct part of the 
wages of seafarers to pursue high profit? The reason can be directly related to the 
requirement of the head office on the profits that Ag2 has to submit each year. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the head office of Ag2 was in charge of major 
issues, including the distribution of the profits. It was regulated by the head office that 
Ag2 must manage its own costs, including the seafarers’ wages and managers’ wages 
(which are set by the head office). In addition, it must hand over almost all net profits, 
which cannot be lower than a certain amount set by the head office annually. To 
accomplish this task, Ag2 had to take some money out of seafarers’ wages.
Seafarers were very unhappy with Ag2 deducting part of their wages. A 3rd engineer 
said:
The director only thinks about how much profit he can submit to the group and 
of the development of his career. He takes away a large amount of our wage. If 
he could make smaller wage deductions, our lives would be greatly improved. 
No matter how high the agency’s profit, the lives of us seafarers cannot be 
bettered a little.
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A  2 nd o ffic e r  said:
The agency is not satisfied with the agency service fees offered by the ship­
owner. So it takes a lot out of our wage. Consequently, many seafarers are angry 
and eventually leave. I think the agency needs to reform the management to give 
seafarers the whole wage offered by the ship-owner, as some private agencies 
have been doing. Our agency cannot be too greedy.
When talking about deducting part of seafarers’ wages, the managers seemed rather
helpless. They also made some complaints. The director of Ag2 said:
Each year, 80% to 90% of the net profit of the agency is submitted to the head 
office. If we did not have to submit the profits or had more profit left, there 
would not be a problem with increasing the wages of seafarers or reducing the 
loss rate of officer seafarers.
The Manning manager of Ag2 said:
We know the low wage is one of the reasons why many seafarers leave the 
agency. We also want to increase seafarers’ wages. However, the head office 
will not allow this. If we were to give more money to seafarers, the agency’s 
profits would fall. In this case, how can we reach the required standard? In fact, 
the managers of the head office do not consider the condition of the labour 
market or adjust the requirements accordingly. Ten years ago, when there was 
no labour shortage in the labour market and the wages of officer seafarers were 
not so high, we could manage to balance the wages of seafarers and the required 
profits and attract high quality seafarers to work for us and maintain the increase 
of the business. But now, the cost of seafarers is high but the requirements of the 
head office are also still high. So we are under a lot of pressure. If we did not 
have to submit profits and were completely independent, all the managers’ and 
seafarers’ wages and benefits would be improved a lot, without any doubt. But 
the head office does not allow us to become independent, as it would lose the 
profit that we submit. So we are stuck here.
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Due to head office control over Ag2’s profit, Ag2 cannot invest its profits into the 
running of the business to pay seafarers a market rate. The low wages contributed to 
the resignation of officer seafarers since 2002, which caused a shortage in labour 
supply and consequently constrained the development of the foreign manning 
business.
To adjust to the loss of officer seafarers and the increasing demand of foreign ship­
owners in terms of the seafaring labour, Ag2’s management strategies have been 
changing since 2004. However, such changes resulted in the reduced quality of 
seafarers, which made it difficult to increase salaries by foreign ship-owners. This 
contributed to the low wages of officer seafarers in Ag2 and thereby resulted in the 
resignation of seafarers. The next section will specify this.
9.3 Reason two: the changes of management and the lesser quality of seafarers 
Because of the shortage of officer seafarers, changes have taken place in the 
management of Ag2, which include the lowered requirement of the ship-owners on 
the quality of seafarers, insufficient training, excessively fast promotion, loose 
manning and lax disciplinary management. This section discusses these changes to 
explain some of the reasons for the reduced quality of seafarers, which limited wage 
increases by foreign ship-owners and thereby contributed to seafarers’ resignation. It 
seeks to add further reasons for the shortage of officer seafarers in Ag2, which 
constrained the increase of labour export.
Since many of the changes stemmed from the ship-owners relaxing their requirements 
in terms of the quality of seafarers, this issue will be addressed first.
9.3.1 The lowered requirement of the foreign ship-owners on the quality of seafarers 
Some foreign ship-owners have lowered their requirements in terms of the quality of 
seafarers to cope with the loss of officer seafarers since 2004.
Prior to 2004, foreign ship-owners had stringent requirements in terms of seafarers’ 
sailing experiences. The Manning managers explained that only the seafarers with 
more than two years of working experience in their posts were eligible to become
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candidates at that time. The size of the ship where the seafarers had worked was 
another important criterion. For instance, when a ship-owner selected seafarers to 
work onboard a 50,000 tonnage ship before 2004, he would only recruit those who 
had worked onboard 70,000 tonnage or even larger ships for at least 2 years.
Since 2004, however, when seafarers with even one year’s working experience have 
been hard to find, it was not unusual for some ship-owners to employ seafarers 
without any experience in their rank. The size of the ships on which candidates had 
previously worked was no longer considered either.
In addition, before 2004, the onboard evaluation forms and the documents that 
recorded seafarers’ previous work performance and training were important 
references when the foreign ship-owners selected seafarers. However, these 
documents were no longer considered by ship-owners after 2004. The Manning 
manager said:
Currently ship-owners have no time to check the forms carefully. As long as 
there is a seafarer available, he will be employed very quickly after a brief 
interview and a cursory check of his previous working experience.
Therefore, it is suggested that ship-owners have decreased their requirements 
regarding the quality of seafarers to deal with the labour shortage. The Manning 
manager explained this in more detail by giving some specific examples:
Before 2000, when a ship-owner wanted to employ a 3rd officer, we could find 
five candidates. If these five were not good enough, we could find more. And 
we were unable to help seafarers to get employed if they did not pass their 
interviews. But in recent years, it is completely different. If a seafarer is not 
good enough, we can negotiate with the ship-owner and finally he has to 
compromise. Sometimes, we just tell the ship-owner directly that no matter 
whether they think he is qualified or not, they have to employ him because 
nobody else can be found. Ship-owners have complained about the low quality, 
but they can do nothing. They know that there is a serious shortage of officer 
seafarers. But a ship cannot just stay there without a crew. Five years ago, the
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ship-owners looked for seafarers’ weaknesses and tried to challenge them so as 
to employ the best; but currently ship-owners look for their advantages and think 
about how they can be used.
Because ship-owners lowered their requirements in terms of the quality of seafarers, 
some changes happened in the management of training, which led to the reduced 
quality of seafarers. The next section explains this.
9.3.2 Weakened training management
9.3.2.1 Weakened land-based training
With the loss of seafarers and the lowered requirements of the ship-owners, the 
training management of Ag2 has become looser since 2004, which contributes 
negatively to the improvement of the quality of seafarers.
The training organized in Ag2 can be categorized into two types: land-based training 
and training at sea. Ag2 was mainly responsible for the land-based training. The land- 
based training focused on improving the quality of seafarers in the following five 
aspects: onboard working skills, international conventions, English language, 
emergency responses and moral quality, according to the training document. The 
land-based training consisted of three kinds of training as follows:
1. On-leave/stand-by training, mainly organized by Ag2 for seafarers during leave
2. Pre-joining training for seafarers who had already passed ship-owners’ interviews 
and were going to work onboard ship in a couple of weeks
3. Training for newly-recruited seafarers
Before 2004, the land-based training of seafarers was strictly managed by the agency. 
The performance of seafarers in this training was directly related to their promotion, 
material support and work opportunities. For instance, it was stipulated by the agency 
that if their training record was good, which included the requirement that seafarers 
should attend the organized training on time, they could be promoted smoothly, and 
consequently had better material support. If seafarers did not take part in organized 
land-based training (such as the pre-joining training), they would not be given 
onboard working opportunities. Such regulation was implemented well before 2004.
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After 2004, however, the agency no longer adhered to these regulations and land- 
based training was no longer compulsory. The reason for this could be fundamentally 
linked to the lack of officer seafarers. The Manning manager explained:
The director does not support the training. The training department exists 
because of the requirements of previous ship-owners. Now, because of the lack 
of seafarers, ship-owners no longer requires much on training or the quality of 
seafarers; the agency does not take training seriously... We are too busy looking 
for seafarers, so no one thinks about the training.
In addition to the loose management of the land-based training, Ag2 developed a new 
type of training program in order to improve seafarers’ interview performance in 
2006, called pre-interview training. This sort of training was completely oriented 
towards passing ship-owners’ interviews, comprising anticipating interview questions, 
preparing the answers to these questions, and explaining interview skills. With the 
help of this pre-interview training, seafarers seemed to have more reasons not to 
participate in the regular land-based training. A chief officer said:
The interview is not very useful to check the real capability of seafarers, as the 
answers to interview questions can be prepared by the agency and as long as the 
candidates remember them, there won’t be a problem with passing the 
interviews.
Because of the shortage of officer seafarers, foreign ship-owners lowered their 
requirements in terms of the quality of seafarers and Ag2 loosened its management of 
land-based training. Consequently, few seafarers took part in land-based training 
regularly. The Training managers said:
Seafarers are in short supply. Ship-owners can’t be too selective. So seafarers 
have no pressure, no sense of urgency, because they will be employed anyway. 
This is a very important reason why they do not participate in training when they 
are on leave.
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Even when we offered accommodation and food, and even when they did not 
have to spend any money, few seafarers enrolled for the training. Sometimes 
there was free training organized by foreign ship-owners and the agency 
compelled seafarers to join; still, very few seafarers went on the courses. 
Currently, only some senior officers have taken part in training when they have 
encountered problems at work.
As a result, since 2004, land-based training is not as well organized as it had been in 
the past. For instance, the on-leave/stand-by training organized for seafarers on leave 
was held four to five times a year before 2004, for two months each time. After 2004, 
however, according to the Training manager, there was no on-leave training organized 
in some years when few seafarers joined.
With regard to pre-joining training, it was organized before every voyage prior to 
2004, normally lasting for seven days, longer than the required length in the training 
plan (three days). In addition, the regulation was strictly implemented, as seafarers 
had to join or they would lose the onboard working opportunity. However, after 2004, 
the pre-joining training was less than three days, when it was held at all, and seafarers 
who did not attend were still able to work onboard. The Training manager said:
Current pre-joining training is at most two to three days; in most cases it lasts 
only half a day or one day. Many of the seafarers who have taken part in the 
training were those who came to the agency to get their seafaring documents and 
were prompted by us to enroll in training... Sometimes when there were very 
few trainees, the training was cut short or cancelled.
Furthermore, the pre-employment training for newly recruited seafarers, which lasted 
for four to six weeks before 2004, decreased in duration to three weeks after 2004. 
According to the Training manager, this type of training has become the only sort of 
land-based training to be organized with any certainty since 2004.
Therefore, seafarers were not trained regularly when they were on leave. This 
impeded the improvement of the quality of seafarers, which made the increase in
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wages difficult to achieve. The low wages led to the resignation of officer seafarers in 
Ag2 and consequently constrained the growth of the foreign manning business.
In addition, the ocean training management of Ag2 has become looser since 2004 due 
to the shortage of officer seafarers. The following section explains this change and 
considers its implications to the quality of seafarers.
9.3.2.2 Weakened ocean training
Seafarers’ ocean training was managed by the senior officers onboard ships, 
especially captains, who were responsible for the ship-owners. It was requested that 
on-board training must be implemented strictly in accordance with the requirement of 
the ship’s SMS manual and all the training activities should be well recorded. Ag2 
took the responsibility of recoding and supervising the ocean training that was 
required by the CMB.
Seafarers complained that the quality of the training at sea had declined, and the 
reason for this can be related to the irresponsibility of freelancers. When reflecting on 
the ocean training before 2004, a 2nd officer said:
For the whole working year, the training was very tiring, but it was very helpful. 
It was compulsory, according to the training plans of the ship-owners and the 
agency. The training was organized at the weekend by the captain and chief 
engineer. They were the registered seafarers of the agency and were very 
responsible.
When talking about training after 2004, however, he continued as follows:
But current training at sea, including some very basic but very important 
training - like firefighting and life saving skills, which are directly related to the 
life of seafarers - are far from adequate because many officer seafarers, 
including many captains and chief engineers, are freelance seafarers, and they 
seldom train us. They just think about their wages; they are not responsible. In 
addition, some freelance senior officers do not train us at sea because they are 
confused by many problems. If they do not understand them, how can they help
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us? I think the conditions will improve when the agency’s shortage of officer 
seafarers is no longer so serious and the agency does not employ freelance 
officer seafarers.
This view was expressed repeatedly by the interviewed seafarers. Therefore, it seems 
clear that the quality of the training at sea had indeed decreased. When seafarers were 
not having regular, high quality training, their quality decreased. This limited wage 
increases by foreign ship-owners and consequently contributed to the resignation of 
seafarers in Ag2. The shortage of labour as a result of seafarers’ resignation 
constrained the development of the seafarer export.
The following sections continue to examine the changes to the other management 
strategies of Ag2 in response to the labour shortage and the influence of these changes 
on the quality of seafarers. This helps to understand why it is difficult to improve 
seafarers’ wages and why many seafarers resigned in Ag2, which consequently 
constrained the growth of the foreign manning business since the mid-2000s.
9.3.3 Changes of the manning management
Because of the shortage of officer seafarers, the Manning managers dispatched 
seafarers at a higher frequency and prolonged their time at sea. This section initially 
discusses this change and considers how it resulted in the reduced quality of seafarers.
When talking about the changes in manning management since 2004, the Manning 
manager explained:
The labour shortage has become serious since 2004. Many of our senior officers 
are called to work onboard after less than one month’s holiday...In addition, 
they work onboard very hard, under very heavy pressure and for long time 
periods, often around nine months now.
Seafarers complained about the short periods of leave and the heavy workload 
onboard ships since 2004 during the interviews. A chief officer said:
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Five years ago, we did not have to work as intensely as we do now, and we had 
longer leave - four to six months or even longer if we wanted - because there 
were enough officer seafarers. So I could have plenty of time to undertake 
training and to do other things. But in the past few years, I have normally had to 
work for nine or ten months at sea and only had two to four months’ break 
before working onboard again because there were not enough officer seafarers... 
I always felt very tired whenever I finished working onboard. In addition, 
because the work at sea is very stressful, I often get sick when I get off the ship. 
So every time I need at least 2 months to recover from the tiredness and illness. 
But now, I do not feel that I have enough time to recover before I am called back 
to work again. It is also very hard for me to participate in training or do other 
things.
A 2nd officer said:
... [because of the shortage of officer seafarers], the size of the crew is usually 
the smallest permitted by international conventions onboard ship. Because of the 
smaller numbers of people onboard than before, working at sea is very hard and 
we are always working to the utmost of our ability. Also, because of the 
shortage of officers available, we do not have enough time to rest when we are 
on holiday on shore. The Manning manager often calls me to work onboard ship 
when I have had less than two months’ holiday. So I feel tired.
Data suggest that seafarers had very short holidays but very hard work at sea due to 
changes of the manning management in response to the shortage of officer seafarers. 
Therefore, in addition to the lack of enforcement of training requirements and the 
corresponding neglect of quality monitoring of seafarers by the foreign ship-owners as 
discussed in the previous sections, the manning management that resulted in 
seafarers’ short holidays and their need to recover from the hard work at sea 
contributed to the poor participation of seafarers in training. This adds further 
explanations as to why seafarers did not participate in the land-based training during 
shore leave and why their quality decreased.
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In addition to cutting holidays and prolonging the length of time spent at sea, 
Manning managers changed the method of dispatching seafarers in order to cope with 
the shortage of officer seafarers, which also contributed to the reduced quality of 
seafarers.
Before 2004, the manning management was based on a ‘panel mode’. That is, 
Manning managers selected a number of ships which were owned by shipping 
companies of similar scales, then selected a number of seafarers and put the selected 
ships and seafarers within a panel. Then seafarers were dispatched to work onboard 
different ships within the panel17. This strategy gave seafarers opportunities not only 
to work onboard the same ships repeatedly so as to consolidate their knowledge and 
skills, but also to work onboard different ships, so that they could experience different 
kinds of management and training and their ability and experiences could be 
improved. When talking about the influence of the manning management before 2004, 
the Manning manager said:
The previous ‘panel mode’ management was good. This was very helpful for us 
to expand our clients. If seafarers were restricted to one ship-owner, they could 
learn very little...
When talking about previous manning management, a captain said:
In the 1990s, the manning management was good. Seafarers were assigned 
onboard different ships. For instance, I worked onboard general cargo ships, 
bulk ships and log ships for different ship-owners. I learnt a lot from these 
experiences and they were very important for the development of my career; 
ship-owners like to employ me because of my rich experiences.
A rating said:
17 For instance, Manning managers may have asked a seafarer to work onboard Ship A of the panel for 
the first voyage, then Ship B for the second voyage, and then to return to Ship A for the third voyage, 
then to ship B or a new ship C for the fourth voyage, or to return to Ship A or B for the fifth voyage.
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The previous management gave me many chances to work onboard different 
ships; I learned a lot. I felt that work was challenging and interesting.
However, since 2004, the previous ‘panel mode’ manning strategy has been 
abandoned due to the shortage of seafarers. When talking about the current method of 
manning management, the Manning manager said:
Unlike before, the current manning management is in a mess; the dispatching 
decisions of seafarers are not based on any systematic plan. Sometimes when a 
ship-owner needs a seafarer, we call seafarers who are on holiday to ask whether 
they are able to work onboard ship or not; as long as we can find a seafarer, we 
will dispatch him. We have no other choice because seafarers are in short 
supply.
When talking about the impacts of this management on the quality of seafarers, the 
Manning manager continued:
Because of the shortage of officer seafarers, we are unable to guarantee that 
seafarers can be dispatched onboard different ships according to a designed plan 
to consolidate their knowledge, or to systematically enlarge and enrich their 
skills and experiences. The quality of seafarers is negatively influenced as a 
result.
Therefore, data suggest that the manning management of Ag2 has become less 
systematic than before since 2004. To cope with the shortage of officer seafarers, the 
manning managers dispatched seafarers at a higher frequency and prolonged their 
time at sea. This contributed to the poor participation of seafarers in land-based 
training. In addition, the previous ‘panel mode’ manning strategy has been abandoned 
due to the shortage of seafarers. This also constrained the improvement of the quality 
of seafarers. As a consequence, it is difficult to realize wage increases by foreign ship­
owners and many seafarers resigned due to the low wages, which limited the increase 
of the foreign manning business as a result.
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The following section examines the changes to the management of promotion in 
response to the labour shortage and the influences of these changes on the quality of 
seafarers. It seeks to add further reasons for the low wages of seafarers and their 
resignation.
9.3.4 Changes to the management of promotion
The promotion management in Ag2 has also become looser since 2004 as a result of 
the shortage of seafarers. This contributed to the reduced quality of seafarers in Ag2.
Before 2004, Ag2 had higher requirements than the CMB18 regarding the quality of 
seafarers applying to sit the national examination for promotion. Table 9.2 compares 
the requirements of the CMB and Ag2 regarding the sailing months required at the 
original rank before applying to take promotion examinations.
Table 9.2 Sailing time at the original rank required by CMB and Ag2 (before 
2004)____________________ ____________________ ____________________
Ranks Sailing time at sea regulated by CMB
Sailing time at sea 
regulated by Ag2
Cadet promoted to third 
officer/engineer 18 months 24 months
Third officer/engineer 
promoted to second 
officer/engineer
18 months 24 months
Second officer/engineer 
promoted to chief officer/ first 
engineer
12 months
More than 12 months, 
depending on practical 
need of Ag2
Chief officer/ first engineer 
promoted to captain/chief 
engineer
18 months
More than 18 months, 
depending on practical 
need of Ag2
Source: Ag2’s Department of Training
In addition, seafarers were required to submit a written application to the Certificate 
Department of Ag2 before 2004 for promotion. The department examined the 
qualifications and performance of the seafarers. It also considered the demand of the 
agency for seafarers at each rank and collected the opinions of managers in other
18 The Regulation on Examination, Assessment and Certificate for Competence of Seafarers of the 
People’s Republic of China, published by the Ministry of Communication of China on 1stAugust 2004, 
is one of the main regulations standardizing seafarers’ examination, assessment and certification 
educational background, professional training and sailing experience.
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departments. If a seafarer was about to be dispatched to work onboard ship, he would 
not be allowed to apply for promotion training organized by the CMB. Finally, all the 
documents were handed over to the senior managers, who made the final list of 
candidates for promotion.
Furthermore, before 2004, once seafarers had passed the examinations and been 
awarded their COC, they had to undergo a period of apprenticeship. After this, they 
would first be promoted by the agency before they were recommended to attend 
interviews with ship-owners. Finally, only those who could pass the strict interviews 
of the ship-owners could work at a higher rank and enjoy better material support.
When seafarers recalled this strict management, many of them perceived that it was 
good for the improvement of their skills and safety at sea. A 1st engineer said:
Despite the strict management and stringent requirements of the agency when 
considering our promotion before 2004, we were promoted at quite a sensible 
speed. Strict management is necessary, I think. Our promotion was not delayed 
or negatively influenced because of its strictness. The management of the 
agency told seafarers that as long as they were good, they could be promoted, 
and in fact it did so. We seafarers called the agency a good ‘cradle’ because its 
management let seafarers grow quickly and healthily.
However, due to the shortage of officer seafarers, especially senior officer seafarers, 
since 2004, fast promotion was badly needed by Ag2. Consequently, the promotion of 
seafarers in Ag2 was no longer systematically managed.
Specifically, after 2004, Ag2 did not have any additional requirements to the 
conditions set up by the CMB. It no longer controlled seafarers’ applications to sit 
examinations. Instead, as long as seafarers reached the requirements of the CMB, the 
agency encouraged them to take promotion examinations by refunding their 
examination fees. In addition, as long as seafarers passed the examination and got 
their COC, apprenticeships would be arranged and then they would be promoted 
immediately by the agency. Different from before, the apprenticeship was no longer 
important. In some cases, interviews with ship-owners were arranged before seafarers
205
had received any apprenticeship. It was not rare for seafarers without apprenticeship 
to be promoted by ship-owners directly.
When talking about current promotion management, the Manning managers thought 
that it was very loose and the promotion of seafarers was too fast. He said:
The agency’s promotion management has become very weak in recent years. 
Before 2004, seafarers had to have at least one year’s apprenticeship before they 
could be promoted... Now, promotion is too fast because of the labour shortage. 
In fact, some seafarers are not adequately qualified for promotion. This is not 
right. There should be some management to provide a process to allow seafarers 
to learn and grow gradually.
To deal with the shortage of officer seafarers, since 2004, Ag2’s promotion 
management has become more lenient in its requirements and the speed of promotion 
has become faster than before. This contributes to the reduced quality of seafarers in 
Ag2. Before specifying how the lesser quality of seafarers made it difficult to increase 
salaries by foreign ship-owners in section 9.3.6, the next sub-section briefly examines 
the changes of the discipline of the agency on seafarers and the implications to 
seafarers’ quality so as to add further reasons for the low wages of seafarers and their 
resignation, which negatively influenced the development of the foreign manning 
business since the mid-2000s.
9.3.5 The changes of the discipline of the agency on seafarers 
Before 2004, the agency was strict about discipline. The regulations specified 
different kinds of mistakes and corresponding punishments. Since 2004, however, 
discipline has not been enforced by Ag2. When talking about the discipline of the 
agency, the President of the TU said:
In previous times, registered seafarers would be fired if ship-owners sacked 
them twice consecutively from jobs at sea; as for other seafarers, they only had 
one chance. But we cannot do this now because of the lack of officer seafarers. 
Currently, when a seafarer makes a mistake at sea or is fired by the ship-owner, 
we won’t apply strict discipline or punishment, but will just dispatch him to
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another ship where he has not made a mistake before. So the self-discipline of 
seafarers is poor.
Seafarers’ performance was negatively influenced by this loose discipline. When 
talking about the professional performance of seafarers at sea, the director said:
Seafarers are not managed as strictly as before. When there have been problems 
onboard ships, as long as ship-owners did not investigate the problems in any 
depth, the agency has turned a blind eye, and seafarers who should have been 
made to take responsibility for their laziness or wrongdoings have not been 
punished. So the workers’ discipline is loose and seafarers present weakness and 
laxity at work.
The quality of seafarers in Ag2 decreased due to the changes of the management 
strategies, such as insufficient training, excessively fast promotion, loose manning and 
lax disciplinary management. The lowered quality of seafarers and their poor 
performances consequently constrained the increase of their wages by foreign ship­
owners.
9.3.6 The reduced quality of seafarers and their low wages
Some senior officer seafarers complained about the lesser quality of seafarers. A chief 
engineer mentioned his experiences as follows:
The quality of Ag2’s seafarers was once the best in this city. But now it is far 
from good. I have strong feelings about this from my last sailing. Many 
seafarers, including officers, knew little about their work. They could not 
undertake their duty. For example, when our Japanese ship-owner asked one 3rd 
engineer to examine the water in the boiler, he did not know he should get rid of 
the backwater first and then take the inside water, but gave the backwater 
directly to the ship-owner. Then that Japanese manager asked me ‘Are you sure 
this is the water I wanted, or is it your Chinese tea?’ I was very angry, since the 
3 rd engineer did not know a very basic operation.
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Another example is when we called at a Spanish port, and an officer of the port 
state control examined our dynamotor, checking whether it could be stopped 
automatically if a problem occurred. However, when the officer turned down the 
oil pressure to a very low level, the dynamotor could not stop automatically. The 
officer said that if we had not tackled the problem when he came back the next 
day, our ship would be detained. I began to investigate the problem with three 
other engineering officers. Whatever I asked them, none of them could answer 
clearly. Finally, I found and solved the problem by myself. Those engineer 
officers did not understand the theory or the elements of how each engine works. 
So they could not tackle any problem if it happened at sea, but asked me for 
help. I felt very tired.
A captain said:
Some officers do not even know how to set down a lifeboat. The quality of 
officer seafarers and ratings is not as good as before. I think this situation will 
improve when the shipping market goes down and the lack of officer seafarers is 
not so serious.
The director said:
Because the management of the agency has not been as strict in recent years as it 
was before, seafarers do not build a solid foundation for their skills. There are 
many complaints from ship-owners and the reputation of the agency has 
suffered.
The reduced quality of the seafarers made it difficult to increase their wages by
foreign ship-owners. The Business manager said:
Now, because our management and the quality of our seafarers are not as good 
as they used to be, it is difficult to negotiate with foreign ship-owners to increase 
their wages. In fact, it is because of the low wages that the foreign ship-owners 
are bearing with the low quality of our seafarers. They have increased their 
wages, but only to a limited extent.
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In addition, the reduced quality of seafarers has resulted in an increase in the number 
of accidents at sea in recent years and some large ship-owners have ceased to work 
with Ag2. This made it even more difficult to increase seafarers’ wages. When talking 
about the reduced quality of seafarers and the impact on the business, the director
said:
The number of accidents within the past three years has increased noticeably 
because of the problem with the quality of seafarers. Last week, ship X, 
navigated by the seafarers of our agency, collided into the rear of another ship; 
water came into ship X through its nose cabin. As a result, ship X stopped and 
the ship-owner lost 70,000-80,000 dollars every day. That ship-owner was angry 
and discontinued its contract with us. Some other big ship-owners have also 
stopped doing business with us due to their dissatisfaction with the performance 
of our seafarers. These years, we have more cooperation with smaller ship­
owners who had lower requirements in terms of the quality of seafarers.
It was easier to negotiate increases to seafarers’ wages with previous ship­
owners than it is with the current smaller ship-owners. Although the smaller 
ship-owners have increased the wages of seafarers to some extent in recent 
years, this increase is still very limited. We have been under more pressure 
because wages have increased fast in the market and the gaps between the wages 
given by Ag2 and the rates in the market have been enlarging year by year.
Therefore, the quality of Ag2’s seafarers has decreased since 2004 due to the changes 
of the management to cope with the shortage of seafarers. This has made it difficult to 
increase salaries by ship-owners and thereby contributed to the low wages of seafarers.
9.4 Summary
This chapter mainly analyses the reasons why seafarers in Ag2 received poor material 
support. It seeks to provide some explanations to the reasons for the resignation of 
officer seafarers in Ag2, which caused a shortfall in labour supply and consequently 
constrained the development of the foreign manning business since the mid-2000s.
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It is initially analysed in Chapter 9 that the wages of Ag2’s seafarers are lower than 
those in both the national and international seafarers’ labour markets. The main reason 
for this, as analysed, is the interference of the head office, which means that Ag2 has 
no ability to manage its profits but had to return 80-90% of its net profit to the head 
office. Therefore, the discussion suggests that this independent agency was not really 
independent in terms of the control that it had over its profits. The independence of 
Ag2 was still quite circumscribed by the relationship with the head office.
According to the managers of Ag2, the intervention of the head office made Ag2 
impossible to pay seafarers a competitive market rate and resulted in mass of officer 
seafarers leaving the agency. In response to the loss of officer seafarers and the 
consequent shortage of labour, Ag2 had to change its management strategies and 
hence the quality of seafarers declined, which made the increase in wages even more 
difficult to achieve and contributed to the loss of officer seafarers from 2002 (this 
logic can be seen in Chart 9.1).
The shortage of seafaring labour consequently constrained the development of Ag2’s 
manning business with foreign ship-owners, as we will see in the next chapter. Before 
discussing this, Chapter 10 will consider the management strategies of Ag2 to cope 
with the resignation of seafarers and the consequences for seafarers and for the 
foreign manning business. The discussion seeks to add further explanations as to why 
many seafarers resigned in Ag2, which contributed to the shortage of seafaring labour 
and thereby limited the increase of the foreign manning business.
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Chart 9.1 The low material support and its impacts on the foreign manning business of Ag2
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Chapter 10:
Strategies for labour retention, the role of the TU and the foreign manning 
business
This chapter continues to explain some of the reasons why many officer seafarers 
resigned from Ag2, which impeded the development of the foreign manning business. 
Specifically, it describes the ways in which Ag2 seeks to channel the conflicts 
between the management and seafarers to reduce resignation rates, but in practice, 
how managers treated seafarers and why seafarers were dissatisfied with the 
management, which led to their resignation. In addition, it discusses how the TU in 
Ag2 failed to protect the interests of seafarers and because of this, seafarers can not 
get any help to improve employment conditions or work incentives, which also 
contributed to seafarers’ resignation.
It initially discusses two management strategies -  the ‘two service’ strategy and 
‘traditional ideological mobilization’, both of which are designed to reduce the 
resignation rates of officer seafarers. Before looking at the foreign manning business 
after 2002 as a result of the shortage of seafarers, the chapter considers the role of the 
TU in Ag2.
10.1 The ‘two service’ strategy and the relationship between managers and seafarers 
To reduce the loss of seafarers, a strategy was implemented in 2003, called ‘two 
services: serving the ship-owners and serving seafarers’. The director learned this 
strategy from western HRM. This policy encouraged managers to change their 
conception from managing seafarers to serving seafarers, treating seafarers fairly, 
improving communication with seafarers and involving them in management. It 
emphasized humanized and personalized management in order to stabilize the 
seafarers’ team and turn the company into a cohesive community.
Managers commonly thought that a good relationship between seafarers and managers 
had been built up through managers’ frequent initiation of communication with 
seafarers and the help that they have offered to deal with seafarers’ problems. 
However, many seafarers felt that this strategy was just a token effort and they had 
not felt any improvement in their relationship with the management. Some of the
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seafarers even said they had never heard of this strategy and they thought that the 
relationship between the management and labour was still very unpleasant. The 
following sections explain seafarers’ perceptions in detail.
10.1.1 The problems between labour and management
The ‘two service’ strategy emphasized a more humanised management, encouraging 
managers to care about seafarers and provide friendly management. However, 
seafarers were dissatisfied with the managers’ attitudes and behaviour towards them. 
They complained about the following problems that they were confronted with.
Ratings and peasant seafarers felt that managers did not show them respect. They 
complained about the bad attitudes and arrogance of managers, as illustrated in this 
example:
The managers treat seafarers according to their ranks. If you are a peasant, will 
they take you seriously? Definitely not. If your rank is low, it is not a question 
of whether their attitude towards you is good or bad; but of whether they will 
give you enough respect as a human. When you come to the agency, they shout 
at you “Leave! Leave! Go back home! Don’t stand in front of me. Wait at 
home!” ... When the managers meet an important person, they will be very 
polite; but when facing us, the ratings, most of them will turn very arrogant or 
even cruel. So if you are a rating, you feel that you are inferior.
In contrast to the ratings, who were low in rank and redundant in the labour market, 
officer seafarers felt that they were treated with respect by their managers. However, 
they were still unhappy with the managers’ attitude. Some officer seafarers, especially 
the elders, were angry about their inferior status. A 63-year-old chief engineer 
commented:
The attitude of the managers towards me is not bad. But I feel that the officer 
seafarers are not as important for our agency as we once were. In 1981, when 
the agency was established, it depended on us a lot and the managers were very 
nice to us, as there were only a handful of registered officer seafarers then.
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At that time, when officer seafarers were leaving for a certain ship or coming 
back after a trip, the managers of the agency would go to the airport to see us off 
or welcome us back. Additionally, managers looked in and even nursed us when 
we were ill in hospital. Sometime they also helped us to change the gas jars in 
our houses. They did these things because they had to depend on us to make 
money.
But now, it is different. There are almost 700 registered seafarers in the 
company. When there are more seafarers and when the agency has earned more 
money, managers pay less attention to us. Now when I come to the agency, 
nobody takes the initiative to talk to me. They all seem to be very busy. Around 
1995, I remember a chief engineer complained to me that when he was ill in 
hospital, nobody from the agency went to see him. He felt very angry. But now, 
this situation is too common. It is very strange if a manager visits a seafarer 
when he is ill now.
Some officer seafarers were also dissatisfied with the managers because they offered 
lip service only. For instance, although the agency promised to transfer the hukou of 
peasant officer seafarers when they became senior officers, many peasant senior 
officers had to wait for several years after reaching this position. In addition, some 
allowances that should be paid to seafarers were not paid in time. A 2nd engineer told 
his story about unpaid housing allowance:
While my manager has promised to give me the money, they asked me to wait 
without specifying how long it would take. So I don’t know how long I still 
have to wait for the money.
The ‘two service’ strategy also highlighted the communication between the managers 
and seafarers and the involvement of the seafarers in management. However, 
seafarers told a different story.
Both officers and ratings said they seldom came to the agency and there was little 
communication between seafarers and managers. Some seafarers thought their ideas 
were not important to the agency and consequently they seldom mentioned them.
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They gave many similar complaints, as illustrated in the following two examples. A 
rating seafarer said:
I never come to the agency unless I have to. I rarely communicate with the 
managers or suggest anything, as they don’t care about us or change anything 
for us. Everything has been decided by the managers to guarantee their high 
profits.
A 1st engineer said:
Though I am a registered seafarer, I think I am an outsider to the agency and 
they will not listen to me. Even if I tell them my ideas, nothing will change.
Some seafarers regarded the gap in the economic conditions and social status between 
managers and seafarers as one of the reasons for the poor communication. A 2nd 
engineer said:
In fact, it is not very pleasant to talk with the managers. While their attitude is 
not as bad as it is towards ratings, the managers are still rich and powerful 
people, unlike us seafarers. They never talk to me or care about my life or work. 
I feel, you know, the managers are far from me. In this situation, how can I 
communicate with the managers or tell them my true ideas?
A chief officer said:
...This [little communication] is because the director and the managers are of a 
much higher status than me. I am afraid the director or manager will have a bad 
impression of me if I tell them what they need to improve and what they need to 
do. Given all the negative consequences for me, why should I say anything?
Some seafarers did not communicate with managers because they were unhappy with 
the payment offered by the agency. A captain said:
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I will not communicate with them [managers], as the development of the agency 
is not related to my interests at all. I signed a fifteen-year contract from 1998. 
During the last ten years, although the agency’s profits have been high, the 
salaries of our seafarers have been low. Although the shipping market is 
growing so fast now, my salary is still lower than the salaries of seafarers in 
other domestic companies.
Therefore, the management has not become friendly or considerate, according to 
seafarers; the communication between the management and seafarers has not 
improved. The ‘two service’ strategy that is intended to stabilise the seafarers’ team 
and turn the company into a cohesive community seems to have had little effect.
Seafarers’ dissatisfaction with the management’s treatment was not limited to 
managers’ attitudes or lack of concern. Over and above this, seafarers felt that the 
management was unfair and unprofessional, because some managers took advantage 
of seafarers, expecting bribes from them. The next section will look at this.
10.1.2 Personal relationships/Guanxi
As explored by Walder (1986), the personal relationships/Gwanx/ was one of the 
institutional cultures in traditional Chinese factories. In Ag2, as we saw in the case in 
Agl, Guanxi is evident in the shipping industry.
To eradicate this historical disadvantage of the Chinese institutions and to improve 
management, the ‘two service’ strategy implemented in Ag2 required managers to 
promote equal and fair management. However, according to seafarers, personal 
relationships/G«tf>m were still strongly influential in management decisions and the 
management was unfair in many ways. So why were personal relationships still 
important in Ag2 after almost thirty years of economic reform, and what were the 
impacts on seafarers? The following sub-sections discuss the questions.
10.1.2.1 The power of managers and the importance of personal relationships 
The personal decisions of managers can greatly influence the interests of seafarers, 
which means that seafarers’ personal relationships with managers are very important. 
The power of managers is illustrated in the following examples.
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Working opportunities
Manning managers could influence the working opportunities of seafarers. According 
to the seafarers, a good personal relationship with managers led to better opportunities 
to work onboard ships. A 3rd officer said:
If I want to work onboard, the most important thing for me is to be 
recommended by the Manning manager to be interviewed by the ship-owner. If 
there are ten 3rd officer seafarers, the manager will not ask all of them to prepare 
for the interview, but will select several seafarers who are close or important to 
him. Then the rest of the 3rd officers have to wait for other chances. So you can 
get great opportunities if you have a good relationship with the managers.
Promotion
The Manning managers also influenced the promotion of seafarers. By developing a 
good relationship with the managers, seafarers thought they could work at a 
favourable rank at sea. A 2nd officer told me:
Without a connection with the Manning managers, if you hold a 2nd officer’s 
certificate, they can ask you to be 3 rd officer onboard, giving you the wages of a 
3rd officer. They will say that this is because, ‘there is a shortage of 3rd officers’. 
In this case, you have no other choice but to work as a 3rd officer, receiving 500 
dollars less per month than a 2nd officer. I had such an experience.
A motorman said:
Before I started to work as a motorman, I worked as a steward for three years. I 
accumulated no experience as an engineer as a result of the management. It was 
very unfair to me. I then talked about my condition to other elder seafarers. 
They told me the reason was my failure to cultivate connections with the 
Manning managers. Following their instructions, I built good personal ties with 
the Manning managers and consequently worked as a motorman on my third 
trip.
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Working onboard ‘good ships’
According to seafarers, ‘good ships’ are not only ships of good condition, but also 
included ships sailing on good sailing routes and those associated with high salaries 
because of the generous overtime pay from foreign shipping companies. In addition, 
when working onboard ‘good ships’, fewer jobs were required and safety at sea could 
be better secured. A ship owned by a famous shipping company could be a ‘good 
ship’ as well because working aboard such a ship could be a valuable experience for 
seafarers’ records.
Seafarers were very concerned about the conditions of the ships on which they 
worked. “Every seafarer wants to work onboard good ships”, a chief engineer told me. 
Having a good relationship with managers, according to seafarers, meant that they 
could have better opportunities to work onboard good ships. An AB said: “Manning 
managers will deliberately choose a good ship for the seafarers who are close to them. 
This is the reality and very common.”
A 1st officer said:
Now, we are assigned by the Manning managers onboard ships of different 
conditions. Who will be called to work on good ships and who will be called to 
work on bad ships depends on the decision of the Manning managers. With 
good personal ties with the manager, we can be called to work onboard good 
ships. With bad ties, we will only go aboard bad ships.
Working for a good period at sea
Some seafarers also suggested that the relationship with managers could influence the 
duration of work at sea, which sometimes did not strictly follow the terms in the 
sailing contract, but depended on the decisions of Manning managers. A 2nd engineer 
said:
Without good personal ties with the Manning managers, they will not arrange a 
seafarer to replace you when you finish your working period. They won’t feel 
guilty because they can use the excuse that ‘no other seafarer can be found to
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replace you’. Adversely, they can blame you for using the satellite phone 
onboard to call them several times to ask for a holiday. I experienced this.
When I was told that I had to work for several extra months, I felt desperately 
frustrated and disappointed. As you know, the work onboard is very hard and 
every seafarer looks forward to the coming holiday and returning home. So the 
work during the additional months was much harder.
But now that I have cultivated a good personal tie with the manager, I can go on 
holiday on time or even earlier than the time stipulated in the contract and also 
enjoy a good return trip.
Due to the power of the Manning managers, seafarers took their relationships with 
these managers seriously. In my fieldwork, many seafarers I chose to interview were 
called by the Manning managers to come to the agency immediately. When I asked 
them how they were able to come so quickly without advanced appointments, most of 
them, including captains and chief engineers, answered that they had come by taxi 
because they wanted to perform well in front of the managers. One 3rd engineer also 
told me that:
I have to satisfy the requests of the Manning managers; or else they will be 
angry with me and have a bad impression of me. Then, next time they intend to 
recommend me to the ship-owner, they will remember that I once refused them. 
So they will not give me the opportunity, or will force me to work aboard bad 
ships.
In addition, when Manning managers asked seafarers to go aboard a ship in bad 
condition, even if the seafarers did not want to follow the order, some of them had to 
compromise in order to maintain their relationships with the managers. A 2nd officer 
said:
But if the condition of the ship is not good, I will not tell the managers that I 
don’t like the ship or I don’t want to go. Even if I spoke up, they would not
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change their minds, but my personal tie with the managers would probably be 
impaired.
A chief officer told me:
I hope to work aboard good ships, but I have no choice. Without exception, I 
accept the orders of the Manning manager every time. If the state of the ship is 
bad, I just don’t think about the dangers.
Even if some seafarers did not follow the orders of managers, they declined in a very 
implicit, prudent way. A Bosun said:
If I don't want to work onboard a ship, I will not go onboard. I will tell the 
managers that I am seriously ill or that something bad has happened at home and 
I cannot leave. I cannot ask the Manning managers to arrange another ship for 
me, because if I did so, they would be angry with me and probably blame me, 
saying, ‘If you don’t go, tell me who will!’ So I need to be very careful with my 
attitude and words. I need to find an irrefutable excuse. I have to let them know 
I really want to go but I am just unable to do so. I cannot offend them. I dare 
not.
Therefore, managers possessed significant power that could influence the interests of 
seafarers directly. As a result, seafarers took their relationships with the managers 
very seriously.
However, showing deference alone seemed not to be enough to develop and maintain 
good relationships with managers. The next part discusses the ways in which seafarers 
built up connections/GwtfH*/ with managers.
10.1.2.2 The bribery behaviour of seafarers
Due to the great power of managers, seafarers had to develop and maintain good 
relationships with managers. According to seafarers, bribing was the most effective 
and common way.
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The most common bribe, according to seafarers, was money. Seafarers thought 
bribing through money was effective. A rating said:
I was recruited in 1995. I waited at home for two years for an opportunity. In 
1997 I got my first onboard working opportunity because I bribed one manager 
with 2000 yuan. It was so useful that I got the opportunity just two weeks after I 
had bribed him. For my second opportunity, I bribed two managers with 1000 
yuan each. One week later, they called me and told me to prepare to go. It was 
100% effective. Now I bribe them every time I finish a voyage, giving them 
between 1000 and 5000 yuan to maintain a long-term relationship. You know, 
too many seafarers bribe the managers. If I hadn’t heard the experiences of 
others, I would not bribe. If others bribe but I don’t, they will get the good 
working opportunities.
In addition, some seafarers chose other ways to bribe. However, they had to be very 
careful with the bribes that they prepared. A 3rd engineer said:
Today, just before this interview, I bribed a Manning manager by giving him 
two packs of cigarettes. I was also told that the two packs of cigarettes must be 
the same to show my respect. Otherwise, the manager would think that I had not 
prepared carefully. I think it is a common view among seafarers that bribing 
managers is a good way to cultivate a connection with them and create better 
opportunities for ourselves.
However, not everyone was able to bribe managers. According to seafarers, managers 
did not accept bribes casually from people with whom they were not familiar. 
Therefore, seafarers who wanted to bribe managers had to find a good ‘broker’. A 
chief engineer said:
But not every seafarer has the chance to bribe. Around 1990,1 remembered a 3rd 
engineer who had had a long holiday for 24 months and hoped to bribe a 
Manning manager to get a working opportunity. But that Manning manager did 
not accept, because he did not know the seafarer. Then the seafarer came to me 
for help. I knew that he desperately needed a chance. It was also clear that
221
without bribing the manager, he would not get any onboard opportunity. So I 
helped him by asking the manager out to dinner with the seafarer and myself. 
Finally, the seafarer managed to bribe the manager with a pack of cigarettes 
after dinner. As a result, one week later, he was given an onboard working 
opportunity.
Consequently, through bribing, seafarers built up relationships with managers so as to 
further their personal interests. However, successful bribery did not come naturally. 
Seafarers had to find a good ‘broker’ and to carefully prepare the bribes. When 
personal relationships were so dominant within the agency, how did they influence 
seafarers and how did seafarers perceive this? The following section will focus on this 
issue.
10.1.2.3 Seafarers’ assessments of the particularism
Some seafarers were angry with the management. Initially, the importance of personal 
relationships made the management seem very unfair. This can be seen from the 
previous quotes, exemplifying that seafarers who were personally connected to 
managers were given good working opportunities. As a result, some seafarers felt 
disappointed with the management. A 2nd officer said:
Sometimes, managers’ encouragement and promotion of responsible and
experienced seafarers can bring these seafarers a sense of success and
satisfaction, which is more useful than money to unite the seafarers to the
company. However, no matter how hard I work, I rarely get any positive 
feedback from the managers. I don’t think they really care about hard-working 
seafarers. I feel that the distance between the managers and myself is getting 
larger and larger.
In addition, in order to build up personal relationships, bribing managers resulted in 
economic pressure on seafarers. Seafarers commonly reflected that in recent years, 
bribery had become harder because the requirements of the managers had become 
higher. A chief engineer who joined the agency in 1985 said:
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Nowadays, with the increase in the salary of seafarers and the improvements to 
material life, bribes have become much more expensive than they were ten and 
twenty years ago. Ten years ago, treating managers to dinner or bribing them 
with a pack of cigarettes was a common way to build up personal ties. But 
nowadays, if you bribe them with less than 2000 yuan, you will still not get a 
good onboard opportunity.
Furthermore, due to the dominant position of personal relationships in the agency,
many low-skilled seafarers were given working opportunities, which caused problems
at sea. A chief officer said:
This approach of management is problematic. It is not only unfair, impairing the 
interests of seafarers, but brings many problems at sea. This is very obvious 
when considering the employment of ratings.
Bribing Manning managers is more common and serious among ratings than 
officer seafarers because they are redundant in the labour market. It could be 
said that ratings have to bribe to get onboard working opportunities. 
Consequently, some of the ratings assigned onboard don’t work hard at all. They 
are very difficult to manage. They think that even if they don’t work hard, they 
can still get opportunities as long as they bribe the managers. So they are very 
irresponsible and unprofessional... In this agency, I have worked with some very 
responsible and hard-working ratings, but because they don’t know any 
powerful people and can not afford expensive bribes, they hardly get any 
opportunities even though they are very good ratings.
A 1st engineer said:
I know a steward, who is the son of the ex-judge of the urban Maritime Court. 
He didn’t work hard onboard ship. Many times the captain called the agency to 
find somebody to replace him. But the agency did not do so, because he is the 
son of the ex-judge. When I worked onboard the same ship as him from 
Singapore, seafarers asked me to ‘save their lives’, as the rice prepared by the 
steward was never properly cooked. I talked to the steward and told him I would
223
like to help him to prepare rice, but he found me some rotten rice to cook to 
humiliate me. I was very angry. Since the seafarers also became angry when 
they could not have good food, I fired the steward by threatening the agency that 
if the steward did not leave the ship, I would leave. There are many incidents 
like this.
Although seafarers could further their personal interests by bribing the managers, the 
best opportunities were not prepared for them. There was a group of seafarers who 
were given the best working opportunities and material support. They did not have to 
bribe and they were not the most skilled or experienced seafarers, but they were 
connected closely to people in positions of power, such as relatives or close friends of 
government officials and the managers of the agency. As a result, a majority of 
interviewees agreed with the “dispatching sequence” or a “manning rule” that a senior 
seafarer generalized after he had “observed” the work of Manning managers for 22 
years:
Seafarers enjoying the best onboard opportunities and arrangements are those 
who are related to somebody powerful, such as the relatives of the managers. 
Following this are the people who bribe the managers through their own efforts. 
Those who do not bribe but are very skilful and experienced come third. 
Sometimes, these seafarers are needed to work with those in the first and second 
categories so as to accomplish the sailing task.
Therefore, the management in Ag2 deviated from the spirit of the ‘two service’ 
strategy. The strategy, which was intended to reduce the loss of seafarers, failed as a 
result. So why were the managers unable to implement the strategy in their daily 
work?
10.1.3 The management of the managers in Ag2
The first reason why managers did not implement the strategy is related to their 
benefits, which are secured by the head office. That is, even if the manning business is 
not profitable, the managers will not get sacked. Instead, the head office will find 
them other jobs because of their strong social background. In Ag2, with the exception 
of the several senior managers who had been working in the agency since the 1980s,
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most of the managers, especially the young managers, were recruited through their 
social relationships and social background. A 63-year-old chief engineer said:
Without connection with a particular manager or with powerful people, nobody 
can be employed by Ag2 as managers. When Ag2 was established in 1985, I 
was the agency’s only chief engineer. I trained the current managers, who were 
engineers when they worked at sea. I know the skills and capability of each of 
them clearly. They were not distinguished seafarers. I am sure that 90% of the 
managers would be confused if they were asked to go onboard to tackle engine 
problems. When I lectured them about the automatic control of the boiler, none 
of the current managers understood. So those who were not good at seafaring 
were promoted to do office management work just because of their social 
background.
One captain said:
Some seafarers were promoted to do management work not because of their 
capability but because of their social connections with powerful people ...I am 
confident to say that most of them were not skillful seafarers when they worked 
aboard ship, as I worked with most of them.
Secondly, the poor implementation of the ‘two service’ strategy is related to the fact 
that there is little incentive for the managers. Since the head office takes most of the 
net profits away, there is very little money left for Ag2’s managers’ bonus. Therefore, 
no matter how hard the managers work or how well they treat seafarers, their material 
support can not be improved much.
Thirdly, managers’ poor treatment of seafarers is associated with their weak 
supervision and limited accountability in Ag2.
In all, due to the lack of reform concerning the management of managers, the 
managers did not carry out the ‘two service’ strategy effectively. They did not serve 
the seafarers or carry out friendly management, but asked for bribes from seafarers. 
Seafarers were consequently dissatisfied with the management. This contributes to the
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explanations as to why many seafarers resigned from Ag2, which impeded the growth 
of the foreign manning business after the mid-2000s.
In addition to the ‘two service’ strategy, Ag2 implemented another strategy to 
stabilize the seafarers’ team and turn the company into a cohesive community. The 
following section considers this strategy and its effects.
10.2 Traditional ideological mobilization
Under the requirements of the head office, Ag2 still remained some traditional 
activities that were organized by the SOEs in the 1970s and 1980s. These activities 
were intended to channel the conflicts between labour and management and improve 
seafarers’ loyalty by propagandising the care and love of the leaders to seafarers.
One of the main activities was that several senior managers visited the families of 
seafarers working onboard ships on the agricultural spring festival. This task was very 
important: the director claimed that, “Such visiting was required by the head office. It 
is an important political task”. The aim of these visits was to publicize several key 
meanings to seafarers through the year-end reports.
One aim was to show that the managers loved and cared about the seafarers. For 
instance, the following paragraph in a 2007 report put it like this:
...the activity of visiting the families of the seafarers was encouraged and 
supported by the head office. During the spring festival holidays in 2007, three 
senior managers of the company participated in this activity. To avoid visiting 
seafarers’ families during working hours, the managers sacrificed their leisure 
time and visited the families in the evenings. They had no time to have dinner, 
but just had some dry bread. Despite this, none of the managers complained. 
They commonly believed that this visiting has significant meaning and their 
own interests should not be counted.
Another purpose was to publicize ‘good examples’ and ask seafarers to learn from 
them. The 2005 report said:
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...The managers were also moved by the families of seafarers. For instance, the 
managers found that some seafarers’ parents were ill but seafarers could not go 
home and take care of them; some seafarers’ wives were ill but they still had to 
take care of children; some seafarers’ wives could only afford instant noodles for 
every meal, but they did not complain to their husbands who were working at sea.
One family member told the managers, ‘It was wonderful to see you. I will 
definitely be a good wife so as to reduce his worries about us and let him work 
well at sea. I won’t tell him about any problems at home. Although I am not well, 
if the agency asks my husband to work onboard, we will support the company’s 
decision.’
Another seafarer’s wife said, ‘Since I am married to a seafarer, no matter what 
difficulties arise, I will handle them by myself. When my husband was working at 
sea, my mother-in-law was ill and my parents were ill as well. I had to take care 
of them and it was a very heavy burden. However, I did not ask my husband to 
stop working or return home to deal with the problems. As a wife of a seafarer, I 
should be brave and cope with any problems.
The ultimate intention of the reports was to propagandise the seafarers’ and their 
families’ love of the management and mobilize seafarers to work loyally for the 
agency. A paragraph in the report 2006 reported:
The parents of another seafarer said, ‘We really appreciate your visit. When I see 
you, I feel that I have seen my own son.’ Because of the mutual appreciation, the 
hearts of the managers and the families of the seafarers were closely connected. 
We will become a more solid community, overcoming all the difficulties in front 
of us. Because of the good seafarers and their families, we will not be afraid of 
any difficulty.
In addition to the visits and the propaganda, the agency organized other activities in 
order to improve the loyalty of seafarers. For instance, activities celebrating the New 
Year were organized in the agency’s meeting room each year and some seafarers and 
their families were invited to attend; following this, free dinners were offered and
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New Year presents, like food, towels and toothpaste, were given to seafarers. In 2007, 
for the first time, some officer seafarers received boxes of moon-cake sent by the 
agency on Mid-Autumn Day. Moral lessons were organized to publicise the notion 
that seafarers who resigned from the agency were selfish, irresponsible and immature, 
and that everyone should look down upon them.
The head office required Ag2 to organize these activities. In China, such activities and 
political propaganda are organized by the central government to unite Chinese people. 
The main media in China often report, for example, good examples of workers who 
Tike their factory as much as their homes’ or ‘sacrifice their own interests for the 
interests of the factory or the country’. In addition, some live entertainment 
performances are organized for the people in poor rural areas, which are meant to 
‘send the care and love of the central government to the local brothers and sisters’, 
and other Chinese people can also watch these performances on TV. In the large 
SOEs, some collective activities, such as Labourers’ Sports Meetings, spring and 
winter trips and performances to celebrate special days and festivals are organized 
every year, which are also meant to propagandise the idea of solidarity and mobilize 
workers to work hard.
However, the activities organized by Ag2 that were intended to stabilise the seafarers’ 
team and transform the company into a cohesive community had little effect. 
Seafarers did not show much appreciation because they thought the activities were 
just formalistic and did not address their problems, such as low material support. A 
captain from Ag2 said:
Actually, you can feel the care of the company. On the last mid-autumn day, the 
company sent me a pack of moon-cake. It had never happened before. Also, at 
the end of every year, my family is invited to the New Year celebrations 
organized by the company, which is normally a collective dinner. But my family 
and I have never attended. It is meaningless for us; we are suffering from low 
salaries and the pressure of life. Additionally, the agency did not mind or even 
notice whether my family and I were there or not, so we did not bother to waste 
our time and money.
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A 2nd officer said:
I attended the New Year celebration in 2006. At the end of the activity, every 
family was given a box of frozen steamed-bread, worth less than 100 yuan. I 
joked with my wife that I thought it would give us a woollen blanket to celebrate 
the fact that we had moved into our new house. I don’t think such activities can 
bring the hearts of seafarers closer to the management because seafarers are 
confronted with realistic problems, such as low wages and the managers’ bad 
treatment of them.
Therefore, the traditional mobilization that aimed at channelling the conflicts between 
the management and seafarers and reducing resignation rates had little effect. 
Although the traditional strategies proved useless, Ag2 had to repeat them year-by- 
year so as to fulfil the ‘political’ task assigned by the head office. The rate of the loss 
of seafarers did not decrease despite these activities, which consequently impeded the 
increase of the foreign manning business in the 2000s, as we will see at the end of this 
chapter.
The next section adds further explanations to the reasons for the resignation of 
seafarers. It considers how the TU in Ag2 has reacted to the poor treatment that 
seafarers received from the management and protected seafarers’ interests and rights.
10.3 The trade union in Ag2
10.3.1 The TU and its structure
The TU has been almost forgotten by the seafarers in Ag2. Seafarers claimed that they 
had not had any connection with the TU for many years. A senior seafarer said:
I am not sure whether there is still a TU in Ag2 or not. I guess it should have 
one. Ten years ago, the TU organized some entertainment and sports activities 
for us. However, it has stopped doing this. I do not even know the current Chair 
of the TU. I am sure many seafarers don’t know either.
The TU of Ag2 was established when Ag2 merged with the head office in 1991. It 
was a branch of the head office’s TU and was under its leadership. Instead of
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associating with the TU of the head office to organize activities and being supported 
by it financially, the TU of Ag2 worked independently. The funding of the TU, 
according to its president, came from Ag2’s profits.
In Ag2, the TU was under the management of the Party Branch. The status and 
treatment of the chair of the TU was the same as that of the senior managers, such as 
the Head of the Department of Finance.
The structure of the TU was quite simple, consisting o f a part-tine president and part- 
time heads of the union teams onboard each ship. The election of the president was 
not in accordance with the Chinese TU Law. The chair was the full-time director of 
the manning department. He was appointed by the Director of Ag2 as the president of 
the TU. The monthly working hours of the chair of the TU were not clearly regulated. 
As the chair said, “whenever there is a need for me to work as the chair, that is my 
working time”. In addition, he was not paid an extra salary for his job in the TU. 
When talking about such arrangement, the director of Ag2 said:
We appointed a Manning manager as the President o f  the TU because we 
consider that the Manning managers work with seafarers directly. If there is any 
problem, seafarers can look to the Manning managers for help. It is convenient.
All the part-time heads of the union teams onboard each ship were captains. When a 
crew onboard each ship was taken as a team, the captain organized the work of the 
TU at sea and was responsible for the president of the TU.
In 2008, 600 out of 700 registered seafarers, including peasant seafarers, were 
members of the TU. Consequently, membership was less than 100%. The reason 
given by the President of the TU was that the 100 seafarers were peasant seafarers 
who were recruited in 2008 and late 2007. These seafarers would be included next 
year if the managers were satisfied with their performance. In law, however, these 
peasant seafarers had the right to be unionized irrespective of managers’ views.
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10.3.2 The role of the TU
As in Agl, the union played no significant part in advancing workers’ interest. At 
Ag2, the main responsibility of the TU, according to the Chair, was to coordinate the 
relationship between the seafarers and the company. In addition, the TU’s work 
included expressing the sympathy and solicitude of the community to seafarers who 
were in poor health and organizing donations to help them. However, organizing 
entertainment and sports activities was no longer the work of the TU. The President of 
the TU explained:
Few entertainment activities are organized for seafarers because it is difficult to 
organize seafarers on holiday. In addition, I am occupied by my work in 
manning management.
Another aspect of the TU’s work was helping the secretary of the Party Branch to 
cultivate Party members. The president of the TU stated that in the first half of 2008, 
two seafarers became members of the Party and another two seafarers became 
candidates. Normally four to five seafarers became members of the Party each year. 
In addition, the TU president was also responsible for the moral education of 
members.
With regard to issues connected with the workers’ vital interests, such as fair payment 
and equal treatment, the TU seemed to pay no attention. There was no collective 
bargaining in Ag2, according to the President of the TU. He explained:
I am the Manning manager. The vice secretary of the Party Branch is the Vice 
managing director and the secretary of the Party Branch is the managing 
director. So the management of the agency is actually decided by us, by 
considering the interests of the enterprise and the interests of seafarers together. 
Therefore, there is no need for collective bargaining. Although problems arise, 
such as the low salary of seafarers, we have already tried our best to make the 
management optimize the benefits of the company and the seafarers. We have 
no better choice.
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If there is a major problem with serious consequences, we will try to adjust our 
management method. We won’t organize seafarers to fight against us and there 
is no collective bargaining organized by the TU.
In Ag2, there was no channel to reflect workers’ opinions. This might have been 
because the TU’s president was too busy with manning management or because 
seafarers did not talk to the managers much, as discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. When asked about how he learned about seafarers’ grievances, the President 
of the TU said:
Most of the seafarers have no problem. I am only concerned with seafarers who 
are ill and unable to work onboard ships and those who lose their working 
ability completely. They need my attention.
Therefore, the role of the union was limited to helping a small number of seafarers 
who were ill or unable to work. The needs and grievance of most of the seafarers were 
simply overlooked.
10.3.3 The Assessment of the TU
Managers found the TU helpful. The director of Ag2 said:
I am satisfied with the work of the TU. It takes care of both the benefits of the 
enterprise and the interests of the seafarers, especially those who need our help.
The Training manager said:
The TU persuades seafarers to work loyally and work hard in Ag2. This is an 
important achievement.
The business manager saw the role of the TU as providing help to seafarers who were 
seriously ill. He explained the role of the TU as follows:
The TU in China is different from foreign ones. The Chinese TU is established 
by the Party and is under its leadership. The TU is not an independent
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organization. So it has to work for the Party to unionize the ordinary workers 
and support the leadership of the Party.
When the secretary of the Party Branch is the managing director of the company 
and the Chair of the TU is employed by the company, how can the union fight 
against the management for the interests of workers? So the TU just needs to do 
what it can do in current circumstances, for instance, organizing donations and 
raising money for poor and ill seafarers. That is the role of the union in reality.
Seafarers’ assessment of the TU was not positive. They felt that they had no support 
from the TU to engage with the discussion of the company’s management. The 
following quotes illustrate this point.
“We don’t participate in discussion about the company’s management. 
Managers discuss this internally.” (A 3rd officer)
“I have never participated in policy making. No one has asked my opinion.” (A 
2nd engineer)
“There is nothing for us to discuss. The company just gives you a contract and 
tells you the rules. If you think it is ok, you sign the contract. If you are not 
happy, you just do not sign and have no job.” (A 3rd engineer)
“The company decides everything to maximize its profits. It never asks about 
the opinions of seafarers. They retain as much of our salaries as they can for 
profit. Unless all seafarers resist the management together, the company will not 
concede.” (A chief officer)
Seafarers also complained that the TU did not organize entertaining activities for 
seafarers on leave. A 2nd engineer who joined the agency in 2003 said:
Many TUs of SOEs in China at least organize entertainment and sports activities 
for their workers and take care of their welfare. However, the TU in Ag2 has not
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organized any activity for seafarers for a long time. I can’t remember the last 
one.
A captain said:
While we are on leave, no trips or activities are organized by the TU. I am not 
sure whether the TU exists. It does not play any role. I have almost forgotten 
about it.
When talking about the union teams onboard each ship, the captains who were the 
heads of the teams could not name any job related to the unions that they had done. 
As one captain put it:
I once heard that captains were the heads of the union teams onboard ships. 
Actually there is little work for us in this regard and we have little connection to 
the union.
Therefore, the TU failed to protect the interests and rights of seafarers. The lack of 
work incentives and the absence of a mechanism for improving their position 
contributed to the fact that many seafarers resigned from Ag2, which led to the 
shortage of seafarers and thereby constrained the growth of the foreign manning 
business after the mid-2000s.
10.4 The loss of officer seafarers and its influence on the foreign manning business 
Many officer seafarers resigned in Ag2 as a result of the management, such as low 
material support and the failure of strategies to bond the workers to the agency, as 
explained in this and the previous chapter (Where the seafarers who resigned from 
Ag2 went will be explained in Chapter 13).
The decline in the number of officer seafarers in Ag2 can be seen from Table 10.1. In 
2002, Ag2 recruited around 150 graduates. In that year, Ag2 possessed the largest 
number of officer seafarers in its history. Despite the consistent recruitment of officer 
seafarers afterwards (around 70-100 graduates annually were recruited from maritime 
universities and colleges), the numbers of officer seafarers have decreased since 2002,
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as resigned seafarers outnumber those recruited. Consequently, the average loss rate 
of officer seafarers from 2002 to 2008 was around 18%. The loss rate illustrated an 
accelerated increase from 2002 to 2008 (Table 10.1; Chart 8.1).
Table 10.1: The decreasing number of officer seafarers from 2002 to 2008
Year (Y) Recruited(R) Number of officer seafarers (N) * Loss (L) Loss rate
2002 150 904 89 10%
2003 75 890 105 12%
2004 87 872 134 15%
2005 85 823 157 19%
2006 97 763 182 24%
2007 105 686 192 28%
2008 115 609 150 25%
Average 18%
N ( y ) -  N ( y - i > -L (y - i ) +  R y .
For instance, the number of officer seafarers in 2005 (Y=2005) = 872-134+85=823 
Source: Ag2 Department of HRM
Due to the large number of resigned officer seafarers, Ag2 was unable to dispatch 
enough seafarers onboard foreign ships. Since there were not enough freelance officer 
seafarers in the market (for reasons discussed in Chapter 3), Ag2 was restrained from 
increasing the supply of seafarers onboard foreign ships and the number of the ships 
manned by Ag2 has remained at around 40 since 2002. When talking about the 
limited increase of the foreign manning business, the business managers of Ag2 said:
We have a business website. Some ship-owners take the initiative to cooperate 
with us. Sometimes they start this cooperation by visiting us. So the expansion 
of the business is not a problem at all. However, we don’t have enough officer 
seafarers. This constrains the development of the manning business. It is our 
biggest problem.
Therefore, the shortage of officer seafarers limited the increase of labour export by 
Ag2.
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10.5 Summary
This chapter seeks to add further reasons for the resignation of officer seafarers in 
Ag2, which resulted in the shortage of seafarers and consequently constrained the 
development of the foreign manning business. Specifically, it considers the following 
issues.
It initially discusses the ‘two service’ strategy. It was learnt by the director from 
western HRM, and its aims are to promote humanized management and channel 
conflicts between the management and labour so as to reduce the resignation rates of 
officer seafarers. However, the strategy was implemented by the managers weakly. 
Data suggest that both ratings and officer seafarers were dissatisfied with the 
managers’ attitudes and behaviour towards them, despite the strategy. As before, there 
was little communication between managers and seafarers. In addition, the personal 
relationships/Gwarar/ that were identified by Walder (1986) as a feature of the 
institutional culture of China’s traditional organizations were still dominant in Ag2. 
Although the ‘two service’ strategy was intended to correct this by promoting equal 
and fair management, this strategy ultimately failed. To cultivate and maintain good 
relationships, most of the seafarers had to bribe managers. This resulted in economic 
difficulties for seafarers and problems with work at sea. This informal and unfair 
management was related to the lack of reform concerning the management of 
managers. Seafarers’ dissatisfaction with the management contributed to their 
resignation.
In addition to the ‘two service’ strategy, some traditional activities were organized by 
the agency under the requirement of the head office to propagandise the care and love 
of the management to seafarers so as to improve seafarers’ loyalty to the agency. 
However, seafarers showed little appreciation, as they received low material support 
and poor treatment from the management, as seen in this and previous chapters. As a 
consequence, the resignation rates of officer seafarers were not reduced.
Furthermore, the role of the TU in Ag2 in representing the interests of seafarers was 
examined. It was found that the TU did not care about seafarers and did little, if 
anything, to protect their interests. Seafarers felt that the TU was actually very weak,
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if it existed at all. The failure of the TU in terms of improving employment conditions 
and work incentives for seafarers contributed to their resignation.
Therefore, seafarers were confronted with problems such as low material support, 
poor treatment from managers and little protection from the TU due to the 
interventions of institutions at higher levels and the lack of relevant reforms as seen in 
this and the previous chapters. These problems contributed to the resignation of 
seafarers in Ag2. The shortage of officer seafarers consequently constrained the 
increase of labour export by Ag2 since 2002.
In both of these cases, then, there are factors that impede the development of seafarer 
export. In the case of Agl, we saw that due to the various forms of support and 
constraints from the PSC and governmental departments, Agl reformed its 
management to a limited extent and the agency lacked market orientation. This 
resulted in a shortfall of seafarers, which consequently constrained the development 
of the foreign manning business. We can see here, in the case of Ag2, that although it 
is not a subsidiary of a state-owned shipping company, there are still factors that 
impede the expansion of the seafarer export in this independent state-owned crewing 
agency. This includes the intervention of the head office in the distribution of Ag2’s 
profit, which resulted in the low wages of officer seafarers, and the lack of reform 
concerning the management of managers, which led to managers’ poor treatment of 
seafarers and seafarers’ dissatisfaction with the management. These problems resulted 
in the resignation of seafarers in Ag2. Due to this shortage of seafarers, the increase of 
the seafarer labour export was constrained. In addition, in both of the agencies, the 
TUs are nugatory. They played little role in protecting the interests of seafarers or 
improving their employment conditions. The absence of a mechanism for improving 
seafarers’ positions contributed to the shortage of seafarers in Agl and Ag2 and the 
poor performance of the foreign manning business.
Agl and Ag2 have been two of the most influential foreign manning agencies in 
China. The study of these agencies suggests that despite the economic reform, the 
state-owned crewing agencies in China may not be as reformed or market-oriented as 
people have assumed (Li and Wonham, 1999; Sharma, 2002; Wu, et al 2007). This 
partly explains the overestimates of the likely progress of China’s seafarer export.
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With the economic reform in China, Chinese seafarers can choose their employers. In 
addition, with the fast growth of the domestic shipping industry and hence a huge 
demand for seafaring labour, many Chinese SOEs have been suffering from the loss 
of high-quality officer seafarers since the middle of the 2000s. In such a context, some 
researchers assume that Chinese seafarers are becoming freelancers and as such are 
more likely to choose to work for foreign shipping companies due to the 
attractiveness of working onboard foreign ships. This implies another route to a 
substantial increase of China’s seafarer export (these studies are introduced later).
The following part, Part Four, discusses this assumption. In particular, it seeks to cast 
some light on the analysis of the following issues: 1) to what extent Chinese seafarers 
intend to leave their SOEs and become freelancers; 2) whether the movement of 
Chinese seafarers has been as free as some researchers have assumed; 3) whether the 
resignation of seafarers from state-owned shipping companies necessarily means that 
they become freelancers. This is done by drawing on the views of the managers and 
seafarers in the case studies.
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PART FOUR
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CHINESE SEAFARERS 
INTO THE GLOBAL LABOUR MARKET
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In tr o d u c tio n
With the economic reform in China, Chinese seafarers can choose their employers, 
including the foreign shipping companies. Some researchers have assumed that due to 
the attractiveness of working onboard foreign ships, there is a trend for Chinese 
seafarers to become freelance seafarers working in foreign shipping companies, which 
brings about a substantial increase in the supply of Chinese seafarers to the global 
labour market (this will be referred to as ‘trend theory’ hereinafter) (Wu 2003; Wu 
2004a; b; Wu 2005; Wu et al. 2006; Wu et al 2007). For instance, Wu said:
Alongside the change of recruitment pattern from the national to foreign fleets, 
we have witnessed a trend of the flow of Chinese seafarer from SOE employees 
to freemen (Wu 2004b, p i4).
It is noted that the employment and working conditions are more complex today 
in general, and that there is a trend towards freemen working under foreign ship 
employment in particular (Wu et al. 2006, p37).
However, the analysis of the present study suggests that the assumption that market 
reform leads to freelance seafarers, which produces a substantial increase of seafarer 
export is too simplistic and that in fact Chinese seafarers are limited in their ability to 
leave their state-owned companies and become freelancers by a number of factors to 
do with seafarers’ dependency on their state-owned crewing agencies, institutional 
barriers and the diminishing popularity of seafaring as a career in China.
In Part Four we will explore these issues further. Chapter 11 examines seafarers’ 
dependency on their state-owned companies in the context of the Chinese socialist 
market economy. Chapter 12 explores the institutional barriers to the ability of 
seafarers to move towards the labour market. Chapter 13 considers the new jobs that 
the seafarers in the case studies choose in cases where they do leave the crewing 
agency and the reasons behind these choices. Drawing substantially on their own 
words, the analysis seeks to contribute a socio-economic explanation for what this 
thesis suggests is an overestimation of the likely progress of seafarer labour export in 
China.
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Chapter 11:
Seafarers’ dependency on their state-owned crewing agencies
This chapter explains seafarers’ dependency on their state-owned companies in the 
context of the ‘Chinese socialist market economy’ by analysing seafarers’ perceptions 
about issues regarding job security, welfare, certification of qualifications, wage 
security and working safety at sea. The discussion explains why Chinese seafarers are 
limited in their ability to become freelancers and why the ‘trend theory’, which argues 
that Chinese seafarers are becoming freelancers as a result of the economic reform 
and China’s seafarer export will increase dramatically, is an oversimplification of a 
complex reality and fails to take account of social and economic and institutional 
factors in the working lives of seafarers that serve to militate against their free 
movement into global markets.
We begin with the question of job security.
11.1 Job security
This section discusses seafarers’ perceptions about issues regarding job security in 
order to understand their dependency on their state-owned crewing agencies.
In Agl and Ag2, seafarers are not worried about losing their jobs by being laid off by 
their employers. As discussed in Chapter 4, Agl avoids firing seafarers in order to 
maintain societal stability. Even when there are surplus seafarers, Agl still recruits 
100 to 200 seafarers each year to fulfil what its managers regard as its social 
responsibility. Supported by the parent shipping company, this additional manpower 
is also regarded as a kind of ‘strategic reserve’, according to the HRM manager.
Ag2 does not fire seafarers either. Even when Ag2 had around 200 surplus seafarers 
at the end of the 1990s, it did not fire any of them. Here too, managers perceive a 
social responsibility. As the director of Ag2 said, ‘enlarging employment is the social 
responsibility of state-owned companies’.
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If the seafarers of the SOCAs leave these agencies of their own accord, they will lose 
their job security. This seems to restrain many seafarers from resignation. The 
following subsections explain this in detail.
11.1.1 The loss of job security
When thinking about becoming freelancers, job security is perceived by seafarers to 
be a major issue. The insecurity they believe would ensue from becoming a freelance 
seafarer acts barrier and is therefore an obstacle to their flow into the labour market. A 
chief engineer of Ag2 said:
Whether or not to be a freelance seafarer is not the prime concern. What is 
important is to have a good and stable job. Even if  I became a freelance seafarer, 
work opportunities would not be guaranteed... so I cannot quit my stable job in 
the SOCAs hastily.
A 2nd engineer of Ag2 said:
I dare not really resign from the company. This crewing agency is one of the 
most professional agencies. I can easily get onboard working opportunities here. 
I feel my job is secure. But in the market, nothing is secure for freelancers, 
especially job opportunities. So I won’t quit.
Why do seafarers have such concerns about job insecurity in the labour market? 
Firstly, like other land-based freelancers, the working opportunities of freelance 
seafarers are inevitably influenced by complex factors, especially the fluctuation in 
the shipping economy. This increases the job insecurity of freelance seafarers. A chief 
officer from Agl said:
It is now a peak time for the shipping economy. This also happened in 1995. At 
this time, many small companies are buying ships and offering high wages to 
seafarers. Therefore, some seafarers work in the market for these companies. In 
several years’ time, however, when the shipping market goes down, most of 
these small companies will collapse and the ships will be sold. Then the
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freelancers will face the serious problems with unemployment. This happened in 
the late 1990s.
A 2nd officer of Agl said:
I have worked in the market for a year and a half because the wages are high at 
the moment. But I do not resign from Agl. This is because if I cannot get 
working opportunities when the shipping market is no longer as good as it is 
now, or if I am confronted with other problems, I can still go back to the 
company. I need to leave myself some leeway.
Secondly, as Zhao and Amante (2003) found, in China, channels to provide seafarers 
with information about job opportunities were not set up. Consequently, it is not easy 
for freelancers to find such information, which contributes further to the perception of 
job insecurity as freelancer seafarers (2003, p82).
Therefore, the likelihood they will face job uncertainty as freelances serves to 
discourage the seafarers with stable jobs in the SOCAs from taking steps to become 
freelancers.
Why are stable jobs in the SOCAs so important for Chinese seafarers? The following 
section seeks to explain this. Initially, we look at the perceptions of ratings. Then we 
focus on officer seafarers of different ages and backgrounds.
11.1.2 The importance of a stable job for ratings
In both of the SOCAs, registered ratings are offered stable jobs with permanent 
contracts. Considering the harsh conditions of the labour market for ratings (as 
discussed in section 6.1.4), the stability of jobs in the SOE is significant for them. A 
sailor said:
Now at least I have a stable job. I cannot give it up. It is very difficult to work in 
the market because there have been redundant ratings already... At least I can 
earn 6,000 yuan per month now. What if I cannot find this sort of income after I 
quit my job in Agl? Officers may have more opportunities, but not ratings. The
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manager of Agl said the company would not increase the salaries of the ratings 
as much as that of the officer seafarers and that if ratings are not satisfied, we 
can go. The manager said this because he knows very well that ratings are very 
unlikely to quit because there have been few working opportunities and thus 
serious job insecurity for ratings in the labour market.
An OS said:
The jobs in the market are all temporary. There are just too many ratings, but no 
job security. I have never heard of any ratings resigning from the SOCAs.
Because of the condition of the labour market, with redundant ratings and hence few 
job opportunities, a stable job in the SOCAs is very important for the ratings. Because 
of this, they suggest that they would prefer the stability of SOEs than working in the 
market as freelancers.
In addition, the stability of the jobs in the SOCAs has significant meanings for officer 
seafarers of some ages and backgrounds. Firstly, we focus on the middle-aged and 
elder officer seafarers, and then the young officer seafarers.
11.1.3 The importance of stable jobs for middle-aged and elder seafarers 
The job stability provided by Agl and Ag2 seems to have particular significance for 
elder seafarers and it appears very difficult for them to give up this security. A 2nd 
engineer said:
I do not want to lose this stable job. Chinese people of my age, or your parent’s 
age, would like their children to marry people who work in government 
institutions, having a stable income, rather than doing temporary jobs, without 
any security... A stable job in a SOE is very important for the Chinese.
Why is it so important? Several reasons were explained by seafarers. Firstly, it is 
related to the age and the educational background of the elder seafarers and the 
intense competition in the labour market. A 50-year-old 2nd officer with high school 
qualification said:
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...I never think about resigning. Working in the market is too complicated for 
me. Without high qualifications, in addition to my age, I have no advantage in 
the labour market. Having worked in the SOE for my whole life, I just want to 
wait for a safe retirement.
If we look at the educational backgrounds of these seafarers in their 40s and 50s, who 
were recruited in the 1980s, we find that they are mainly high school graduates, 
veterans from the army and ‘educated youth’ who were once assigned to work in rural 
areas by the Chinese government during the Great Cultural Revolution, as shown in 
the sample and introduced in Chapter 4. Not many of them have high educational 
qualifications. They regard this uncompetitive educational background, in addition to 
their age, as putting them at a disadvantage in the labour market, making the retention 
of their stable jobs in the SOE very important to them.
In addition, seafarers in this age group normally have the serious responsibility of 
taking care of a family, which makes it even more difficult to give up a stable job in 
the SOE. A 2nd engineer said:
Now I have parents in their 60s and 70s and children to take care of, so I cannot 
afford the risk of having no stable income in the market.
A 1st engineer said:
I want to leave the agency, but it is not easy. I am not young and I have family 
to take care of... If I were a bachelor and my parents were younger, I would 
possibly quit.
The family responsibilities of seafarers are again related to the weak welfare and 
security system in the Chinese society. Ordinary Chinese people face numerous 
problems in this regard, such as low pensions, expensive medical services and costly 
education (Saich 2009; Salditt et al 2007; Sander 2010; Shi 2008). Hence, in China, 
the middle-aged people of the family are obliged to take care of their elderly parents 
and support young children with their wages. This role therefore strengthens the
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significance of the job stability provided by the SOEs and weakens the popularity of 
the unsecured jobs in the labour market as freelancers, as the previous quotes 
expressed.
When having a stable job is not only the business of the seafarers themselves but also 
concerns the livelihood of the family, the views of family members play some role in 
reinforcing the significance of job stability in the SOE as well. A 1st engineer said:
More importantly, I need to consider the extent to which my resignation from 
Agl is acceptable for my parents. They are old. They both worked for SOEs for 
their entire working lives. They would be very worried if I lost a stable job.
Parents’ concerns about job uncertainty are understandable if we look at the particular 
experiences of the seafarers’ parents. These people were bom in the 1930s and 1940s. 
They experienced the period of the planned economy before 1979 as workers. They 
were once the ‘working class’ and the ‘masters of enterprises and the state’, which 
were formed into SOEs in the planned economy. The socialist ideology still remains 
in their minds to a certain degree (Chen 2006). In addition, they have worked for the 
SOEs for their entire working lives, being taken care of during the period of the ‘iron 
rice-bowl’. Without much experience of working in the new “market economy” that 
has become significant since the 1990s, when most of them had already retired, the 
notion of leaving the SOEs, losing a stable job and working for the capitalists 
(POCAs) without any job security is challenging for them (Chen, 2006). Therefore, 
the parents of the seafarers have worries about the loss of stable jobs in the SOE, 
which consequently discourages seafarers from becoming freelancers to some extent.
Thus, stable jobs are important for middle-aged and elder seafarers. Because of this, 
they prefer to stay in the SOCAs rather than becoming freelance seafarers.
11.1.4 Young officer seafarers’ perceptions about job stability 
The stability of jobs in the SOCAs seems less important for many young officer 
seafarers and the loss of young officer seafarers is therefore serious in Agl and Ag2. 
However, most of the seafarers who do resign are those with higher education. 
According to the HRM manager of Agl, a large majority of the resigned officer
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seafarers are less than thirty-five years old, with higher education and have worked in 
Agl for less than ten years. The Training manager in Ag2 also said that most of the 
young officer seafarers who resigned are those with higher education (As we will see 
they do not necessarily go into the international market as freelancers. Chapter 13 will 
explain this in detail).
In contrast, the young officer seafarers with low education prefer stable jobs in the 
SOCAs, rather than freelancers because it seems that they think the labour market 
does not offer many choices to seafarers with low education, which makes job 
security in the SOCAs very important. A young officer seafarer with secondary high 
school education in Ag2 said:
I have not accumulated good working experiences or possessed good skills. It 
would not be easy for me to find better working opportunities in the market. 
Without a very high educational background, I have limited choices in my 
career. So I think I need to cherish my secured job here and work well.
As a result of these differences, the recruitment strategies of the crewing agencies in 
recent years have tended to exhibit a preference for graduates from maritime colleges 
and secondary high schools over those from the top maritime universities because 
their loyalty to the company is perceived to be more reliable. The President of the TU 
of Agl explained:
So since 2006, we have been recruiting more seafarers from maritime colleges, 
rather than top maritime universities, and recruiting more peasant seafarers with 
high school education. Thus is because we want our labour resources to be more 
stable.
The Training manager of Ag2 said:
The loss of young officer seafarers with higher education is very serious. We 
have stopped recruiting graduates from the top maritime universities and shifted 
to recruiting graduates from maritime colleges and secondary schools. These 
students are relatively more stable than those from top maritime universities.
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Therefore, although it is not unusual that many young officer seafarers are resigning 
from Agl and Ag2, the stability of jobs in the SOCA is still very important for those 
with lower educational background. As they are worried about their job opportunities 
if they become freelancers, they do not intend to leave the SOCAs but cherish their 
secured jobs. Since current recruitment strategies favour such seafarers over those 
with better and more marketable qualifications, this contributes to reduce the overall 
availability of seafarers from these agencies to the free labour market.
Overall then, section 11.1 shows that seafarers face insecurity when working as 
freelancers. Since the stability of jobs in the SOE is significant for many seafarers of 
different ages, ranks and backgrounds, the loss of a stable job discourages them from 
becoming freelancers.
11.2 The issue of welfare
Agl and Ag2 provided seafarers with welfare that is not available to the same degree 
to freelancers. This is perceived by some of the SOCAs’ seafarers as a reason for not 
leaving their agencies. The case of Agl will be presented first.
11.2.1 The welfare and the perceptions of seafarers in Agl
In China, the big, traditional SOEs normally pay good social insurance for their 
registered workers, who can therefore enjoy rather good support after retirement (Wu, 
2007; Zhao and Amante, 2003). The PSC of Agl is an example of this. As mentioned 
in Chapter 6, the PSC pays the welfare of seafarers at the highest standard, 
representing as much as 47% of the cost of the wages of seafarers. Because of this big 
investment, registered seafarers of Agl receive good support after they retire, as 
mentioned earlier. However, if seafarers resign before the legal retirement age (55 
years), they will not receive help at this highest standard. Consequently, they will lose 
60-70% of the benefits that they would have received had they not resigned. The 
President of the TU of Agl gave an example:
Take the old-age insurance, for example. A seafarer who retires in June 2008 
can get a pension of 4,000 yuan per month. But if he resigns even one month 
earlier, in May 2008, he will get less than 2,000 yuan per month, because when
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he quits, the standard of his welfare benefits reduces a lot. So not being a 
registered worker of Agl means that seafarers can only receive welfare of a 
much lower standard. And most of the welfare previously paid by the Agl based 
on the high standard will simply be donated to the society, and is no longer 
related to the seafarers.
This discourages some seafarers from resigning from Agl. A 2nd engineer said:
I dare not quit because of the social welfare. If I quit now, a large part of the 
social insurance that was paid by the PSC would be confiscated by the 
government. So when I retired, I would have very little pension and other 
benefits. I am very worried about this.
A chief officer said:
My major concern is the welfare that I have accumulated by working at Agl for 
more than eighteen years. If someday the welfare were no longer provided, I 
would probably resign. But as long as the welfare is still provided as it is now, I 
won't quit, since if I left, I would lose a large part of the welfare that has been 
accumulated at the expense of my low wages.
Bearing in mind the weakness of the social welfare and security system in China 
(Saich, 2009; Salditt, et al 2007; Sander, 2010; Shi, 2008), it is not difficult to 
understand why the high welfare provided by the SOCAs is important for the 
seafarers, as exemplified in the above quotes, and therefore restrains them from 
becoming freelancers.
The importance of welfare seems particularly significant for certain groups of 
seafarers. Particularly seafarers over 40 years old, especially those over 50, expressed 
the view that the welfare is very important for them. A 45-year-old chief officer of 
Agl said:
For seafarers of my age, or those over fifty, we are facing retirement in less than 
ten years. Welfare issues, such as old age pensions and medical insurance, are
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realistic problems that we will soon have to confront. So many seafarers at my 
age do not quit because the welfare provided by Agl after retirement is going to 
be extremely important for our lives. We are currently working here for the 
welfare.
A 52-year-old 2nd engineer said:
I am now waiting for retirement. I have no other thinking. If I became freelance 
now, I would lose almost all of my pension. So I don’t want to quit.
To retain more peasant officer seafarers, the management strategy has been 
implemented since 2005 that each year Agl offers larger proportions of the peasant 
seafarers fixed-term contracts. As introduced in Chapter 4, only two or three excellent 
peasant captains and chief engineers were offered contracts with the PSC in 2005. By 
2007, 35% of peasant officer seafarers had became registered seafarers of the PSC. 
Because of this, they became entitled to the same welfare and benefits as their urban 
workmates. Since such treatment can only be offered by the large SOCAs, the loss 
rate of peasant officer seafarers in Agl has been decreasing annually since 2005, 
according to the HRM manager. Therefore the welfare provision made for peasant 
officer seafarers is one of the important reasons why they stay in Agl rather than 
becoming freelancers. A 3rd engineer of Agl said:
I don’t want to quit now because I am waiting for the opportunity to contract 
with the PSC and become a registered worker so I can have better welfare, 
higher wages and other benefits, just like the registered seafarers. These are 
really important for me.
In addition, the welfare provided by the SOCA is one of the key reasons why ratings 
favour SOCAs. A motorman explained:
Ratings endeavour to become registered workers of the state-owned shipping 
companies or state-owned crewing agencies. One of the important reasons is the 
provision of the welfares by the SOEs.
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A  sailor said:
Ratings seldom resign. One of the main reasons is that Agl provides very good 
welfare for us registered workers.
Such an opinion appears repeatedly from interviewed ratings. The motorman 
continued:
If I worked as a freelancer in the labour market, there would be no hope of being 
paid welfare by the agencies in the market. In fact, those agencies rarely care 
about the welfare of the officer seafarers, let alone ratings. So working in the 
state-owned agencies is very desirable for us ratings.
Ratings believe that few freelance ratings who work outside the big SOEs are offered 
any welfare. The reason for this is related to their weak position in a labour market 
already flooded with redundant ratings. Han (2008, p 26) claims that ‘Officer 
seafarers are in shortage in domestic shipping market... In contrast, there are a large 
number of redundant ratings’. Huang (2008, p 273) analysed that ‘National training 
institutions have trained a large number of ratings since 2000; a significant number of 
redundant ratings have emerged in the national seafaring labour market.’ An AB in 
Agl talked about rating’s weak position in the labour market and explained why the 
freelance ratings had little opportunity to be offered any welfare:
Ratings have very few choices in the labour market. For us, the manual labour 
onboard ship, it is difficult to tell who knows the jobs more than others, since it 
is really a low-skilled job and all the ratings seem almost the same. So we 
cannot talk about welfare or other conditions because there are just too many of 
us and the managers can easily replace us with others if we pose any problem.
Consequently, ratings have little power to negotiate on employment issues, including 
welfare, with the private crewing agencies. Few freelance ratings are provided with 
welfare in China. If registered ratings resigned from the SOCAs, they would have no 
chance to benefit from welfare. This explains why the ratings value their jobs in the 
SOCA.
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Therefore, Agl can offer registered seafarers good welfare support, which is 
important for many seafarers, including middle-aged and elder officer seafarers, 
ratings and peasant officer seafarers and helps to prevents them from leaving A gl.
11.2.2 The welfare and the perceptions of seafarers in Ag2
As introduced in Chapter 9, Ag2 does not provide registered seafarers with high 
welfare because as an independent crewing agency, it does not have the support that 
Agl can get from its parent shipping company. However, ratings in Ag2 still 
appreciate the provision of welfare, which consequently strengthens their dependence 
on the agency. An AB said:
Although the social insurance is not very high in Ag2, we are still in a better 
position than the freelance ratings working in the market. They can get no 
welfare, in fact. So in this sense, I am still satisfied with Ag2.
If we consider the poor position of the ratings, as introduced in the last section, we 
can understand why the welfare provided by Ag2, although it is low, is still 
appreciated by the ratings and consequently discourages them from becoming 
freelancers, as the AB said.
As well as ratings, peasant officer seafarers of Ag2 are also reluctant to leave Ag2 
because the agency can help them to achieve the status of urban residents, which is a 
special non-wage benefit provided by Ag2 in order to retain peasant officers. Peasant 
seafarers suggest that they are waiting for the opportunity to transfer their hukou to an 
urban one when they reach the rank of senior officer seafarers so that they and their 
families could have the status of urban residents, enjoying all the social welfare and 
support provided by the government to urban residents. To obtain these benefits, 
seafarers are not only required to continuously serve in Ag2 until they reach the rank 
of senior officers, but also have to sign an eight-year contract with Ag2 after their 
hukou are transferred. Given the significance of possessing urban hukou for peasant 
seafarers and their families, as mentioned in Chapter 7, the peasant officer seafarers 
are strongly dependent on Ag2, as no other agency can help them with this hukou 
transition.
252
In all, section 11.2 shows that seafarers have to lose some or all of their non-wage 
benefits when they leave the SOCAs. Since welfare has significant meaning for many 
seafarers of different ranks, ages and backgrounds, the loss of the welfare and non­
wage benefits provided by the SOCAs hinders the seafarers from becoming 
freelancers.
11.3 Difficulties with applying for maritime certificates
In China, only a few large SOEs and state-owned institutions are authorized by the 
Chinese government to issue or process some of the seafarers’ maritime certificates. 
In Agl and Ag2, seafarers’ certificates are prepared and managed by the agencies and 
seafarers do not have to worry about this time consuming, difficult and sometimes 
costly procedure themselves. However, if seafarers resign, the crewing agencies will 
no longer prepare or manage their certificates. A 1st engineer of Agl said:
Agl is closely connected to the maritime department. So if I am assigned by 
Agl to work onboard foreign ships, I do not have to spend any money or worry 
about anything to get my working papers because Agl prepares everything for 
me. But if I do not work for Agl, when I need these certificates, Agl will not 
issue the certificate for me, of course. I need to depend on myself.
However, it is difficult for seafarers to apply for the certificates by themselves (Shen, 
et al 2005, p i75). In China, individual seafarers are not allowed to directly apply for 
some of these certificates, but have to depend on a qualified crewing agency. 
Consequently, freelancers have to depend on the POCAs and these agencies have to 
seek help from the state-owned certificate issuing institutions when applying for 
certificates. When the power is centralized, high payments are inevitable. When 
talking about applying for a departure certificate, a freelance officer said:
I have to ask the POCAs for help. The POCAs have to ask others for help [to 
apply for the certificates of seafarers]. As a result of repeated exploitation, I 
have to spend a large sum of money, normally 3,000 to 5,000 yuan, to get my 
departure certificate. In fact, it is just a piece of paper and it doesn’t cost more
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than 10 yuan to make it. However, since very few companies in the city have the 
right to issue the certificate, I have to pay the money anyway.
Therefore, if the seafarers of Agl and Ag2 leave their state-owned agencies, they will 
be confronted with the difficulty of the application for certificates. This is perceived 
by some seafarers as a barrier to their ability to leave their companies and become 
freelancers. A 2nd officer of Agl said:
If I leave A gl, I have to deal with the application for my certificates myself. As 
far as I know, the application for some of the certificates is not easy at all.... So 
without a stable job with high wages, I won't leave the agency, because no 
matter where you go, you are constrained and under control.
11.4 Wage security
Seafarers in Agl and Ag2 never have to worry about the agency paying their wages in 
arrears. However, some small private crewing agencies, especially those that are not 
registered at any governmental institutions, have a reputation of sometimes paying the 
wages of seafarers in arrears. When talking about working for the POCAs, some 
seafarers complained about the low credibility of some small POCAs and the bad 
experiences that they and their friends had had. A chief officer of Agl said:
The SOCAs won’t pay the wages of seafarers in arrears. That is guaranteed. 
However, many POCAs often arrear the wages. When seafarers ask for their 
wages, some POCAs often only give them half or nothing at all. I know many 
seafarers who do not ever get their wages. Some of them have negotiated with 
the agencies for as long as two months or even five months, but they cannot get 
their wages.
A 3rd engineer of Ag2 said:
If I worked for the small agencies, it is likely that I would not get my whole 
wage. After those agencies are given the agent service fee by the ship-owner, 
some of them run away, taking some or all of the wages of seafarers. This 
happened to my friend. It was very frustrating.
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A  captain  o f  A g l  said:
I had a friend who just got his chief officer’s certificate last year, so he didn’t 
have any working experience as a chief officer. It was not easy for him to be 
recruited by large agencies, like Agls as a freelance seafarer. But many small 
agencies wanted to recommend him to ship-owners. After he was dispatched by 
a small agency and worked for three months, he received no salary. Every time 
he went to the agency to ask for his salary, the manager would ask him to wait. 
Finally, my friend gave up on his salary, since he could not go to the agency 
every day but had to do his own job.
Seafarers’ distrust stems from the unregulated seafarer labour market in China (Shen 
et al 2005, p i74; Zhao 2000b; Zhao and Amenta 2003, p 83). Due to the weak 
regulations on the labour market, many Chinese crewing agencies operate without 
registering with the governmental institutions. Many of the agencies operate without 
the consideration of the national and international labour and maritime rules. In 
addition to the lack of representation of the ACFTU, seafarers are vulnerable to 
exploitation (Zhao and Amante, 2003, p82-83). Within such a context, seafarers 
expressed their distrust of the crewing agencies and their concerns about wage 
security.
Some seafarers therefore suggested that they would not work as freelancers for some 
of the POCAs as a long-term plan, given the low credibility of the POCAs. A 3rd 
engineer of Agl said:
I once worked for the small crewing agencies. I know their credibility is low and 
I was very worried. Although the small agencies give higher wages than the big 
SOCAs, you never know whether you will actually get your wages or not. But 
the big SOCAs have good credibility and you can have peace of mind and a 
sense of security. So I don't want to work for the small agencies.
A chief engineer of Ag2 said:
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If you work in the market as a freelancer, nothing is guaranteed. Because you 
know little about the crewing agencies or the ship-owners, the wages and the 
condition of the ships that you are going to work onboard are unsecured. I don’t 
think working in the POCAs is as good as working in these SOCAs.
11.5 Safety at sea
Many of the clients of Agl and Ag2 are professional shipping companies and 
undertake systematic maintenance and management of their ships. Therefore, most of 
the ships are in relatively good condition. In addition, Agl and Ag2 employ and 
primarily dispatch a number of regular, professional seafarers. However, seafarers 
expressed concerns with the condition of the ships and the quality of workmates when 
talking about working for some POCAs as freelancers. The following two sections 
will explain these concerns.
11.5.1 Working conditions and safety at sea
Seafarers have concerns with the condition of the ships on which some POCAs are 
likely to dispatch freelancers. Concerns about safety at sea discourage them from 
becoming freelancers. A chief engineer of Agl said:
If you go to some small agencies for job opportunities, you are very likely to be 
arranged to work aboard smaller ships in poor condition, which are owned by 
small shipping companies. Normally, the formal, large shipping companies do 
not cooperate with these small agencies. When I worked onboard small ships, I 
found not only that the workload was huge, but also that it was very dangerous. 
So I don't think working in the market as freelancer or depending on the small 
agencies is a long-term plan for me.
Another officer of Ag2 said:
The small crewing agencies mainly cooperate with small ship-owners, who 
often have one or two small, old ships. Working onboard such ships, my safety 
might be in danger. So I work for the large SOCAs, whose clients are mainly 
large shipping companies, and I am much more likely to work onboard ships in 
good condition.
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Data suggest that the main reason why seafarers work onboard ships in poor condition 
is that many POCAs tend to cooperate with domestic small ship-owners. This is 
because, as mentioned in Chapter 3, most of the POCAs are unable to register their 
business at China’s administrative institution because of the very high registry 
requirements. Consequently, they do not have foreign manning qualifications. In 
addition, without the support of the government, many POCAs do not have stable 
seafaring labour. The seafarers employed by the POCAs are often freelancers and 
their quality cannot be guaranteed, as we have seen in chapter 3. Therefore, it is 
difficult for many POCAs to cooperate with the big shipping companies. Instead, the 
small domestic shipping companies are the main clients of many POCAs in China 
(Zhao and Amante 2003).
As a result, problems with the poor condition of the ships on which the POCAs 
dispatch seafarers and the consequent implications for the seafarers’ safety at sea 
restrain some SOCAs’ seafarers from leaving their companies and becoming 
freelancers.
11.5.2 Quality of workmates and safety at sea
According to seafarers, some POCAs employ unqualified seafarers, and this 
consequently impacts on safety at sea in a negative way. A 1st engineer of Ag2 said:
If you work for the POCAs, you don’t know anything about your workmates, 
such as their skills or their quality. This is very bad for work at sea, which is 
characterized as teamwork. I had the experience of being dispatched by a POCA 
and working at sea for four to five months. During these months, ten to fifteen 
seafarers were replaced with new seafarers and hence the turnover rate was as 
high as 50% to 70%. Many of these seafarers just worked for two or three 
months, without long-term intentions. I met some seafarers who worked 
onboard the ships for two months and then prepared to work as construction 
workers in the following two months. So the quality of the seafarers dispatched 
by the POCAs is often very poor and it can be very dangerous to work with 
these people at sea.
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A  c h ie f  o fficer  o f  A g 2  said:
Big crewing agencies have relatively stable teams of seafarers and entire quality 
of all seafarers can be guaranteed. However, small crewing agencies recruit 
seafarers temporarily, who may have different backgrounds and show different 
quality at work. In fact, the POCAs do not care much about the quality of 
seafarers. I have a sense of insecurity when I work for the small crewing 
agencies.
A 3rd officer of Agl said:
They [the POCAs] supply some seafarers who are not qualified to work 
onboard. If I worked with these people at sea, my safety could be at stake.
The reasons why the POCAs cannot dispatch high-quality seafarers is again related to 
the small scale of their business due to the lack of support from the government, 
which makes it difficult for the POCAs to employ stable teams or provide regular 
training. In fact, sometimes, when POCAs are struggling to recruit sufficient numbers 
of seafarers, the quality of these seafarers is not much considered (Zhao and Amante 
2003).
Repeated comments were identified from seafarer informants that the problem with 
the quality of workmates discouraged them from becoming freelancers. Here is an 
example from a chief officer:
Many of the seafarers employed by the POCAs are low-skilled. They are not 
trained properly. Some of them even use fraudulent certificates. Small ship­
owners do not care much about the quality of seafarers and this is very bad for 
safety at sea. So as far as I know, few seafarers want to work for those agencies. 
I don’t work for the POCAs either.
11.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrates seafarers’ dependence on their state-owned companies due 
to the benefits, such as job security, welfare, application for certificates, wage security
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and safe working environment at sea, that are offered by their state-owned companies 
in the context of the new Chinese socialist market economy. When taking seafaring as 
a long-term career and depending on it for their livelihood, seafarers in the SOCA 
may work temporarily for domestic shipping companies when they are on leave, but it 
is not easy for them to leave their companies (see also Shen et al 2005 pi 85; Zhao 
2000b). In addition, as we have seen from the analysis, whether seafarers in the 
SOCAs resign to become freelancers is influenced by complex factors, not limited to 
the management o f the agencies or simple factors such as wages, but is related to a 
wider set of issues, including the positions of seafarers in the labour market, seafarers’ 
historical experience and their personal expectations. The ‘trend theory’, which 
concludes that Chinese seafarers are leaving their SOCAs and becoming freelancers 
as a result of the economic reform, therefore seems too simplistic. The assumption 
that market reform leads to freelance seafarers, which leads to a substantial increase 
of seafarer export, lacks rigour.
In addition, seafarers’ concerns with job security, welfare, the difficulty of applying 
for documents and risks when working for some of the POCAs reflect the limitations 
of the reform of the Chinese seafarer labour market and Chinese society.
Even for those seafarers who intend to leave the SOCAs, it is still not straightforward, 
because the shortage of seafarers has led to SOCAs to set up barriers to prevent the 
resignation of seafarers. The next chapter will look at this issue.
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Chapter 12: The institutional barriers to the flow of seafarers
Nichols (1980, p74-75) identifies an important dimension of the notion of free wage 
labour as being ‘free to choose and leave the employer’. This chapter continues 
examining the trend theory in the light of Nichols’ assertion. It analyses the 
constrained movement of seafarers as a result of the management strategies that were 
designed to prevent the resignation of seafarers. It demonstrates that it is hard to 
characterize Chinese seafarers as free wage labour and that the movement of Chinese 
seafarers is not as free as the ‘trend theory’ assumes. The discussion also assesses the 
extent of the reform of the crewing agencies examined in this study and the seafarer 
labour market in China. It starts with the discussion of the management strategies in 
Agl, then considers the strategies in Ag2.
12.1 Retaining certificates while seafarers are on leave in Agl
As discussed in Chapter 7, since many officer seafarers work in the market while they 
are on leave, managers complain about a shortage of high-quality seafarers. To solve 
the problem, from 2007, Agl started to exercise strict control over seafarers’ 
certificates. It requires captains to keep seafarers’ certificates while they are working 
at sea and to submit them to the company after the trip. The agency also restrains 
managers from giving seafarers their certificates when seafarers are on leave. A 
second engineer described the situation:
From 2007, the company started to retain our certificates during our leave.
Before 2007, as long as we paid the company 10% of the first month’s wage
onboard ship, we could get our certificates and work in the market. Now, this is
not allowed. The company just wants to have stricter control over us.
To punish the seafarers who do not follow orders and fail to submit their certificates 
when they are on leave, their welfare and leaving salaries will be deducted. In 
addition, the travel fees between seafarers’ homes and the ports where they get 
onboard ship will not be refunded. Furthermore, seafarers’ future promotion can be 
delayed and they can be put to work onboard ships with low salaries when they return 
to the company. A seafarer who had worked in the market for one year said:
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I got my certificates before the policy was implemented and I was working in 
the market for one year. The agency withheld my leaving salary and welfare for 
a long time. The managers of Agl called me to work onboard ships but it was 
my family, not me, who answered the phone. If I want to go back to A gl, the 
first three ships will be ships with low wages. So in those three years, I will not 
be able to earn much money.
The HRM manager explained the practice of retaining seafarers’ certificates in 
relation to better management of the certificates and a stricter control over seafarers. 
He said:
Yes, it is to better manage seafarers’ certificates. We renew the certificates for 
seafarers. But sometimes, seafarers have no idea when their certificates should 
be updated. So we keep them - it is easier for our management. In addition, it 
allows better control of the movement of seafarers. If they sign contracts with 
us, they are our workers, so they are not supposed to work for any other 
company without the arrangement or permission of A gl. When they work for 
other agencies, our manning management cannot be guaranteed.
A g l’s retaining seafarers’ certificates prevents seafarers from taking alternative 
sailing opportunities in the market when they are on leave. A chief officer said:
Other companies, like x and y, have each called me at least once a month to ask 
me whether I can work for them or not. But my certificates have been retained 
by my company, so I cannot work for these companies.
When I asked seafarers what they do when they are on leave, some of them said they 
stayed at home. A second engineer said:
Few seafarers have alternative income beyond the wages from working for the 
company. Since the periods of leave are not very long, we usually help with the 
housework, cooking and shopping.
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A  rating said:
I do not do other jobs while I am on leave. I look after my child, update my 
knowledge and meet my friends. My holiday often lasts three to four months 
and that is not very long.
However, the effect of the management practice of retaining certificates is still limited 
because some seafarers still have means to obtain their certificates. The President of 
the TU said:
This method is not very practical. Some seafarers can get their certificates 
anyway and we can do nothing about it.
Although the president did not give a detailed explanation for this, some seafarers told 
me how they achieved this. The most common way, according to seafarers, is to bribe 
the managers. A second officer said:
Although the control over certificates is stricter, you can still get your 
certificates if your social relationship is strong enough. I know a seafarer who 
has just bribed a Manning manager with 1000 dollars and got his certificate. If 
you are connected with somebody powerful, you do not have to bribe at all. The 
nephew of the director never has to bribe any manager, and he is dispatched by 
the director personally. He never has to wait for a job opportunity. The rules and 
regulations are just for us ordinary workers.
A 3rd engineer said:
You can bribe the managers with money if you have an appropriate “broker”. 
Then you can get your certificates. The management of the certificate is not 
serious as long as you have proper personal connection. Even if they know you 
work in the market, you won’t be punished either.
This situation can be understood if we recall the loose management of the managers 
and the importance of personal relationships within Agl, as introduced in Chapter 7.
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Therefore, data suggest that the effect of the strategy of retaining seafarers’ 
certificates is mediated by the significance of personal relationships in Agl. Despite 
this, since the strategy was implemented in 2007 in order to cope with the shortage of 
seafarers, it has been more difficult for some seafarers to sail while on leave and 
consequently, they have less chance to have alternative working opportunity in the 
labour market than before.
Agl also prevents the loss of seafarers by the policy of financial penalties. The next 
section will look at this.
12.2 Financial penalties in Agl
12.2.1 Preventing the loss of seafarers using financial penalties 
In Agl, if seafarers quit before the end of their contracts, they have to pay a financial 
penalty. This is perceived by seafarers as an obstacle to resigning from Agl. A 
captain said:
Before the termination of the contract, we have to pay a financial penalty if we 
want to resign. If we do not pay the financial penalty, we either cannot get our 
certificates or can only use them for another five years at most.... So it is of 
prime importance that the company approves our resignation first and we must 
pay the financial penalty. We are stuck here.
A 3rd officer said:
If you do not pay the financial penalty and you don’t follow the orders of the 
agency, then you will be blacklisted. In this case, if your certificates need to be 
renewed, the company will not renew them for you. Even if you lose your 
certificates, you cannot get replacements because the company will not help 
you. This is why the company is like thick legs and we are like thin arms, and 
why seafarers are afraid of the company. Retaining and controlling the 
certificates is the most important way for the company to control seafarers. For 
us, no certificates means no rice bowl and unemployment. So we must pay a 
financial penalty if we want to leave and this is a big obstacle to resignation.
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Data suggest that the reason why Agl can successfully control seafarers’ movement 
through financial penalties is related to the agency’s control over seafarers’ 
certificates. So why can Agl control the certificates of seafarers so directly? How are 
these certificates managed?
In China, only a few public institutions and SOEs can process a seaman’s book. Agl 
is one of them. It processes all its seafarers’ books. A gl’s reference number19 is at the 
beginning of the registration number of seafarers’ certificates. Without the operation 
of Agl, the books of seafarers cannot be changed in any way, including the requisite 
five-yearly renewal, replacing lost certificates or writing them off. In addition, with 
the number of Agl on the books, they are supposed to be used only by seafarers who 
are directly dispatched by Agl and for whose management Agl is responsible. If 
seafarers want to leave A gl, their certificates need to be written off by Agl at the 
maritime bureau, which enables them to apply for new certificates in the future. To do 
this, seafarers have to pay a financial penalty to terminate the employment 
relationship with A gl. Even if  seafarers somehow manage to leave Agl with their 
certificates without paying the financial penalty, Agl will not renew or write off the 
current certificate at the maritime bureau. As a consequence, these certificates will 
expire in less than five years and it will be impossible for seafarers to apply for new 
certificates, which directly endangers their career. Therefore, Agl strictly controls 
seafarers’ book and their certificates. Seafarers must pay a financial penalty if it is 
required, which, according to seafarers, has become a barrier to their ability to leave 
their agency and become freelancers.
12.2.2 Seafarers’ views about the financial penalty
The penal sum is composed of the breach of contract fee, the fee for the 
administration o f the certificates, the training fees, the fee that Agl paid to the 
maritime educational institutions for the recruitment of seafarers, cadet training fees 
and fees that seafarers need to repay to the company, including various allowances
19 Each of the institutions and companies that are authorized to issue/apply for seafarers’ certificates is 
given a number by the Chinese Maritime Bureau.
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and welfare and the money that seafarers owe to the company. Seafarers thought there 
were some problems with the penal sum.
The first problem, according to seafarers, is that some items in the contract are 
unreasonable and should not be charged. A 2nd officer said:
For instance, the fee for the administration of certificates is unreasonable. 
According to the requirement of the maritime bureau, seafarers should keep 
their certificates, except for the seaman’s book. However, Agl compels us to 
submit all certificates and let it keep them. If we do not submit them, it will 
punish us. So it is the company itself that voluntarily undertakes the 
responsibility of keeping our certificates. The fee for the administration of 
certificates should not be included in the financial penalty.
In addition, the financial penalty includes the money that seafarers owe to the 
company, such as the welfare that Agl pays on behalf of seafarers. Some seafarers 
felt that returning this sum of money is unreasonable. A chief officer explained:
When I need to terminate my contract with the company, I need to make up the 
money for the welfare that is prepaid by the company. However, after 
resignation, I cannot enjoy the high welfare. In addition, I have already paid a 
lot of money for the welfare but I will not benefit from it if I resign. So it is not 
right that the company asks me to pay more.
The second problem that seafarers mentioned with the management of the financial 
penalty in Agl is that although Agl lists what seafarers should return to the company 
in general, it does not specify the way in which it calculates the amount. Without a 
standard, managers set the amount of the financial penalty according to their personal 
considerations. A 3rd officer said:
I would probably pay the financial penalty if the manager asked me to pay
13,000 yuan when I first discussed the penalty with him. But he originally asked 
me to pay 4,000. The second time I visited him, it was 6,000, then 13,000 the
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third time. This is unacceptable. I remember asking Manager Liu how he had 
calculated the sum and why he changed the amount every time.
A rating said:
I have read the contract. The terms cannot be said to be clear and reasonable. 
There are many conditions, which all depend on the explanation of the 
company. In all, everything said by the managers is right.
A retired Manning manager said:
There is no explicit regulation. If the managers are happy with you or you have 
personal relationships with them, you can pay less; otherwise you will be asked 
to pay double. He just sets the penalty according to his mood. This is the fact.
The President of the TU explained the ambiguity. He said:
The contract is old and the terms are rather general and rough. There are no 
rules by which financial penalty is calculated. In addition, some penalties, such 
as training fees, should be based on receipts. But because our training centre is 
not qualified to issue receipts, many things are hard to clarify.
The third problem with the management of the financial penalty, according to the 
seafarers, is related to the fact that Agl had changed the terms of the contract without 
notifying them. Some seafarers complained that when they read their contracts, some 
of the terms had been changed. Some seafarers even mentioned that they had never 
signed the new contracts personally and that they had been signed by the managers 
instead. Therefore, they had no idea about the new terms or requirements. A chief 
officer said:
The contract in 1999 included terms about the housing allowance. However, 
after I signed a contract that year, the housing reform in China changed the 
policy. When I received my contract this year, I found that some terms
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concerning the housing allowance had been changed by the company, but I was 
not informed of any of this.
The fourth problem is related to the financial penalty designed for peasant seafarers. 
As introduced in Chapter 4, peasant seafarers do not sign employment contracts with 
Agl. They are employed by the local labour bureaus that supply labour force to the 
agencies so as to improve the local employment. However, even if peasant seafarers 
do not sign employment contracts with Agl, they are still asked to pay the penalty if 
they quit. Peasant seafarers felt that this was unreasonable. A peasant officer said:
A financial penalty is charged based on a breach of contract. The existence of 
the contract is the condition. Without signing any contract with Agl, we are not 
treated like registered workers: we are not given any non-wage benefits, social 
insurance, leave salary or annual bonus. But when we leave, the company asks 
for a financial penalty from us. This is very unreasonable.
The HRM manager explained that the penalty for peasant seafarers is based on an 
agreement, not a contract. He did not give any information about the agreement when 
I asked about it. When I asked to read the agreement, the manager refused. In fact, the 
agreement proved illegal, as we will see in the following paragraphs.
12.2.3 The different reactions of seafarers of different ages
Confronted with the problems with the management of the financial penalty in Agl, 
seafarers of different ages showed different reactions.
Although the number was small, young officer seafarers brought several accusations 
against the company. One example is the story of a 3 rd officer seafarer. He did not 
sign any contract with the agency when he was recruited. But he was charged a large 
sum of money when he wanted to quit. He did not think it was reasonable and he had 
no money to pay. At that time, his certificate was about to expire and needed to be 
renewed. So he had two choices, either continuing to work in Agl or paying the 
financial penalty and applying for new certificates. He did not know what to do. He 
sought help from his friend. He also consulted lawyers. One of the lawyers, Mr. Fang, 
was confident in his victory. A lawsuit was started. A g l’s lawyer argued that although
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there was no contract between the seafarer and Agl, the 3rd officer had signed a 
contract with the local bureau in the countryside which dispatched him to the 
company. However, the seafarer had never heard of that local bureau or signed any 
contract with it, and this was ultimately proved. According to the manager of Agl, 
peasant seafarers also signed an agreement with the agency. However, because many 
of the terms in the agreement are illegal according to the seafarer’s lawyer, A g l’s 
lawyer did not mention this agreement in court. Consequently, the case went in the 
seafarers’ favour. Agl wrote off his certificates and the seafarer did not pay any 
financial penalty.
The seafarer also helped one of his friends who was confronted with similar problems 
with the high financial penalty required by A gl. He said:
My friend wanted to resign. I found him a lawyer, Mr. Fang. Fang told my 
friend to take a copy of the agreement to see the manager and told him what to 
say there. My friend did so and the manager of Agl gave him his certificates 
without much penalty. But when seafarers know little about law, the managers 
just frighten them, retaining their certificates and asking for financial penalties. 
It is very cruel.
In contrast to young seafarers, middle-aged and older seafarers are rather 
conservative. Few of them looked for legal support or fought against the company in 
any way. One of the reasons for this, according to the seafarers, is that they feel they 
won’t win anyway. A 1st engineer said:
Retaining seafarers’ certificates or requiring high financial penalties to prevent 
them from resigning is illegal. The company does not have the right. If we bring 
this accusation, we will win. But everyone looks down upon seafarers. We are 
discriminated against. The legal institutions are well connected with the SOE. 
Individually, how can I have the power to fight against the company? Whom 
should I accuse? I have no way.
A chief engineer said:
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The company retains seafarers’ certificates and charges financial penalties. This 
is illegal. But seafarers are hard to unite. It is not easy for seafarers to rally to 
sue the company.
Another reason is related to the huge burden of supporting a family, which does not 
allow these seafarers much time or energy to fight for fairness. A 2nd officer said:
I cannot tangle with them for too long because I need money. I have no time or 
energy. The most important thing for me is to earn money. The second most 
important thing is to earn money. The third most important thing is still to earn 
money.
Therefore, Agl controls the seafarers’ certificates and requires high financial 
penalties to prevent the loss of seafarers. As seafarers see it, there are problems with 
the management. However, when confronted with the problems, some young 
seafarers have resisted by seeking legal support while middle-aged and older seafarers 
chose to bear with the treatment. The financial penalty consequently makes it difficult 
in practical terms for seafarers to move freely and puts them in a passive position.
Like Agl, Ag2 mainly uses high penalties and ‘ensuring behaviour fees’ (EBF) to 
control the resignation o f seafarers. The next section will look at these strategies to 
see how they influenced the free movement of seafarers.
12.3 Financial penalties in Ag2
To prevent the resignation of seafarers, Ag2 added a regulation to the appendix of its 
contracts (both the formal contracts of registered workers and the Peasant Officer 
Seafarers’ Manning Contract), that if  seafarers resign before the end of the contract, 
they must pay a financial penalty.
The amount is related to the rank of seafarers. The higher the rank, the greater the 
financial penalty the seafarer has to pay. This is related to the lack of officer seafarers, 
which is more serious regarding senior officers than junior officers.
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Table 12.1 lists the penalties for different ranks in 2007. The numbers underlined are 
the basic penalties required from seafarers of each rank. In addition, seafarers have to 
return an ‘agency fee’, which is related to how many times seafarers have been 
dispatched by the agency. The more times they have been dispatched, the higher the 
agency fee that will be charged. The numbers in brackets in Table 12.1 are the highest 
amount of the ‘agency fee’ required from seafarers of each rank.
Table 12.1 The penalty when resigning from the agency in 2007
Rank Penalty (yuan)
Captain 100.000 +(300.000)
Chief engineer 80,000+(280,000)
Chief officer/1st engineer 60,000+(170,000)
2nd officer/ engineer 40,000+(120,000)
3 rd officer/ engineer 20,000+(80,000)
Ratings 10,000
Source: Ag2’s Department of HRM
Some seafarers thought that such a high financial penalty made it difficult for them to 
resign. Here is an example from a 2nd officer:
The financial penalty is too high for me. It is difficult to afford. But if you do 
not pay, you cannot get your certificates. Whenever I think about resigning, I 
feel that this is a big obstacle.
One captain said. “If  you sign the contract, it may be difficult to leave the agency 
because of the high financial penalty”.
Seafarers complained that the financial penalties were very unreasonable. Firstly, 
some seafarers thought that they should not have to pay the agency fee because the 
foreign ship-owners had already paid an agency fee every time the agency dispatched 
seafarers for them. In addition, some seafarers found that the regulations in the 
appendix, which required high financial penalties and retained seafarers’ certificates,
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were illegal. Item 25 of the New Labour Contract Law 2008 regulates that employers 
should not ask for any penalty when workers propose to leave the company unless 
workers are paid extra training fees outside the regulated amount by the company or 
are engaged in confidential management work. Nor should companies charge workers 
any management fees or retain any of their documents. Therefore, according to the 
New Labour Contract Law 2008, as long as they inform the agency one month before 
they resign, seafarers can leave without paying any penalty and the agency should 
return all the documents belonging to them. Therefore, seafarers thought Ag2’s 
requiring a financial penalty and retaining seafarers’ documents was illegal.
However, no information was collected from managers or seafarers to indicate that 
seafarers collectively resisted the management. Seafarers had to pay the financial 
penalty if they resigned, since Ag2 controlled their certificates directly. Although the 
measure cannot completely stop seafarers from leaving, the high financial penalty 
became an obstacle to some seafarers’ desire to leave their company.
12.4 ‘Ensuring Behaviour Fees’ (EBF) in Ag2
Ag2 also retains seafarers’ certificates when they are on leave, in order to prevent 
them from looking for alternative working opportunities. To ensure that seafarers 
submit their certificates, the agency connects the submission of their certificates with 
seafarers’ EBF. As discussed in Chapter 8, the sailing salaries of seafarers are divided 
into two parts. One part is paid to seafarers when they are working at sea. The other 
part is the EBF. The EBF is retained by the agency and returned to seafarers under 
two conditions: 1) that they complete the sailing task successfully; 2) that they submit 
all their documents to the agency as soon as they disembark.
If seafarers do not submit their documents in time, the EBF will not be paid. In 
addition, the social insurance and leave salaries of registered seafarers will not be paid 
either. During the interviews, a 2nd engineer officer said that he was deprived of the 
EBF, six months’ social insurance fees and his leave salary because he did not submit 
his certificates in time but worked for another agency for four months.
Because of the EBF, it is difficult for seafarers to sail for other agencies when they are 
on leave. A 1st engineer said:
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To get my whole wages, my certificates are kept by the agency during my leave, 
not in my hands. So I do not work for other agencies, but stay at home and rest.
Another 3rd engineer said when being asked what he did while on leave:
We normally relax at home and do not work. The company controls our 
certificates strictly so there is not much chance to work elsewhere.
Seafarers are of the view that the EBF is very unreasonable. One captain said:
In some foreign crew agencies, part of the seafarer’s salary is paid on land, not 
directly at sea. But that money is saved in the seafarer’s own accounts, not in the 
agency’s account.
Seafarers were also dissatisfied with the EBF because of the ambiguity in calculating 
the amount. One seafarer said:
I think deducting part of our wage as the EBF is problematic. We don’t know 
exactly how much the agency has paid for our travel and why the managers 
charge us that particular amount.
Another freelance seafarer, who had previously helped with the management of the 
agency for one year, explained this:
The amount of the EBF charged was always more than the actual expenses. The 
surplus was then retained by the agency.
In addition, requiring EBF is illegal according to the New Labour Contract Law 2008. 
Item 60 regulated that manning agencies should not withhold any part of the wage of 
the workers paid by the employer or charge workers any management fees.
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Despite their dissatisfaction, in order to secure their wages, seafarers have to obey the 
management of the agency. Consequently, the EBF made it difficult for some 
seafarers to seek alternative working opportunities in the market.
12.5 Summary
As Nichols (1980) noted, one o f the important dimensions of free wage labour is that 
workers can not only choose their employers, but also be free to leave. Discussion of 
the case studies, however, demonstrates that Agl and Ag2 use similar methods to 
prevent the resignation o f seafarers, i.e. retaining seafarers’ certificates when they are 
on leave and regulating financial penalties on resignation before the end of the 
contract. Though these measures cannot completely stop seafarers from leaving, they 
make it difficult. In this respect, the argument that market reform leads to freelance 
seafarers, which leads to a substantial increase of seafarer export is not convincing.
The ‘trend theory’, arguing that Chinese seafarers are becoming freelancers and the 
export of Chinese seafarers will increase dramatically, is also based on the 
phenomenon that many Chinese SOCAs have been experiencing the loss of high- 
quality officer seafarers since the middle of the 2000s. However, does the resignation 
of the seafarers mean that they become freelancers, as the trend theory assumes? 
Where do these seafarers go afterwards? Since these questions have not been 
considered by previous researchers, the next chapter will focus on them.
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Chapter 13: The flow of seafarers to land-based jobs
This chapter considers whether the resignation of seafarers from state-owned shipping 
companies necessarily means that they become freelancers, as the trend theory 
suggests. This is done by looking at the reasons for the resignation of seafarers from 
Agl and Ag2 and their choices after resignation, drawing on the views of the 
managers and seafarers in the case studies. The discussion also explores the position 
of the Chinese seafarers in the context of the ‘socialist market economy’. In addition, 
Wu’s argument that ‘seafaring is still an attractive occupation in China’ (Wu et al, 
2007, p9) is considered as well.
Specifically, Sections 13.1 and 13.2 explore some of the reasons for the resignation of 
young officer seafarers with higher education in Agl and Ag2 and some middle-aged 
and elder officer seafarers in Ag2, respectively. Section 13.3 analyses seafarers’ 
perceptions about seafaring as a career to explain why seafarers resign in favour of 
land-based jobs.
13.1 The resignation o f young officer seafarers with higher education in A gl and Ag2 
The loss of young officer seafarers with higher education is a serious problem in Agl 
and Ag2.
For instance, in A gl, the loss rates were around 3% from 2004 to 2008. A majority 
are young seafarers, less than 35 years old, with higher education and working in Agl 
for less than ten years, according to the HRM Manager.
So why can these young seafarers give up their jobs in the SOCAs, which seems very 
difficult for some o f the elder seafarers, as we have seen in Chapter 11?
Firstly, it seems that job security for young officer seafarers with higher education is 
not as important as it is for the elder seafarers. A 29-years-old seafarer said:
Job security is important. But it is not the prime concern. Sometimes payment 
and career prospects are more important for us. I think I would like to accept a
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job with high payment and good career prospects but without good security, 
rather than the opposite.
The different attitudes between younger and elder seafarers towards job stability can 
be understood if  we compare the situation and background o f the young officer 
seafarers with that o f the elder seafarers. Unlike the middle aged and elder seafarers, 
most of the young seafarers do not have to support their parents who may still be 
earning. Few o f the young seafarers are married or have children. Furthermore, since 
the parents of the young seafarers have experienced changes during the economic 
reform as workers, their socialist ideology is not as strong as it is for the parents of the 
elder seafarer. Losing a stable job in the SOE or working for capitalists is not as 
unacceptable as it is for the parents of seafarers over 40 years old. Therefore, the 
importance of job stability for the young officer seafarers is not as significant as it is 
for the middle-aged and elder seafarers.
Secondly, concerning welfare, although it is important for the elder seafarers (as we 
have seen in Chapter 11), for the young officer seafarers, especially those with urban 
hukou, the social insurance and benefits of the SOCAs are not their prime concern. A 
3rd officer said:
Welfare is not the main concern because my pension and some medical services 
are a long way off for me. Good work opportunities and career prospects are 
more realistic issues.
A 3rd engineer said:
I have not accumulated as much welfare as the middle aged and elder seafarers. 
So if I leave the agency, I won’t lose a lot.
Over and above this, the third reason why young officer seafarers with higher 
education can give up their jobs in Agl and Ag2 is related to their good educational 
background, which allows them more choices in the labour market according to the 
interviewed seafarers. The President of the TU of Agl explained the situation in his 
agency:
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Many young seafarers with higher education believe they have good work 
prospects onshore. I have seen that many young seafarers, especially those from 
the cities, are confident in finding a good land-based job and thus leave the 
agency. It is very hard for me to do moral work with these seafarers. They 
represented a large proportion of the seafarers who resigned. It is a big loss for 
the company.
The Training manager of Ag2 said:
It is not difficult for some young graduates with higher education to find new 
land-based jobs now. In fact, some young graduates have joined Ag2 while they 
were actually waiting for other land-based job opportunities. As soon as they got 
these new land-based jobs, they quit Ag2 immediately.
Therefore, their relative lack of concern about job security and welfare and their 
interest in land-based jobs explain to some extent the serious loss of young officer 
seafarers with higher education from Agl and Ag2. In addition to this, the resignation 
of middle-aged and elder seafarers in Ag2 is not insignificant. This is quite different 
from the situation in A gl, in that although many middle-aged and elder seafarers 
work temporarily in the market while they are on leave, they do not quit. So why does 
the difference exist? The next section will look at this.
13.2 The resignation of middle-aged and elder officer seafarers in Ag2
The director and the HRM manager complained about the loss of middle-aged and
elder officer seafarers. The director of Ag2 said:
The loss of some distinguished senior officer seafarers is serious. Last year 
[2007], 50 senior officers resigned altogether.
However, instead o f becoming freelancers, many of them quit Ag2 for new, stable, 
land-based jobs. The Training manager of Ag2 said:
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Many senior officer seafarers resign for land-based jobs. 70% to 80% of them 
have already found stable jobs before they quit, which are mainly land-based 
and provided by the ship-owners. In fact, 70-80% of our senior officer seafarers 
who resigned are ‘stolen’ by our clients.
A chief engineer o f Ag2 said:
Many senior officer seafarers have resigned. In fact, they have found a better 
place, a stable job before they resigned. Now many of them have become the 
managers o f the shipping companies for which they once worked. They were all 
excellent seafarers once.
The Manning manager o f Ag2 explained why these seafarers are offered such 
opportunities by the ship-owners. He said:
They have worked onboard foreign ships since the first day they became 
seafarers. Over ten or twenty years, they get to know the management of the 
foreign shipping company very well. Because of their long working experiences, 
ship-owners also know some o f  these high-quality seafarers well. Many of our 
seafarers are o f very high quality and thereby greatly appreciated by the ship­
owners. When the ship-owners need to expand their business to take advantage 
of the good shipping market, these highly skilled seafarers are employed to do 
land-based managerial work and provided with very good salaries.
Therefore, many high-quality senior officer seafarers in Ag2 have resigned to take 
land-based jobs in shipping companies. However, considering the low resignation 
rates of middle-aged and elder seafarers in A gl, we may want to ask whether they are 
offered the same working opportunities that are offered to resigned seafarers in Ag2? 
And why is it so?
In fact, many excellent, high-quality senior officer seafarers in Agl do not have the 
land-based working opportunities that are offered to the seafarers of Ag2 by the ship­
owners. In A gl, the ship-owner whom most officer seafarers serve is the PSC. As 
seen in Chapter 7, the recruitment o f the managers in the PSC depends more on their
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social backgrounds than on quality or skills. Therefore, even though many excellent 
seafarers have worked for the PSC for more than 20 years, very few of them have 
been promoted to managerial positions on the basis of their performance alone. As a 
consequence, seafarers in Agl do not have the land-based managerial working 
opportunities that are offered to those in Ag2. This might suggest that the 
management in the Chinese SOEs is not as flexible or fair as that in the foreign 
shipping companies, reinforcing the point that the reform of the Chinese SOEs is still 
limited in some ways.
Therefore, a difference exists - seafarers in Agl do not resign, while many seafarers in 
Ag2 resign because they are offered stable, land-based jobs beforehand. This 
reinforces the point that freelance work, which cannot provide security, is not a 
popular choice among middle-aged and elder seafarers.
By discussing seafarers’ loss in Agl and Ag2, it is found in both of the agencies, 
many seafarers of different ages choose land-based jobs after resignation. Why did the 
seafarers give up seafaring for land-based jobs? To explain this further, the following 
section represents how the seafarers perceive being a seafarer.
13.3 Seafarers’ views about their career
Seafarers in Agl and Ag2 gave many negative comments about work at sea. Firstly, 
seafarers seem dissatisfied with their wages, which have lost their absolute advantage 
compared to current land-based salaries. When recalling the advantage of seafarers’ 
wages in the 1980s, a 2nd engineer said:
In 1988, an ordinary land-based worker, such as a 2nd rank worker in a factory, 
could earn 48.8 yuan monthly and an apprentice could earn 23 yuan. But ratings 
could earn 80 dollars [around 640 yuan] monthly. But today, many people doing 
land-based jobs earn more than us officer seafarers. The advantage of seafarers’ 
wages is diminishing.
The director of Ag2 explained:
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The absolute advantage of salaries at sea compared with land-based salaries has 
gone. Each year, a captain can earn around 30,000 dollars [the salary is 4,3000 
dollars, working for 6-8 months]. Based on his experience and qualifications, it 
would not be difficult for him to earn the same amount at a land-based job.
In addition, seafarers have lost many of the privileges that they enjoyed before the 
1990s. This has also made seafaring a less attractive career now than it was in the 
1980s and seafarers’ social status has been falling. The director of Ag2 said:
In the 1980s, very few people were able to go abroad because it was directly 
controlled by the government. Consequently, seafaring was an attractive career 
because seafarers could go around the world and visit different countries. In 
addition, without a market in China, the categories of the goods provided by the 
SOEs were very limited then. Many people had never even seen canned food or 
drinks. But seafarers had the opportunity to acquire these ‘modem’ goods. And 
many Chinese people had never seen dollars at that time. But seafarers could 
earn foreign money. Seafarers’ social status was therefore very high and many 
people wanted to become seafarers rather than working in an office, doing land- 
based managerial work.
But now, going abroad is very easy. A travel agency can get all the documents 
the individual needs. In addition, the goods in the Chinese market are sufficient. 
Foreign foods and restaurants can be found in most of China’s major cities. So 
seafarers’ privileges have gone and seafaring is not an attractive career at all.
Furthermore, seafaring can be a tough and dangerous job, according to seafarers. 
Seafarers complained about the heavy workload onboard ship. A second officer said:
Seafaring is a very hard job. Seafarers always feel very tired. We have no 
weekend or fixed time to rest. Although some international laws restrict working 
hours, it is not unusual for us to work continuously for several days and nights.
A captain said:
279
The work onboard ship is very stressful. When the ship reaches port, it is even 
more stressful. You have to deal with various inspections and the fast discharge 
and loading of cargo. Sometimes we have to work continuously for two or three 
days, without rest. If you are young, you can bear with that. When you get to 
your 50s, you start to feel that you are unable to tolerate the heavy workload.
A chief engineer said:
Our working environment is bad, especially the deafening noise. The job is dirty 
and hard. Sometimes we have to work in this environment continuously for 20 
hours. After this, even when you have some time to sleep, you cannot sleep well 
because the noise of the engine is still lingering in your head.
As mentioned in Chapter 9, since there is a shortage of officer seafarers in Ag2, their 
leave is rather short. The hard work at sea and insufficient holidays have resulted in ill 
health for many seafarers. A chief engineer said:
When working onboard ships, I am always very busy and stressed. This is 
mainly a result of my responsibilities at sea. I need to think and worry about 
many things, such as engine failure, the inspection of equipment when reaching 
ports and the supervision of other seafarers. When I go home, I cannot recover 
from the tiredness that results from the work onboard within two months. If I 
sail for seven or eight months, it will take at least three months for me to 
recover. In addition, when I take the heavy burden off my mind, I will be ill for 
a while. I have many diseases, such as adiposis hepatica, gallstones, 
cholecystitis, renal cyst, prolapse of the lumbar intervertebral disc, cervical 
spondylosis and migraine. Now I earn some money, but it eventually goes to the 
doctor. Very few seafarers live long. It is rare for seafarers to live to 80 years 
old. Many seafarers I knew died in their 60s.
Seafarers also complained about the bad food and the boring life onboard ship. A 
rating, when talking about the life at sea, said:
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At sea, we eat few greens or fresh vegetables. The food is not good. We eat 
limited kinds of food, like seafood, potatoes, onions, cabbage and chicken, for 
almost a year, some of which are frozen for long periods. In addition, we do not 
eat well because many of the cooks are not good at cooking. They are employed 
because they are the relatives o f the managers.
A 28-year-old 3rd engineer said:
When we work and live aboard ship, it feels like being stuck in a small cage, 
working endlessly. The life is very boring. There is a lack of entertainment and 
supporting facilities. For instance, it is very difficult for us to get access to the 
Internet because it is only used for captains. In addition, although there is a 
satellite phone, it is just too expensive for us. We only use it for the Traditional 
Spring Festival. Life onboard ship is very lonely and boring. I don’t think I will 
stay long at sea.
In particular, seafarers at different ages showed special concern about the impacts of a 
career at sea on keeping a family or developing a relationship. Some young seafarers 
aged around 30 and below felt that finding a girlfriend and getting married might be a 
problem for them. A 29-year-old 3rd engineer said:
Seafarers’ social status is currently low. We earn money through very hard 
work. Many people call us manual workers or equate us to migrant workers. In 
addition, we are often away from home for eight or ten months. Furthermore, we 
are not rich people and we cannot buy girls very expensive presents. Moreover, 
when we are onboard ship, it is virtually impossible to keep our minds active 
and catch up with the rapid changes in the society. So it is difficult for us to be 
smart and attractive: we are more like old peasants who know little about the 
modem world. Therefore, many girls and their families look down upon 
seafarers. Because of the nature of the job, some girls’ parents forbid their 
daughters to develop relationships with seafarers. It is not easy for a seafarer to 
marry a good girl now.
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Some middle-aged seafarers missed their families, especially their children. One 36- 
year-old rating said:
At the last day o f the seafaring, for many seafarers, it is not easy to keep a 
family or a close friend. Divorce is very common among seafarers because we 
spend little time with our families and because we are not those rich and 
powerful people but are doing hard and dirty jobs. We don’t have much time to 
get together with friends either... I miss my family a lot, especially since I had 
my daughter two years ago. She always called ‘daddy’ ‘daddy’ when she saw 
me and held me and kissed me. So I regret being a seafarer when I think about 
this. But I still have to keep my job, since I don’t know much about land-based 
work...When I am 50 and think about my work experiences, I will find that I 
have wasted 20 years at sea and I am no richer than ordinary people or happier 
than them. If I am lucky, I will still have my daughter and wife. If not, I will 
have nothing.
A 60-year-old seafarer felt sorry for his family. He said:
I spent my best years at sea. I owe my family a lot. Working onboard ship is 
hard. If I could find a land-based job and earn several thousand yuan monthly 
now, I would do so, because then I would be able to lead a normal life, spend 
time with my family and take care of them every day. And I would be far away 
from the risks at sea. It is very difficult for seafarers to have a complete family.
Therefore, seafarers perceived that theirs was not a pleasant job. They also suggested 
that they would not recommend others to become seafarers unless there was no other 
choice. A 1st engineer said:
I don’t recommend other people to become seafarers because I don’t want to 
hurt them, especially the people.. .The good opportunities are on land, not at sea. 
Especially considering ratings, who work just for money, their job involves little 
skill; they cannot accumulate good experiences.
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After being a seafarer for almost 30 years, I have met very few people who love 
this job. Most seafarers do it for money or because they got into it when they 
were young and knew nothing about the job. Now, very few people from urban 
cities want to become seafarers.
A 2nd officer said:
The happiest time for seafarers is when we finish trip and return home, getting 
together with our families. I would not suggest becoming a seafarer to my child 
or friend because we have to pay too much for this career.
When talking about seafarers’ views about seafaring, young seafarers’ lack of interest 
in sailing was mentioned repeatedly by the managers and seafarers. The President of 
A g l’s TU said:
Many young seafarers do not like seafaring. As far as I know, studying 
navigation or becoming a seafarer was not their first choice. Some of them 
became seafarers because they had no other choice: for instance, if they didn’t 
study navigation, they wouldn’t have the opportunity to undertake higher 
education; others were just centrally assigned to study navigation by the 
educational bureau during the National Higher Educational Examination. Also, 
some seafarers, especially peasant seafarers, lacked money, so they had to study 
navigation due to the low tuition fees.
In fact, the problem that young seafarers lack interest in seafaring is not limited to the 
two crewing agencies studied here. A career at sea seems to lack attraction for young 
seafarers in China in general, and this is more obvious in urban cities than rural areas, 
and in coastal developed cities rather than remote, inland cities. According to the 
SIRC survey of active Chinese seafarers, the vast majority of the students in maritime 
training and education were registered with rural hukou. Dalian Maritime University 
recruited 746 new students, among whom 70 percent originated in inland provinces. 
In the same year, neither Dalian Maritime University nor Shanghai Maritime 
University was able to recruit any students from Dalian or Shanghai (Shen and Zhao 
2001).
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Even among the students who are taking navigation courses in maritime universities, 
many of them do not intend to follow a long-term career in seafaring, according to 
preliminary researches. A survey (Xu and Hu 2005) among the fourth year students of 
four top maritime universities20 in China showed that a majority (53.1%) of the 
students did not want to become seafarers after they graduated, and would rather 
choose jobs onshore. Among the 46.9% of the students who did want to become 
seafarers after graduation, less than 20% indicated that they wished to take seafaring 
as a lifelong career. This finding is consistent with the conclusion of Huang (2005) 
that more than 50% of officer seafarers with bachelors’ degrees move to land-based 
jobs after five years at sea, and 70-85% of them do so after ten years of work at sea.
The discussion suggests that seafarers, especially young officer seafarers, are not 
satisfied with their work at sea, (see also Shen et al, 2005, p i 85). They therefore leave 
their SOCAs and move to land-based jobs when there are good opportunities to do so.
13.4 Summary
This chapter analyses the reasons for the resignation of young officer seafarers in Agl 
and Ag2 and the resignation of middle-aged and elder officer seafarers in Ag2. It is 
seen that the resignation of seafarers from state-owned shipping companies does not 
necessarily mean that they become freelancers. It explains from another perspective 
that the trend theory is not convincing.
It is seen that in both of these agencies, many o f those seafarers who resigned moved 
to land-based jobs. To explain this, this chapter analyses the views of the seafarers 
about seafaring as a career. It is suggested that the popularity of the seafaring career is 
diminishing. Seafarers suffer from problems such as low social status, poor working 
conditions and wages that show no advantage compared with the wages of some land- 
based workers. Therefore, for a group of seafarers, when they have good land-based 
opportunities, they leave their crewing agencies and leave the seafarer labour market 
for land-based jobs, rather than joining the seafaring labour market in a more
20 The top four universities are Dalian Maritime University, Shanghai Maritime University, Wuhan 
University of Technology and Jimei Maritime University.
284
liberalized way as freelancers. This is similar to what has happened in the seafaring 
labour market in the advanced European countries where the maritime labour force 
decreased significantly as a result of the developed economy. This study does not 
indicate that China has experienced or will experience a huge decrease in the 
seafaring labour force. However, the analysis of the case studies indicates that due to 
economic reform and the emergence of land-based opportunities in China, the 
popularity of seafaring has declined. The resigned seafarers in the case studies are 
more likely to choose land-based jobs, rather than to become freelance seafarers to 
work in global markets.
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CONCLUSION
From 1992 to 2006, the number of Chinese crewing agencies that were allowed to 
man foreign ships increased from less than ten to fifty-three and the number of 
Chinese seafarers working in the global labour market increased by 400 per cent. 
Despite this, the annual export of Chinese seafarers has not increased much since 
2000, but has remained at around 40,000 each year (Bao and Liu, 2008, p380). By 
2003, Chinese seafarers who worked in the international labour market represented 
only 6.1 per cent of the seafaring labour in the global labour marke (Ellis and 
Sampson, 2008, p i4). China’s seafarer supply represented around one fourth / fifth of 
the seafarer export of the Philippines in the 2000s (Bao and Liu, 2008, p380; 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 2007 a and b). China’s seafarer 
export has been lower than the expectations of the international shipping industry and 
some academics (BIMCO/ISF, 1995; Li and Wonham, 1999; Sharma, 2002; Wu, et al 
2007).
This thesis seeks to cast some light on the limited rate of increase of Chinese seafarer 
labour export. It is based on fieldwork conducted in 2008 in two state-owned crewing 
agencies that are two of the main operators of the foreign manning business in China. 
It examines the employment and labour supply strategies of the crewing agencies and 
the consequences for seafarers. Four points have been concluded, concerning 
respectively, 1) The lack of market orientation of the SOCAs in the case studies; 2) 
The lack of liberalization in China’s seafarer labour market; 3) Impediments to the 
free movement of labour; 4) Little financial incentive to work in the global labour 
market because the differences in wages here and those in the national labour market 
for Chinese seafarers are small.
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1. The lack of market orientation of the SOCAs in the case studies 
To different extents, both o f  the agencies in the case studies lacked market orientation 
due to the intervention o f  institutions at higher levels. This resulted in a shortfall o f  
seafarers and consequently constrained the development o f seafarer export. 
Therefore, the Chinese SOCAs may not be as market-oriented as people have 
assumed, which to some extent explains the limited rate o f increase o f  China’s 
seafarer export.
One of the aims of China’s economic reform is to decentralize the power of the 
government and grant enterprises full decision-making authority to let them become 
market-oriented economic entities. Given the thirty years of economic marketisation 
and privatisation in China, some researchers (Li and Wonham, 1999; Sharma, 2002; 
Wu, et al, 2007) assume that Chinese ship crewing agencies have reformed into 
market-oriented enterprises, but without strong evidence. This study reaches a 
different conclusion. It raises the questions of the government and the higher 
institutions’ interventions in the SOCAs and the extent of their reforms in affecting 
the seafarers and the seafarer labour export. The crewing agencies in the case studies 
have reformed to different degrees and represent the largest examples of two types of 
Chinese crewing agencies dominating the seafarer labour export. The study of these 
agencies allows us to see the operations of the most important players in the Chinese 
seafaring labour market.
With regard to A gl, although it was registered as an independent enterprise, it 
received various forms of support and constraints from the PSC and governmental 
departments. Being dependent on this support, Agl was not entirely responsible for 
the economic success of its business performance, which meant that managers did not 
need to worry unduly about their own job security and as a result were not especially 
concerned with reforming the organization to improve its market efficiency. This in 
turn meant that it lacked something of a market orientation in relation to its HRM 
policies. This resulted in a shortfall of the seafaring labour that is essential for the 
business of a ship crewing agency.
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Specifically, as seen in Chapter 5, the management of seafarers’ manning, training 
and promotion retained the methods that were applied in the 1980s. As a result, a 
group of seafarers had few working opportunities and the seafaring labour resource 
could not be used flexibly in ways that responded to the company’s practical needs; 
furthermore, training was not managed in such a way as to effectively improve the 
quality of seafarers; and the methods employed did not enable seafarers to achieve 
timely promotion.
Agl was also unable to offer its officer seafarers market-oriented wages. This was for 
several reasons, including head office control over the investment of material support, 
the large number of managers due to the failure of the reform to streamline the 
institutions, the huge cost of seafarers’ welfare and the high wages and non-wage 
benefits of the registered ratings, which reflected the limitation of the reform of A gl’s 
management, as analysed in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 also revealed that although the 
payment system was reformed for the purpose of motivating seafarers, the reform 
actually resulted in the unfair management of seafarers’ wages.
As discussed in Chapter 7, due to the lack of reform concerning the management 
system of the managers, they treated seafarers badly.
Because of these problems, while remaining on A g l’s book, some seafarers worked 
temporarily for domestic shipping companies when they were on leave. As the 
shortage in seafarer supply emerged because seafarers were not prepared to answer 
calls from Agl when they were working temporarily elsewhere, Agl was required by 
the PSC to stop much of its foreign manning business: consequently, seafarer export 
dropped sharply.
It seems at first, when looking at Agl, that the intervention that impeded the 
management reform and the increase of seafarer export resulted from A g l’s nature as 
a subsidiary of the PSC. When we examined the case of Ag2, it was seen that even if 
a SOCA was independent of a shipping company, its operation could still be 
constrained by the intervention of the related institutions at higher levels.
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As seen in Chapter 8, Ag2 reformed its management strategies to develop its business. 
However, due to the intervention of the head office in the distribution of Ag2’s profit, 
it was unable to pay seafarers competitive market rates and some officer seafarers 
resigned, as analysed in Chapter 9. Although Ag2 tried to reduce the resignation rates 
by implementing new strategies, the managers implemented these strategies weakly, 
as seen in chapter 10. Consequently, Ag2 was faced with the shortage of seafarers. 
This constrained the increase of the seafarer labour export in the 2000s.
Therefore, despite the economic reform, Agl and Ag2 lacked market-orientation to 
different degrees due to the intervention of the institutions at higher levels. 
Consequently, the agencies were confronted with a lack of officer seafarers and their 
foreign manning businesses were constrained. Agl and Ag2 have been two of the 
most influential foreign manning agencies in China. The study of these agencies 
demonstrates that crewing agencies in China may not be as reformed or market- 
oriented as people have assumed (Li and Wonham, 1999; Sharma, 2002; Wu, et al 
2007). This also partly explains the limited rate of increase of China’s seafarer export.
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2. The lack o f liberalization in China’s seafarer labour market
The reform o f  the Human Resource sector o f the shipping industry was slower than 
the other sectors o f  the shipping industry and other Chinese industries due to the 
intervention o f  the government. The limited liberalization o f the Chinese seafarer 
labour market contributed to the slower increase o f China’s seafarer export than the 
predictions made in the world shipping industry and by some academics.
The reform of China’ shipping industry has been dramatic in many ways, especially in 
terms of the improvement of shipping capacity and the construction of shipping 
infrastructure. However, the reform of the seafarer labour market seems relatively 
slow, as seen in Chapter 3. So far, foreign invested crewing agencies have not been 
allowed to establish themselves in China. Although privately owned crewing agencies 
were allowed to register in 2004, most of them have been unable to register to man 
foreign ships because o f the high requirements on registry. In contrast, it has been the 
fewer than 60 state-owned crewing agencies that control the vast majority of the 
seafaring labour resources, monopolize foreign manning qualifications and dominate 
the foreign manning business due to the support of the government at different levels. 
Consequently, most o f the private-owned crewing agencies have been unable to 
compete with the state-owned crewing agencies in seafarer export and remain 
marginalized from the main system.
Therefore, despite the economic reform, economic liberalization has done little more 
than eroded the edges of the static seafarer export market in China. What 
commentators have focused on is associated with the peripheral changes (such as the 
emergence of hundreds of privately owned crewing agencies and the new working 
opportunities onboard foreign ships for Chinese seafarers). In fact, due to the 
government protection of China’s shipping industry, state-owned crewing agencies 
continue to dominate the foreign manning business and the seafaring labour market 
has not reformed into a liberalized market. This restriction on the private-owned 
crewing agency and foreign invested crewing agency’s ability to man foreign ships is 
a significant factor limiting the export of Chinese seafarer labour.
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3. Impediments to the free movement of labour
From the evidence presented in my case studies, it is hard to characterize Chinese 
seafarers as free wage labour. This study demonstrates that there are a host o f social, 
economic and institutional constraints on the ability o f  seafarers to leave SOEs to 
become freelancers. Therefore the ‘trend theory’, which argues that Chinese 
seafarers are increasingly becoming freelancers and as such will constitute a major 
change in the composition o f  global seafarer market is not supported without 
considerable qualification by my findings.
With the economic reform in China, especially the reform of the employment system, 
Chinese seafarers can choose their employers. Some authors, in particular Wu, argue 
that there is a trend that Chinese seafarers are leaving their SOEs to become 
freelancers working in the global labour market and that China’s seafarer export will 
increase substantially due to the attractiveness of working onboard foreign ships (Wu 
2003, 2004a, b, 2005; Wu et al., 2007).
An important dimension o f the notion o f free wage labour is being free to choose and 
leave the employer. Chapter 12 demonstrates how Agl and Ag2 prevented the 
movement of seafarers towards the labour market and how these strategies 
strengthened management control over seafarers. Although the measures cannot 
completely stop seafarers from leaving, they nevertheless make it difficult for 
seafarers to move freely; and it is hard to characterize Chinese seafarers as free wage 
labour.
In addition, when seafarers considered leaving the SOEs, they were concerned with 
the loss of the benefits that were offered by SOEs, such as job security, good welfare, 
certificate application services, wage security and safe working conditions at sea, as 
seen in Chapter 11.
Therefore, giving up the benefits offered by the SOEs and working as independent 
freelancers is not an easy choice for seafarers. When discussing quitting the SOEs and
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becoming freelancers, the seafarers of different ranks, ages, backgrounds and origins 
had different considerations, which were not limited to the consequences of the 
management of their agencies, but associated with a wide set of issues, such as the 
positions of the seafarers in the labour market, their historical experiences and their 
personal expectations.
For instance, the seafarers with hukou registered in the countryside were peasant 
seafarers. They received fewer benefits than the agencies’ registered seafarers with 
urban hukou. When Agl and Ag2 offered the peasant seafarers the opportunity to 
become registered seafarers, they showed great interest and thus became strongly 
dependent on their agencies. In addition, unlike the officer seafarers, ratings are low- 
skilled workers and there are redundant freelance ratings in the national and 
international seafarer labour market. Therefore, when Agl and Ag2 offered the 
registered ratings stable jobs and welfare provisions, ratings felt quite satisfied and 
few of them resigned from their SOCAs. Furthermore, unless they were offered better 
working opportunities, middle-aged and elder seafarers depended on the SOCAs for 
good welfare provision and job security and few of them quit. Last but not least, few 
seafarers who had no higher education, including young seafarers, resigned from the 
agencies. They provided a very stable labour resource for the agencies and hence were 
well welcomed by their employers.
A further consideration is that many of those seafarers who did resign did not become 
freelance seafarers but rather shifted to land-based jobs due to dissatisfaction with 
seafaring as a career, as seen in Chapter 13. Trend theory suggests that seafarers who 
resign from state-owned shipping companies become freelancers. However, the 
present analysis suggests that the resignation of the seafarers does not necessarily 
mean that they will become freelancers. The trend theory therefore lacks rigor in 
arguing Chinese seafarers are becoming freelancers working in the global labour 
market and that China’s seafarer export will increase substantially.
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4. Little financial advantage in the global labour market over those in the national 
labour market
There is no big difference between the wages o f  Chinese seafarers working in the 
global labour market and those in the national labour market. In some cases, the 
wages o f  the seafarers in the former group are lower than those in the latter group. 
This also negatively influences the supply o f  Chinese seafarers to the global labour 
market.
The wages o f the Chinese seafarers dispatched onboard foreign ships are no longer 
necessarily higher than those o f seafarers working in the domestic seafarer labour 
market, at least in the agencies studied here, as seen in sections 6.1 and 9.1. Because 
of this, when freelance seafarers were employed by Ag2, they were paid based on the 
market rate, which was higher than the wages of the agency’s registered seafarers, as 
seen in section 8.2.3.
The higher wages in the domestic labour market and their negative impact on seafarer 
export have been reported by other researchers. For instance, Shen et al (2003) argue 
that because the wages o f the Chinese seafarers employed in the global labour market 
are not advantageous when compared with the wages in the national seafarer labour 
market, the seafarers in the SOCAs lack enthusiasm to work in foreign shipping 
companies. Some o f the interview data collected by Wu concur with this:
The survey suggests that salaries onboard the foreign fleets are not necessarily 
higher than onboard national fleets, even if the foreign company paid well (Wu, 
2004b, p77).
It seems that the reason for this is not that the Chinese domestic shipping companies 
can offer wages that are equal to or higher than the rates in the global labour market, 
but that Chinese agencies allow foreign shipping companies to pay lower rates than 
the international benchmark wages to the Chinese seafarers they employ. 
Consequently, the wages received by Chinese seafarers working in the global labour
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market are lower than foreign seafarers’ wages (Zhao 2000b; Yin, et al, 2008 p i99). 
For instance, Zhao and Amante found that:
Data collected through our respective studies confirm that the total pay received 
by Chinese seafarers employed on ocean-going ships in big state shipping 
companies, on average, was 35.8 percent lower than that received by the 
Filipino seafarers (2003, p84).
In addition, it is not unusual for Chinese crewing agencies to deduct part of seafarers’ 
wages, which are already lower than the international benchmark rates (Li, et al, 
2008, p i25; Yin, et al, 2008, p204; Huang and Ning, 2008, p250).
One significant reason why the foreign companies and Chinese agencies can keep 
seafarers’ wages low is related to the lack of protection of Chinese seafarers. So far, 
the ACFTU has not signed any agreement with any international trade organizations. 
Chinese seafarers lack collective bargaining power to improve their employment 
conditions, especially considering the weakness of the TU in representing seafarers, 
as seen in sections 7.2 and 10.3.
In contrast to the payment of low wages by the foreign shipping companies and the 
Chinese crewing agencies, the domestic shipping companies have improved seafarers’ 
wages rapidly since the 2000s due to their huge demand for seafaring labour as a 
result of their fast development, as analysed in section 8.4.
Consequently, compared with the wages of seafarers working in the national labour 
market, the wages of Chinese seafarers employed by foreign companies have no 
significant advantage, which impedes seafarer export.
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The thesis suggests that one of the reasons for overestimates of the likely progress of 
China’s seafarer export is related to the limited extent of the reform o f  the Chinese 
seafaring labour market, which is reflected by the following aspects: the impediments 
to the free movement of labour, the lack of market competition for foreign manning 
business and weak market-orientation of SOCAs, and the low payment o f Chinese 
seafarers in the global seafaring labour market. What changes would be necessary to 
increase the supply?
As analysed previously, the impediments to the free movement of seafarers include 
seafarers’ dependence on their agencies and state control of the SOCAs. The free 
movement of seafarers would be helped by reforms to the Chinese social security 
system, reduction of the role of the SOEs in welfare provision and publication and 
implementation of market regulations.
At present, the diminishing popularity of seafaring as a career and the consequent loss 
of seafarers from the seafarer labour market weakens the free movement o f  seafaring 
labour. To improve the attractiveness of the seafaring career, new reforms may also 
be important concerning the establishment of a social insurance system for seafarers 
(including old-age insurance, medical insurance, working injury insurance and 
unemployment insurance), the reduction of seafarers’ payroll tax, connecting 
seafarers’ wages to the international benchmark rates and simplifying the procedure 
of application for maritime certificates.
Regarding the SOCAs that are allowed to man foreign ships, the extent o f  their reform 
is still limited. Walder (1986), in the mid-1980s, argued that communist neo­
traditionalism -  workers’ political dependence on the companies and worker’s 
personal dependence on the managers -  still remained and fettered the development of 
a free market. Even in the mid 2000s, the same sorts of practices can be seen at work 
in the shipping industry (more details can be seen in Chapters 5, 7, 10 and 12).
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The lack of market competition and the weak market orientation of the SOCAs are 
related to the government’s protection of the Chinese shipping industry. Although a 
new policy was published in 2009 (one year after the fieldwork) to enable POCAs to 
register as foreign manning businesses, there is little sign of this coming about. 
Consequently, the POCAs have been unable to cooperate with foreign shipping 
companies directly.
Therefore, to improve the market competition for foreign manning business and the 
market orientation of the Chinese state-owned crewing agencies, it may be important 
for the state to relax its control over the Chinese seafarer labour market. However, 
whether this is a good thing from the standpoint of the Chinese economy is another 
question.
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APPENDICES
A p p e n d ix  A : O u t l i n e  o f  S e a f a r e r s  I n te r v ie w s
1. Seafarers’ background
- Age
Your place o f  b irth : Rural or urban area
Current h u ko u
Single or m a rrie d
How many ch ild re n  do you have?
Education le v e l 
Sailing years
When did y o u  ge t this job?
What is your p o s t?
2. Recruitment and Contract
Would you b rie fly  tell me your recruitment process and why you chose this 
agency?
How did this m ethod of recruitment affect you?
What is your contract type?
Compared w ith  seafarers with other types of contract in your company, do 
you feel that y o u  are treated differently?
Do you s ig n  sailing contracts with particular ship-owners when working 
aboard ship?
Are you w o rrie d  about losing your job in this company?
Do you intend to  leave this agency in the near future? What do you think of 
becoming a freelancer?
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3. Manning and Promotion
Would you tell me the types of ship you served on during the last five years 
and which type of ship do you most like to serve on?
Are you worried about your job opportunities?
How do you evaluate the manning management in this agency?
Please tell me the posts that you were promoted to in this agency and in 
which years.
How do you assess the promotion opportunities in this agency?
Have you ever thought about being promoted to a managerial position?
4. Training
Have you attended any training courses in the last twelve months?
If yes, how long were these courses?
Which courses did you attend?
How useful were the land-based and ocean training that you experienced?
5. Material support and job satisfaction
Please tell me the composition of your monthly income.
Are you satisfied with your income when you are on leave and are working 
onboard ships? And why?
Is it easy for you to get alternative income when you are on leave?
Are you satisfied with the social insurances that the company set up for you? 
Do you think this is a good job?
How do you describe your company? What is the difference between your 
company and other companies in the market?
How do you feeling about working as a seafarer?
Would you recommend a seafaring career to others?
6. Relations with managers
In general, how would you describe the relationship between managers and 
seafarers?
How do you get along with the managers?
How do you assess the quality/ skills of the managers?
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7. Trade unions
Are you a TU member? If not, why? Do you want to join the trade union?
If you had a grievance at work, would you take it to the trade union? If not, 
who would you go to in order to try and do something about it?
What is your view on the trade union in the company?
What should trade union be like?
Has any change occurred in the role of the trade union?
What do you think about the union?
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Appendix B: Outline of Managers Interviews in Agl
1. Vice director of A g l’s head office
Please evaluate the reform of the management of seafaring labour in your 
company and the operation of the subsidiary crewing agencies.
How do you explain the relationship between the company and branch 
shipping companies? To what extent can the company influence the branch’s 
operation?
What do you think about the business of seafarer export in your company? 
To what extent do you think it is important?
What do you think o f the prospect of the foreign manning business and what 
are the strategies to improve labour export?
What do you think o f the shortfall of seafarers and how to deal with it?
Why are the wages o f the seafarers in your company lower than the rates in 
the national shipping market?
Why does the company provide seafarers with social insurance of the highest 
standards and with many other non-wage benefits, which negatively 
influenced seafarers’ wages?
When was the payroll tax implemented and what do you think of it?
Why does the company recruit peasant seafarers and what is the cooperation 
mechanism between the company and the local labour bureau?
What are the main problems with the management of seafarers and with the 
development o f the foreign manning business now?
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2 . D ir e c to r  o f  A g l ’s  p a r e n t  s h ip p in g  c o m p a n y
Please explain the relationship between the company and the head office. 
What are the main differences between the company and private shipping 
companies in the domestic shipping market?
How do you evaluate the reform of the management of seafaring labour in 
your company?
How would you describe the relationship between the company and the 
subsidiary crewing agency?
What do you think about the business of seafarer export in your company? 
To what extent do you think it is important?
What do you think of the prospects of the foreign manning business in your 
company and what are the strategies to improve labour export?
What do you think of the shortfall of seafarers in your company and how to 
deal with it?
Please explain why there are surplus seafarers on the books.
Do you have any plan to improve the quality and quantity of seafarers? If so, 
please specify.
Please explain the management of managers in your company, particularly 
regarding job security, promotion, recruitment, incentives, disciplines, 
training, wages, etc.
What are the main problems with the management of seafarers and with the 
development o f the foreign manning business currently?
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3 . D ir e c to r  o f  A g l
Please briefly describe the agency’s history, including the sources of 
seafarers and your main clients.
Please describe the relationship between the agency and the parent shipping 
company and government at local, provincial and national levels and how the 
relationships have influenced the foreign manning business.
Please describe and evaluate the reform of the management of seafaring 
labour since the 1990s in your company.
What are the main differences between the agency and other agencies in the 
market?
Please introduce the development of the foreign manning business in your 
agency since 2005.
Please show me your agency’s organizational chart.
Why are there surplus seafarers according to the books?
What do you think o f the shortfall o f seafarers in your company and how to 
deal with it?
Why do you employ peasant seafarers and what is the cooperation 
mechanism between the company and the local labour bureaus?
Please explain the management of the managers in your company, 
particularly regarding job security, promotion, recruitment, incentives, 
disciplines, training, wages, etc.
Please evaluate the role of the Trade Union in your agency.
What are the main problems currently faced by the agency?
What do you think o f the prospect of the foreign manning business in your 
agency?
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4 . D ir e c to r  ( o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  H u m a n  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t
What does your job entail?
Please introduce the changes to the recruitment policies for seafarers since 
the 1990s in your company.
Please explain briefly the recruitment and management of peasant seafarers. 
Please analyse the seafarer supplying capability of your agency in terms of 
the practical demand. How do you manage the ‘surplus’ seafarers?
Please explain the management of seafarers’ contracts in your company.
How do you manage seafarers with different types of contracts?
What are the impacts on the agency of the implementation of the New 
Labour Contract Law 2008?
What do you think about the shortfall of seafarers in the agency and how 
does the company deal with it?
What do you think about the relationship between managers and seafarers? 
Please introduce the management of seafarers’ payment, social insurance and 
other non-wage benefits when they are sailing and are on leave, respectively. 
How do you evaluate the level of wages in your company compared to the 
rates in the domestic shipping market? What are the reasons for this?
What are the main differences between the HR management of this agency 
and the management in other agencies in the market?
What do you think o f the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems in your work?
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5. D ir e c to r  ( o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  M a n n in g  D e p a r tm e n t
Please introduce your main duty.
Please explain the general strategy of the manning management in the agency 
and the changes in the past 5 years.
Please introduce the manning procedure in your company and how the 
manning decisions are made. Is there any particular regulation to guide the 
managers’ selection o f seafarers?
Does your agency prevent seafarers from sailing when they are on leave? 
How and why?
How is seafarers’ promotion managed in your company and what are the 
main factors that can influence seafarers’ promotion?
How many seafarers can pass the maritime examinations for promotion each 
year and how many o f them can be promoted by the agency?
How do you help seafarers to get promoted in a reasonable period of time? 
Regarding the management of manning and promotion in this agency, what 
are the main differences between the management in this agency and the 
management in other agencies in the market?
What do you think of the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems in your work?
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6. D ir e c to r  ( o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  T r a in in g  D e p a r tm e n t
What does your job mainly entail?
Please introduce some basic information about the land-based training 
program in your agency.
How is the ocean training managed?
What are the main differences between the training management in this 
agency and the management in other agencies in the market?
Where does the training funding come from in your company?
How do you motivate seafarers to attend training programs?
How do you control the quality of the training delivered to seafarers?
How do you evaluate the effectiveness of training?
How do you evaluate the general quality of the seafarers in your agency 
compared to other agencies?
How can the training o f seafarers be improved, in your opinion?
What do you think of the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems?
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7. Basic information about the managers
Where were you bom? Was this an urban or rural area?
What is your current hukou, urban or rural?
How old are you?
Please tell me your education level. What qualifications do you have?
Do you have sailing experience? If so, how many years? Does such 
experience benefit your current work?
When did you start work?
Is this your first job? If not, how many firms have you worked for?
How long have you been engaged in management in this company? And 
what is the type o f your contract?
Please describe briefly how you found the job opportunity in this company 
and how you were recmited?
Have you taken any material training in the past two years? If yes, what was 
it?
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Appendix C: Outline of Managers Interviews in Ag2
1. Director
Please briefly describe the agency’s history, including the sources of 
seafarers and your main clients.
Please describe the relationship between the agency and the head office and 
how the relationship has influenced the foreign manning business.
What are the main differences between the agency and other agencies in the 
market?
Please introduce the development of the foreign manning business in your 
agency since 2005.
Please show me your agency’s organizational chart.
What do you think of the shortfall of seafarers in your company and how are 
you going to deal with it?
Why do you employ peasant seafarers and what is the cooperation 
mechanism between the company and the local labour bureaus?
Please explain the management of the managers in your company, 
particularly regarding job security, promotion, recruitment, incentives, 
disciplines, training, wages, etc.
Please evaluate the role o f the Trade Union in your agency.
What are the main problems currently faced by the agency?
What do you think of the prospect of the foreign manning business in your 
agency?
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2 . D ir e c to r  ( o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  H u m a n  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  /
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  B u s in e s s  D e v e lo p m e n t
What does your job entail?
Please introduce the changes to the recruitment policies for seafarers since 
the 1990s in your company.
Please explain briefly the recruitment and management of peasant seafarers. 
Please analyse the seafarer supplying capability of your agency in terms of 
the practical demand.
What do you think about the shortfall of seafarers in the agency and how 
does the company deal with it?
Please explain the management of seafarers’ contracts in your company.
How do you manage seafarers with different types of contracts?
What are the impacts on the agency of the implementation of the New 
Labour Contract Law 2008?
What do you think about the relationship between managers and seafarers? 
Please introduce the management of seafarers’ payment, social insurance and 
other non-wage benefits when they are sailing and are on leave, respectively. 
How do you evaluate the level of wages in your company compared to the 
rates in the domestic shipping market? What are the reasons for this?
What are the main differences between the HR management of this agency 
and the management in other agencies in the market?
What do you think of the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems in your work?
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3 . D ir e c t o r  ( o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  M a n n in g  D e p a r tm e n t
Please introduce your main duty.
Please explain the general strategy of the manning management in the agency 
and the changes since 2000?
Please introduce the manning procedure in your company and how the 
manning decisions are made.
Does your agency prevent seafarers from sailing when they are on leave? 
How and why?
How is seafarers’ promotion managed in your company and what are the 
main changes in the recent ten years?
How many seafarers can pass the maritime examinations for promotion each 
year and how many o f them can be promoted by the agency?
Regarding the management of manning and promotion in this agency, what 
are the main differences between the management in this agency and the 
management in other agencies in the market?
What do you think of the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems in your work?
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4 . D ir e c to r  (o r  s e n io r  s ta f f )  o f  T r a in in g  D e p a r tm e n t
What does your job mainly entail?
Please introduce some basic information about the land-based training 
program in your agency.
How is the ocean training managed?
What are the main differences between the training management in this 
agency and the management in other agencies in the market?
Where does the training funding come from in your company?
How do you motivate seafarers to attend training programs?
How do you control the quality of the training delivered to seafarers?
How do you evaluate the effectiveness of training?
How do you evaluate the general quality of the seafarers in your agency 
compared to other agencies?
How can the training of seafarers be improved, in your opinion?
What do you think of the Trade Union?
What has caused you the most problems?
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5. Basic information about the managers
Where were you bom? Was this an urban or rural area?
What is your current hukou, urban or rural?
How old are you?
Please tell me your education level. What qualifications do you have?
Do you have sailing experience? If so, how many years? Does such 
experience benefit your current work?
When did you start work?
Is this your first job? If not, how many firms have you worked for?
How long have you been engaged in management in this company? And 
what is the type of your contract?
Please describe briefly how you found the job opportunity in this company 
and how you were recruited?
Have you taken any material training in the past two years? If yes, what was 
it?
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A p p e n d ix  D : O u t lin e  o f  I n te r v ie w s  w ith  th e  C h a ir s  o f  T r a d e  U n io n s  in  A g l  a n d
A g 2
Please introduce the organizational structure of the trade union.
How were the union officials elected/appointed?
What other jobs do you do in the company?
What is the density of the Trade Union?
Where do you get funding?
Is there a collective contract system in the company?
Please assess the average wage levels of seafarers in this agency compared 
with the market rates.
Please introduce the different types of labour contract in the company and the 
percentages of the seafarers under each type of contract.
What do you think of the shortfall of seafarers?
Have unions changed (form, focus, approach) between 1990s and now?
Please introduce your daily work.
What activities did the trade union develop in last 12 months?
How do you know the workers’ grievances?
What are the key problems concerning establishing better relations with 
workers?
How often do you meet with the managers and how does the trade union 
bargain with the management?
What are the key problems concerning establishing better relations with 
government, enterprises and the Party?
Do you have opportunities to participate in making decisions with respect to 
the workers’ interests?
Why does the union not allow some peasant workers to join the trade union? 
What do you think about the union?
How could you reform this union?
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